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Abstract 
At present there is no simple, yet scientifically robust method for calculating 
insurance loss estimates due to a fire. Therefore building owners and insurers can not 
make suitably informed decisions when selecting fire protection measures or setting 
premiums as they have no way of defining the true risk they face. As a consequence 
this research aims to investigate a number of techniques in an effort to define one as 
appropriate for further research. 
 
Three different methods were explored and consist of risk based analysis, 
deterministic hand calculations and Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD). Extensive 
literature reviews were conducted in each area and the final models were based on the 
outcomes of this research. Rack storage warehouses were chosen for analysis as they 
are currently topical within the fire engineering community and are a particular 
concern for insurers. 
 
The risk based analysis employed statistical techniques including event tree analysis 
and monte carlo simulation to calculate loss distributions and sensitivity analyses. The 
hand calculation method was based on equations presented in the literature and 
incorporated the use of a zone model (BRANZFire) to calculate deterministic loss 
estimates. The CFD model used was Fire Dynamics Simulator and full scale 
warehouse fires were modelled using this programme.  
 
It was concluded that Fire Dynamics Simulator is an inappropriate tool as the 
capability for providing loss estimates in a timely manner is currently beyond the 
model’s capabilities. Of the two remaining methods the statistical risk based model 
was selected as the most appropriate for further investigation. The primary reasons for 
this decision were the ability to calculate loss distributions and conduct sensitivity 
analyses, as well as its versatility and user friendliness. Improved statistical data was 
defined as imperative for future development of the model. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1  Preamble 
This research had been performed for Marsh Ltd as part of a Technology for Industry 
Fellowship (TIF) funded by the New Zealand Foundation for Research Science and 
Technology (FRST). Marsh Ltd is a company that provides insurance broking and risk 
management services to a wide range of companies and industries. This work was 
performed for their risk management group with an aim to better understand the risks 
to property associated with fire. The research was supervised at the company by Neil 
Gravestock.  
1.2  Background 
As the title states this research is focussed on making realistic loss estimates for 
warehouse fire. However we first need to define what is mean be a “loss estimate” as 
it may mean different things to different people. Within the insurance industry there 
are two commonly used types of loss estimate; 
1. Normal Loss Expectancy (NLE). 
2. Maximum Foreseeable Loss (MFL). 
 
where loss is defined as the anticipated dollar cost of an event, both direct and 
indirect. Therefore an NLE is the most likely loss that will occur for a given event; it 
assumes that all systems function as intended and is therefore a realistic/optimistic 
view of the potential loss. In contrast an MFL is a worst case event where it is 
assumed that anything that can go wrong will go wrong. In the case of fire an NLE 
would assume that features such as detection and suppression systems function as 
designed therefore limiting the loss while an MFL would assume that they do not 
work and that often the entire building is lost. Quite clearly an MFL is not hard to 
estimate for the direct loss attributed to a fire, however an NLE is more complicated 
and considers the interaction of a number of systems. As a result this research is 
focussed on providing better systems to make estimates of the NLE due to fire. 
 
It should be noted that these loss estimates are a quantification of the likely 
consequences due to a fire, yet another important facet is the likelihood that they may 
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occur. When considering likelihood and consequences together one is actually 
allowing for the risk associated with the event. This risk is an important feature to 
property owners as they must decide on an acceptable level of risk exposure and 
protect themselves accordingly. Conversely while an insurer needs to have an 
understanding of the risk they are more concerned with the consequences, as to set 
capacity they take the stance that the risk event will occur. Therefore this research will 
be useful to both property owners and insurers as both the risks and consequences 
associated with warehouse fire will be better defined. 
 
Current methods within the insurance industry do provide for making loss estimates 
however they are generally not highly scientific. These methods are based on 
historical analysis, “rules of thumb” and expert opinion and, while better than nothing, 
it is obvious that improvements can be made by introducing quantitative risk 
assessment methods to the process. This is because the current methods will generally 
err on the side of caution and may be overly pessimistic. One of the features of an 
NLE is that it is realistic and it is believed that quantitative methods can be developed 
to improve on what is currently a “best guess” form of loss estimation. But until 
further progress is made, building owners, insurance companies, and other concerned 
parties are currently without a method to make precise loss estimates for fire. 
Therefore building owners can not make informed decisions when deciding on an 
appropriate level of fire protection for their building and insurance companies do not 
know whether the premiums they currently set provide sufficient cover for their risk 
exposure. This research aims to provide a solution to this problem. 
 
1.3  Research Objectives 
Given that no precise method currently exists for fire loss estimation this research 
aims to investigate a number of different ways for predicting fire loss. Further to this 
aim is that the methods are capable of assessing the impact of different protection 
measures. This capability is considered imperative for the models to be of any use. By 
assessing the relative loss values when incorporating different protection strategies the 
optimum combination of protection measures can be identified. The building owner 
can then make an informed assessment of the risk and designate their protection and 
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insurance levels accordingly. Conversely an insurance company can make stipulations 
about the level of protection they require when assigning premiums, with reductions 
allowed when building owners take steps to protect their property. Regardless of how 
the tool is used valuable information can be obtained and the entire decision making 
process improved as a result. 
 
It was decided to investigate a number of different options so that the one with the 
most potential could be identified. This prevents an unnecessary investment of 
resources into a method that may not be appropriate and serves to create a number of 
avenues for future research. The different fields in which to pursue a methodology 
were chosen as follows; 
 
1 Statistical Analysis 
2 Deterministic Analysis  
3 Computational Fluid Dynamics  
 
These fields were chosen as they represent three of the core disciplines of modern fire 
engineering. An additional advantage of these techniques is that they have the 
potential to allow assessment of different protection measures and this has already 
been described as an essential feature above. It is noted that Computational Fluid 
Dynamics is also a deterministic method, however it should also be noted that due to 
its specialised nature this type of analysis warrants separate investigation. Further 
elaboration on the merits of each discipline is contained in the following sections. 
1.3.1  Statistical Analysis 
The primary aim of this research is to develop a technique for loss estimation due to 
fire. The estimated loss can be expressed in terms of risk for the property owner or 
insurance company. As a discipline statistical analysis provides many ways to express 
risk with most forms of risk assessment drawing on statistical methods in some form. 
The advantage of statistical techniques is an ability to express the loss in terms of 
likelihood and consequence. Given that risk is often described as a function of 
likelihood and consequence it becomes apparent that statistical analysis will be of 
benefit for this research. 
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1.3.2 Deterministic Analysis 
Fire engineers use deterministic methods for modelling fire scenarios on a day to day 
basis. As a rule these techniques are usually based on empirical analysis with a 
consideration of first principles. Although most commonly employed to obtain a 
representation of compartment conditions to assess life safety, it is believed that these 
methods can be converted to provide a means for estimating property damage. In 
addition the available techniques can be used to establish the likely compartment 
conditions when using different protection measures, satisfying the second objective 
of this research. An unfortunate feature of using deterministic methods is that they are 
generally capable of predicting only one outcome. This means that they lack 
versatility and will provide only one loss estimate for each scenario. Consequently it 
is proposed to use deterministic methods to calculate the absolute loss from fire as 
opposed to the likely loss that can be estimated with statistical methods. Loss 
estimation in this way is beneficial due to the added insight into fire behaviour. When 
modelling the behaviour an engineer may be able to notice important features of the 
fire that will make some protection measures more beneficial then others. Such 
information may be crucial for loss minimisation therefore making investigation of 
these methods worthwhile. 
 
1.3.3  Computational Fluid Dynamics 
Recent advances in computing have lead to huge advancements in the field of 
Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD). These programs solve simultaneous equations 
based on conservation of mass, energy and momentum that are considered too 
complicated to be solved by traditional hand calculation methods. CFD calculations 
require the computational space, or domain, be divided into a number of small control 
volumes. The governing equations are then solved for each of these control volumes 
and solution of the fluid flow is developed. Although used in a number of different 
fields, such as mechanical and process engineering, certain fire specific CFD 
programmes have been developed. Programmes such as SOFIE (Simulation Of Fires 
In Enclosures) and Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) allow the user to model fire 
behaviour. While some simplifications and assumptions are introduced to allow easy 
modelling of combustion, the results produced are very useful and by assigning 
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appropriate material properties to objects within the domain it is possible to calculate 
the extent of burning and therefore the total flame spread. The possible benefits of 
using these programmes for loss estimation are clear; by directly modelling the fire 
behaviour the user can assess the compartment conditions and make a precise estimate 
of the likely property loss. Moreover a number of models can be developed to 
consider different fire scenarios and the effect of different protection strategies. It is 
apparent that investigating the use of CFD software for loss estimation could be 
extremely beneficial and as such this field was chosen for further exploration. 
 
1.3.4  Building Type 
If one considers the many different types of building that exist then it becomes 
obvious that to develop loss estimation methods for each is not feasible. Therefore 
rack storage warehouses were chosen as the type of building for analysis. This 
decision was made on the basis that rack storage warehouses are currently a popular 
topic in the New Zealand fire engineering community and that they are a particular 
concern for insurance companies. This is due to the large quantities and high 
concentrations of combustible materials within these buildings. Further challenges 
and problems include large losses in seemingly well protected warehouses, increased 
storage heights, increasingly large floor areas, and special types of construction. In 
addition certain advantages for modelling exist due to the simple form of construction, 
ordered arrangement of combustibles and that they are usually comprised of a single 
firecell. The relatively simplistic nature of these buildings and their current high 
profile in the fire industry therefore makes them suitable for study in the development 
of loss estimation techniques. 
 
1.4  Typical Building 
Real life warehouses can be any size and are built using a number of different 
methods. Therefore the idea of a “typical” warehouse may not be appropriate however 
to provide means for analysis a standard warehouse was defined for the purposes of 
this research. The details of this typical building are as follows; 
 
• Warehouse: 60m by 30m by 6m. 
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• Racking: Back to back racking, 28m long, 1.5m aisle width, 0.15m flue width, 
2 tiers high and 1.5m per tier. 
• Goods: Plastics within cardboard packaging, pallet load measures 1m by 1m 
by 1m. 
• Location: Inner city location, closest fire station 3km. 
 
1.4.1 Limitations 
It is recognised that this is very much an ideal warehouse. Admittedly the common 
approach is to store goods to greater heights and that pallets of goods are not exactly 
1m3. In fact no two warehouses will ever be the same and to develop a model that 
could account for every specific detail within a warehouse is almost impossible. 
Instead generalisations will have to be made regarding those parameters that may not 
be crucial for fire behaviour. Therefore the dimensions of the warehouse were chosen 
for simplicity, to illustrate the different methodologies and provide good comparison 
between the different methods. Therefore, while not a worst-case analysis of 
warehouse fire, the results will provide valuable insight and demonstrate the utility of 
each model. As a result comparisons between the different types of model can be 
made and the one with the most potential chosen for further investigation. 
 
 7
Chapter 2 Literature Review – Loss Estimation 
2.1 Introduction 
In order for businesses to make risk management decisions they need an 
understanding of the likelihood and consequences of any given risk event. In the 
insurance community these are normally expressed in terms of loss estimates, this is 
the anticipated dollar cost of an event both direct and indirect. In the field of fire 
engineering an understanding of fire and smoke spread combined with the impact of 
fire protection measures such as sprinklers, fire or smoke separations, and Fire 
Service intervention is necessary to be able to gauge a loss estimate from fire. 
 
To date the approach for loss estimation has generally been unscientific and not taken 
advantage of the increased precision that is available with the improvements in fire 
engineering knowledge. In addition, the focus of legislation and standards 
development in the field of fire engineering has been on meeting the life safety 
requirements of building codes. As a result the understanding of how to meet property 
protection objectives is lagging behind. Therefore, while not required by law, property 
protection is an extremely important and often over looked component of fire 
engineering. Still, there is evidence that this is beginning to change. The recently 
introduced ISO International Fire Protection Engineering Guidelines place an 
increased emphasis on property protection requirements. The global nature of these 
guidelines may lead to an increased awareness of the importance of property 
protection. 
 
Of a particular concern are fires in warehouse and storage buildings. As a matter of 
fact they are described by Zalosh [1] as the “one mainstream topic in industrial fire 
protection”. Moreover the average dollar loss resulting from a warehouse fire is 3 
times that of all other buildings [1]. This is due to the large quantities and high 
concentrations of combustible materials within these buildings. However coupled 
with this Zalosh [1] cites some new challenges and problems such as large losses in 
seemingly well protected warehouses and increased storage heights exceeding the 
protection capabilities of conventional sprinklers. Although not singled out by Zalosh 
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other important factors include; increasingly large floor areas, automated storage and 
retrieval systems, and special types of construction. 
 
Therefore if informed decisions about different protections strategies are to be made it 
is evident that a robust methodology is required to predict property loss from 
warehouse fires. This literature review will recognise and evaluate current methods 
that are available for predicting loss estimates. This evaluation will be used to identify 
strengths and weaknesses within the current methods and to define the ensuing 
research. 
 
2.2  Current Situation 
As mentioned in the introduction the current focus of legislation and standards in the 
field of fire engineering is on life safety. The only mention of property protection is in 
relation to preventing fire spread to property which belongs to other people [2]. Any 
protection of one’s own property is usually achieved as a by-product of fire protection 
measures such as sprinklers, compartmentation and smoke venting systems. Therefore 
in terms of legal requirements building owners are not bound by any legislation. This 
in turn often leads to property owners ignoring property protection and employing 
only the bare minimum as this relates to a smaller initial cost. However there are 
certain situations when the owner or occupants of a building will desire property 
protection, or alternatively their insurance company will make it a requirement of the 
policy. 
 
When these situations arise it is important to determine the system that will provide 
adequate protection and be cost effective. To determine the cost effectiveness of a 
system a cost-benefit analysis is often employed [3]. Within this analysis the most 
important consideration is the likely financial loss due to fire. Therefore an accurate 
estimation of this value is required otherwise the analysis is meaningless. Despite this 
necessity it would appear that no standard method for making an accurate loss 
estimate exists. Even the SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering [4] and the 
Fire Protection Handbook [5] both produced by the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA), often taken as the “bibles” of fire engineering, fail to provide a 
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robust method for predicting loss. Notably they fail to do this for any occupancy, let 
alone warehouses. 
 
The chapters by Moore [6], Golinveaux and Hawkins [7], and Hisley [8] that cover 
warehouse and storage occupancies fail to provide any methods for predicting 
possible loss. Instead they only provide mitigation strategies and do little to address 
the consequences of a fire occurring. The only mention of loss is made when referring 
to historical fires or statistics. While it is important to have an understanding of the 
case history, it is also important to predict future losses. This is seemingly ignored in 
the “text book” literature except for laborious hand calculation methods which can 
approximate the spread of flame [1]. This flame spread is then related to loss by 
assuming that anything touched by flame is lost. However the damage from other 
mediums such as smoke and water, as well as consequential loss, need to be 
recognised and accounted for. Only once these losses are also included can a correct 
estimate be made. 
 
Nevertheless this omission is understandable, a fire engineer’s role is to provide a 
protection strategy, not make estimates of financial loss. If they are consulted for 
property protection it is usually due to the need for protection of important, rare or 
expensive items and a need to protect them at all costs. In this case the need for a 
cost-benefit analysis is not often required as the items themselves are considered 
priceless. However insurance companies clearly have a vested interest in estimating 
the financial loss that may result from any fire, not just one that endangers important 
items. This is reflected when insurance companies allow for a reduction in the 
premium if protection measures such as sprinklers are present [3]. Although this is 
seemingly logical the reasoning behind calculating the premium is not overly robust. 
In fact Ramachandran suggests that insurance companies base their rates purely on 
their own financial performance and the rates of their competitors [3]. While this is 
probably an exaggeration, it does raise an interesting point; if an insurance company 
is to remain economically viable, then it is surely in their interest to obtain a better 
estimate of the likely loss that may occur and align their rates accordingly. Despite 
this it would appear that current practice relies on methods using historical data and 
expert opinion. Techniques of this nature do offer some insight however it is apparent 
that more exact methods are lacking.  
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Ignoring techniques that apply expert judgment, “rules of thumb” and prescriptive 
approaches it is clearly apparent that no accepted method for realistic loss estimation 
is currently employed in the fire engineering or insurance industry. As will be 
discussed below a number of methods have been proposed within the literature. 
However, for whatever reason they have failed to obtain a foothold in current practice 
or the data does not exist for validation. Of these models, an even smaller number 
exist that can provide loss estimates from warehouse fires. Clearly the current 
situation holds no accepted model for loss prediction, particularly for warehouse fire, 
and it is this void that this research aims to fill. 
 
2.3  Proposed Methods 
Although a number of methods have been proposed to estimate property loss from fire 
they can be broadly split into two categories; those that focus on flame spread 
approximations using a deterministic approach and those that use statistical methods. 
The methods within these categories are not without their merits; however they are 
often limited in their range of application. Each of these categories will be discussed 
and a review of the varying methods available within each category shall be 
performed. 
 
2.3.1  Flame Spread Approximations 
The underlying principle of methods within this category is that flame spread within 
an occupancy can be calculated using radiative and convective heat transfer 
approximations. The reasoning is that if the ignition temperature of the exposed object 
is known then the time to ignition can also be calculated. This calculation is relatively 
simple as flame temperatures can be easily estimated and heat release rate and 
compartment gas temperatures are often expressed as a function of time. Therefore 
the rate of heat transfer to an object can be modelled and the corresponding rate of 
temperature rise calculated. However while the fundamentals are simple to grasp, the 
application of these concepts is varied and sometimes complicated. A review of some 
warehouse specific approaches and more general methods is presented below. 
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One of the simplest approaches to take is that of empirical relationships developed 
against small array test data [1]. An example of this is work performed by 
Delichatsios in the early 1980s [9]. Based on data obtained through the original 
plastics storage test programme at Factory Mutual Research Corporation (FMRC) 
Delichatsios developed a model of flame spread through a porous fuel assembly. A 
relationship was developed that related the mass loss rate to the burning rate per unit 
surface area, flame surface area, fuel volume fraction, surface area of fuel per unit 
volume of storage and flame spread rate. A transient solution can then be developed 
that gives the total fire area with time. If the value of property per unit area is known 
then a loss estimate can be derived. Despite this seemingly easy solution and its rough 
agreement with experimental data the data range was too limited to fully validate his 
findings. It may be that sufficient data now exists nevertheless any attempt to further 
validate the work does not appear in the literature. 
 
An alternative approach, also presented by Delichatsios [10], uses bench scale test 
data to calculate the temperature of a heated surface. The method applies a thermally 
thick approximation to use the incident heat flux and the thermal inertia of the 
impinged surface in calculating the surface temperature. Once the limiting ignition 
temperature is reached the material is considered to ignite. This method is particularly 
useful for calculating the time for flame to jump across aisles, but can still be used to 
gain an estimate of total flame spread. Once again if the area of flame spread is 
known a loss estimate can be inferred.  
 
An application of similar principles was made by Cosgrove [11]. However while 
primarily based on hand calculation methods it also incorporated elements from the 
FPETOOL software package. Important values such as heat release rate, flashover 
criterion, compartment temperature and ventilation factors are determined from hand 
calculations. However the spread of fire between objects is modelled with FPETOOL. 
The 600°C flashover criterion is also assessed based on compartment temperatures 
calculated with the software. The results from the software programme are then 
incorporated with the hand calculations to provide an overall result with a focus on 
life safety and structural performance. A major problem is that there is no validation 
of the method instead it seems to be simply a proposal. However more concerning is 
the use of a t-squared fire growth to describe the fire development. As will be 
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discovered later this type of growth is grossly non-conservative for warehouse fires. 
But while problematic, Cosgrove’s method does provide some useful information and 
offers valuable insight into the problem of life safety in warehouse fire. 
 
Before going any further it is important to note the age of the work described above 
and its absence in recent literature. If this work is of use it appears strange that it has 
not gained wide recognition. Also of note is a lack of application and validation. No 
worked examples were found nor guidance on how to apply these methods, except for 
the sample calculation of Cosgrove [11]. It therefore begs the question as to how 
useful these methods really are. Due to this it is proposed that sufficient validation 
must be performed before anyone attempts to apply these techniques. 
 
While these previous methods are composed of more traditional hand calculations an 
approach that applies modern Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) software is also 
worth exploring. These programs solve simultaneous equations based on conservation 
of mass, energy and momentum that are considered too complicated to be solved by 
traditional hand calculation methods. CFD calculations require the computational 
space, or domain, be divided into a number of small control volumes. The governing 
equations are then solved for each of these control volumes and an iterative, transient 
solution is developed. Although some simplifications and assumptions are introduced 
to allow easy modelling of combustion, the results produced are generally quite useful 
and by assigning appropriate material properties to objects within the domain it is 
possible to calculate the extent of burning and therefore the total flame spread. These 
methods are often time consuming but the results produced are often worth the 
required investment of resources. 
 
A considerable amount of work has been carried out in the field of CFD by Kevin 
McGrattan, the primary developer of Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) which is a CFD 
model produced by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
Fortunately rack storage fire tests were used extensively for the development and 
validation of the FDS model thereby giving a measure of confidence that it will be 
appropriate for our purposes. An example of this work is that which aimed to 
reproduce results for burning an array of palletised polystyrene cups typical to that 
observed in a warehouse [12]. The surface that represented the cardboard packaging 
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was given a heat release rate per unit area of 600kW/m2 based on bench and full scale 
calorimeter data. The surface elements, defined by the imposed grid, were considered 
to begin burning as they reached the designated ignition temperature. At the end of 
the simulation the total number of fuel elements that were involved in the fire can 
then be used to calculate loss. Although often approximated as a series of pilot 
ignitions [13] the flame front does not actually travel in a series of discrete steps, it is 
a continuous process. Therefore the flame spread from a CFD simulation is highly 
sensitive to grid size; a grid dimension of 100 mm will give poor results when 
compared to a 1 mm grid. In the work of McGrattan the simulated flame spread led to 
the model heat release rate being within 20% of the heat release rate obtained from 
experiment [14]. This is reasonably good agreement however the primary goal of this 
simulation was to estimate sprinkler activation and as a result the flame spread 
approximation is not discussed in great detail. 
 
One of the drawbacks for using CFD is the time taken to create and run the model. 
The sheer size of warehouse buildings will lead to very large numbers of control 
volumes which increases the computational time considerably. Compounding this 
problem is that important features such as the flue space are of the order of 100 
millimetres. To accurately model the processes within this space requires considerable 
computational effort. Another hindrance is that each model has to be made specific to 
the building of concern requiring the user to spend hours creating the geometry. While 
it may be possible to develop a program to reduce the required workload for simple 
fuel arrangements, there may be occasions when important elements of the geometry 
are overlooked thus rendering the results erroneous. However if a cautious approach 
is undertaken and the limits of the model clearly defined then it is possible to obtain 
good results. Consequently an approach using these methods will be investigated 
within this research. 
 
It is also worth noting that flame spread models are also capable of producing loss 
estimates as a result of high temperatures within the compartment. By considering a 
zone model of the compartment layer temperatures can be estimated. Similarly 
surface temperatures and temperature profiles within the compartment can be 
obtained from a CFD model. If the product has a limiting temperature that may lead to 
melting or decomposition then the extent of loss can be further estimated from the 
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calculated temperature profiles. While this may enhance the model and lead to better 
predictions of loss there is no method to allow for loss due to water and smoke 
damage. These components of damage, particularly smoke, may actually outweigh 
those of flame and heat and hence their omission could drastically under predict the 
actual loss that occurs. 
 
2.3.2  Statistical Approximations 
Although a number of equations and tools are in existence that can help fire engineers 
predict fire behaviour it is sometimes better to take a statistical approach. By nature 
fire is an unpredictable phenomenon and a statistical analysis of fire history can lead 
to greater insight to the possible effects. This can be particularly useful for loss 
estimation; by analysing the trends in actual loss from fires it can better enable one to 
predict possible loss. There are many approaches that can be categorised as statistical 
methods such as those using loss distributions, extreme value theory or a stochastic 
model of fire. Similar principles are often provided between these methods but despite 
this the mechanics of each are quite different. Owing to this a description of the 
techniques and their application is provided below. 
 
The simplest approach is that used by Rutstein [15] who analysed fire and fire loss 
statistics to derive a method for predicting the average area of fire damage for various 
occupancies. Because there was not sufficient data to examine every type of 
occupancy the data was split into broad groups including a division entitled Storage 
Buildings. This occupancy group was described as “very heterogeneous” and the 
statistics did not allow for classification of different types of storage. As a means to 
address this problem Rutstein made the recommendation that for broad property 
groups, such as Storage, application of the method could only be made to “typical” 
buildings within the group. Whether rack storage, or warehouse buildings correspond 
to “typical” buildings is up to the user to justify however it is suggested that the 
average fire loss in metres squared for Storage buildings can be found as 
 
52.05.3 BLoss =  
Equation 2-1 
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Where Loss is in pounds (£) and B is the total floor are of the building (m2). This 
method is convenient in that it is a simple equation however there are some major 
limitations relating to its use. To begin with the author makes no mention of whether 
smoke and water damage are included in the loss estimate. These are major 
components of loss and therefore need to be considered. In addition the method does 
not consider fires in buildings with protection systems. One of the aims of this 
research is to provide comparative loss estimates when employing a range of 
protection options. The fact that there is no allowance for this makes the method 
inappropriate. Further to this, although not critical, the research is based on old data. 
Since publication there have been big advancements in fire protection, construction, 
and types of commodity immediately questioning the applicability to a modern 
problem. For these reasons the method of Rutstein is not advocated in this research 
however further research in this vain is strongly recommended. 
 
Ramachandran [3] provides a useful discussion of fire loss distribution when 
explaining the concept of fire insurance. Fire loss, defined in monetary terms, is 
described as having a skewed non-normal distribution. He cites work by various 
authors indicating that fire loss is best represented by a Pareto or log-normal 
distribution, with log-normal the most widely recommended. The Pareto distribution 
leads to a relatively simple model for estimating loss where the probability of 
exceeding a defined loss, x, is found by expressing x as a function of the minimum 
loss and a factor that relates to the fire hazard category of the building. The 
distribution of probabilities can then be used to calculate a loss estimate. 
Unfortunately the only example given is for an industrial building and there is no 
indication of how the factor relating to fire hazard category of the building is 
determined, only that it can be varied to reflect the presence of protection measures 
such as sprinklers. The weak guidance supplied with this method immediately draws 
it into doubt and therefore we shall discuss it no further. 
 
Unlike the method using a Pareto distribution, which directly calculates the 
probability of exceeding the defined loss, x, the approach using the log normal 
distribution determines a probability density function based on z, the natural logarithm 
of x. The resulting density function can then be used for determining a loss estimate. 
The advantage of this method is that it contains no reliance on the fire hazard category 
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of the building. Therefore if the appropriate data is obtained individual density 
functions can be determined for each fire hazard category. It is noted that should the 
data not be available then this approach is useless and therefore very dependent on its 
availability. An additional drawback is that there is no allowance for including the 
effects of protection systems. Unless the data is presented in such a way that 
individual functions can be calculated for those buildings with and without protection 
the situation is no better. Nevertheless it is evident that should the correct data be 
obtainable then the log normal approach is the better of the two methods for 
warehouses without protection.  
 
An example of work that uses a log normal distribution approximation for fire loss is 
that of Holborn et al [16]. Using data from the London Fire Brigade’s Real Fire 
Library they performed a statistical analysis investigating fire sizes, growth rates and 
time between events. This was done for eleven different occupancy groups, including 
warehouses, for which they present estimated log normal parameters that characterise 
fire size on an area basis. From this they use simple statistical calculations to calculate 
the expected fire size and the 95th percentile of the distribution. The values quoted for 
warehouses are approximately five times that of any other occupancy and reflect the 
severe nature of warehouse fires. It is worth noting that they had a relatively small 
sample size of 20 warehouse fires to perform the analysis. This is recognised by the 
authors as less than ideal and possibly accounts for why they did not present analysis 
relating to protection measures that were in place. Despite this the approach is valid 
and provides useful values for comparison. 
 
Another consideration that must be made when approaching loss estimates from a 
statistical viewpoint is that of extreme value theory. Large claims falling at the tail of 
the probability distribution can lead to special problems [3]. This is particularly 
important for warehouse fires with numerous authors citing the unusually large nature 
of warehouse fire loss [1, 15-17]. Of particular note, although not specific to 
warehouses but using extreme value techniques, is work by Rogers [18]. He found 
that large fires only constituted between 5 and 10 percent of all fires but result in more 
than 50 percent of the total loss from all fires. The data available to Rogers only 
included fires with a loss exceeding £10000. Therefore to estimate the average loss 
from all fires he was forced to employ extreme value techniques. The results produced 
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considered five different occupancies and these were further divided into single storey 
and multiple storey buildings. An average loss estimate for each of these divisions 
was determined that considered both sprinklered and non-sprinklered results. The 
ratio of loss between sprinklered and non-sprinklered options was defined as the loss 
reduction ratio. For single storey buildings this ratio ranged from 16 to 56 percent 
while for multi storey buildings it ranged from 42 to 86 percent across all five 
occupancy types. The magnitude of these ratios definitely indicates the importance of 
sprinklers in buildings, and it is therefore imperative that any model includes an 
allowance for this effect. Unfortunately no one has completed a similar analysis 
specific to warehouses, nonetheless the approach taken is well described and the 
method could be easily applied should the correct data exist. 
 
A statistical approach that has its grounding in a deterministic approach is that 
presented by Ramachandran [19]. He took a common deterministic model proposed 
by Thomas [20] that relates heat release over time to the initial heat release presented 
below as Equation 2-2. 
 
t
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κ
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Equation 2-2 
Where Qt is the heat release rate at time t (kW), Q0 is the initial heat release rate 
(kW), κ is a growth constant (s-1) and t is the relevant time step (s). Ramachandran 
then manipulated Equation 2-2 to create an expression for fire area calculating the 
total fire area based on the initial area ignited as follows. 
 
t
ot eAA
α=  
Equation 2-3 
Where At is the fire area at time t (m2), A0 is the initial area ignited (m2) and α is a 
growth constant (time-1). Although the original exponential model suggested by 
Thomas [20] is of a different format then the common t-squared fire of Heskestad [21] 
work by Butcher [22] indicates that there is “very little difference between the 
parabolic and exponential curves”. This is taken as an indication that Ramachandran’s 
approach is acceptable.  
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As part of Ramachandran’s approach the duration of burning is divided into five 
different periods; (1) ignition to detection/discovery, (2) detection to calling of Fire 
Service, (3) call to arrival at the scene of Fire Service, (4) arrival to time that fire is 
brought under control by Fire Service and (5) control to extinction. It is thought that 
fire growth will vary during each period and therefore the growth factor is calculated 
independently for each period based on statistical data. A summation of the growth in 
each phase is then used to calculate the total area involved in the fire. However the 
fifth period is considered negligible as minimal growth will occur once the fire is 
under control [19]. The total loss can then be predicted if the property value or the 
value at risk per square metre is known with the calculation taking the form of 
Equation 2-4. An additional step can be taken whereby if a vertical flame spread is 
incorporated then the loss can be calculated as a function of volume. 
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Equation 2-4 
As an application of this process the paper included a statistical survey of seven areas 
of industry. Averages of growth parameters and initial area ignited were presented for 
non-sprinklered buildings in each of the seven divisions. These were then further split 
into the following categories ‘production’, ‘storage’ and ‘other’. While not necessarily 
warehouse storage the values presented may prove useful for validation should this 
approach be pursued. Alternatively it would be possible to establish distributions for 
the growth parameters and initial area ignited. Using these distributions it would then 
be possible to run a Monte Carlo simulation to establish a distribution of damaged 
area thus providing a very useful tool for predicting loss. Unfortunately no research 
could be found could be used to quantify these growth rates and as such this approach 
was investigated no further. 
 
Within this method the concept of a doubling time is also introduced. This is related 
to the fire growth parameter through a logarithmic expression and is suggested as the 
parameter to express fire growth. Simply put it is the time taken for a fire to double in 
area. For example if the fire increases from 10 m2 to 20 m2 in three minutes, it will 
take a further three minutes to increase to 40 m2. Relationships are also given that 
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allow the volume destroyed to be estimated directly if the doubling time and vertical 
flame spread rate are known. 
 
While the above approach did not consider sprinklered buildings, if data exists 
pertaining to growth rates for fires where suppression mediums have activated then 
growth rates for these fires can be developed. Work of this nature has been performed 
[23] however this was done for the British textile industry and as such provides no 
useful data for warehouses. 
 
Another approach concerning fire damage on an area basis is also proposed by 
Ramachandran [23]. This method attempts to estimate the probable area damaged in a 
fire as a function of the total area of the building and two empirical constants based on 
statistical data. Once again it does not appear that these constants have been estimated 
for warehouse buildings. The only values given for empirical constants within the 
literature are for manufacturing industries [23]. Consequently this method was 
investigated no further and an analysis of appropriate data would have to be 
performed before any progress is made.  
 
The previous methods are characterised by estimating loss as a continuous random 
variable. This estimation is based on fire history and providing a final outcome such 
as the damaged area. On the other hand stochastic models use statistics to predict fire 
behaviour and development over time [24]. The progression of fire is modelled by 
separating it into a number of discrete realms or states. Transitions between phases are 
determined by probabilities and temporal distributions are assigned within each state 
[25] as shown in Figure 1. While a number of representations of this form exist the 
two most common are Markov models and networks [24]. A description of these 
methods will be presented below, for any further information on other stochastic 
models it is recommended that the reader consult the chapter by Ramachandran [24]. 
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Figure 2-1: Graphical representation of a stochastic model. Reproduced from 
Ramachandran . 
 
Markovian models adhere strictly to the underlying principles of stochastic modelling. 
The fire is separated into defined states with the fire only able to exist in one state at a 
time. Transition probabilities govern the movement between the states and are 
expressed as a function of time from ignition. The fire exists in each state for a certain 
length of time before making a transition and the duration in each state is described by 
a temporal distribution [24]. From this basic premise different forms of model exist, 
including Markov Chains and the Markov Process. Chains are used in repetitive 
calculations where the progression between states is a defined sequence. The tendency 
of the fire to progress in this sequence is governed by a probability that relates to each 
state occurring immediately after the one preceding. Certain states such as burn-out 
and extinguishment are considered to be absorbing states as once entered the fire can 
not progress to another state [24]. On the other hand the fire progress in a Markov 
Process does not consider fire history. Therefore the probability of the fire residing in 
a state in the future is not altered by those states previously occupied. In other words 
the fire is free to move from state to state in a random sequence. This behaviour is 
often described as memoryless and results in a more complex model [24]. For all of 
these models matrix notation is best used to perform any calculations and for a further 
description of the theory behind Markovian models the reader should consult 
Ramachandran [24]. 
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The concept of a Markov Process was applied by Berlin [25] in modelling the 
progress of fire for residential occupancies. The final model is entitled the Building 
Firesafety Model and has a total of six realms; (I) Nonfire State, (II) Sustained 
Burning, (III) Vigorous Burning, (IV) Interactive Burning, (V) Remote Burning and 
(VI) Full Room Involvement. Each realm is characterised by heat release rate, flame 
height and upper layer temperature. The transition probabilities and temporal 
distributions were based on results from over 100 full scale tests with the temporal 
distributions including those of uniform, log normal and normal type. The model 
includes calculations relating to the maximum fire growth and fire intensity and a 
validation of extent of flame damage shows reasonable agreement. As noted by 
Ramachandran [24] the model does have a weakness in that no distinction is made for 
a growing or dying fire and therefore the fire spread may be misrepresented. In other 
words, something that may have been burnt can be considered to burn again with the 
same intensity. This leads to a worst-case approximation, and although conservative 
does not necessarily reflect reality. Despite this the model demonstrates some 
important principles of a Markov Process, and provided the correct data is obtainable, 
it may provide a good basis for developing a model for warehouse fire loss. 
 
An answer to the weakness described in Berlin’s model is to use a State Transition 
Model [24]. Unlike a Markov Chain or Process this model includes logic that models 
flame spread from object to object. Within this logic is a function that excludes flame 
spread backwards to the object that it spread from. Obviously this type of model is 
more complicated and as such the states only describe flame spread within the room 
of origin [24]. An example of this type was presented by Ramachandran [23] which 
includes 4 states; (1) Fire confined to the object first ignited, (2) Fire spreading 
beyond first item but confined to contents of room of origin, (3) Fire spread to involve 
structure of room of origin and (4) Fire spreading to beyond room of origin. This type 
of model would be ideal for warehouses as they are generally one large room and the 
spread from rack to rack would follow the logic of the model as would involvement of 
the structure. The modelled spread would then result in an effective loss estimate, yet 
once again this is reliant on the availability of statistical data to describe the required 
distributions. 
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Unlike Markov models which are concerned primarily with fire spread within a room, 
Network models consider spread from room to room. This is therefore calculated 
based on the probability of a particular room experiencing flashover. The spread 
between rooms is a function of the fire resistance of the room boundaries and the 
severity of the fire contained within [24]. The network itself is comprised of nodes 
representing rooms and branches connecting the nodes representing the available 
paths for spread. Unfortunately this has little application for warehouse fires as they 
are generally one room structures. An extension could be made to approximate each 
row of storage as a node and then apply similar reasoning to form a network. This 
would not be too dissimilar to the approach described above as a Markov State 
Transition Model. In fact the Markovian approach is a greater reflection of reality and 
as a result Network Models are not considered particularly useful for solving the 
problem at hand. However for further information it is recommended that the reader 
consult the chapter by Ramachandran [24] and further work by Dusing et al [26], Platt 
[27] and Buchanan and Elms [28]. 
 
2.4  Critical Parameters 
An obvious problem inherent with research in such a broad area is the range of 
variables that may have an affect on the loss. No two warehouses can be expected to 
be the same and therefore it will be necessary to make some assumptions on what the 
important variables for consideration may be. Zalosh [1] suggests the most important 
parameters are the category of the commodity, aisle width, flue space, storage height 
and protection measures. Of the methods described above only some are capable of 
allowing for the effects of all these variables. Deterministic models lend themselves to 
this most freely while the statistical methods are strongly dependent on the 
availability of data. Other factors that may be of consideration are ventilation 
conditions, form of construction and the building materials. To determine the relevant 
importance of these variables an analysis of the critical parameters is presented below. 
 
2.4.1  Structural Damage 
While not mentioned explicitly in the above loss estimate methods the loss due to 
structural damage can be calculated both implicitly and explicitly. When calculating 
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the value of the building the cost of the structure can be included and therefore 
incorporated into the value per square metre therefore providing an implied structural 
loss. Although this may crudely approximate the structural damage it may be 
advantageous to calculate structural damage directly. From the loss models that 
calculate fire spread and room temperature it is possible to obtain a reasonable 
approximation of exposure conditions within the compartment. It is then possible to 
determine the damage to the structural members through methods presented by 
Buchanan [29]. It is thought that estimating structural loss in this way will lead to 
more accurate values. For example the slab and foundations are a considerable cost of 
the structure however it is more than likely that the damage to these elements will be 
superficial [29] and therefore including their worth in the value per square metre may 
lead to over estimating the possible loss. As a result where possible an explicit 
calculation of structural damage is advocated but as a minimum a per metre squared 
approximation is acceptable. 
 
2.4.2  Smoke and water damage 
As mentioned above the methods detailed do not estimate loss from smoke or water 
damage. These components of damage may be included in the loss statistics however 
this distinction is not made within the literature and loss of this type is definitely not 
calculated within the deterministic or statistical fire spread models. There does not 
appear to be any justification for this but it may be that it is just too hard. The damage 
from these mediums will be specific to the exposed items and therefore a site specific 
estimation of this loss may be the appropriate course of action. The extent of smoke 
damage could be approximated from either zone or CFD models, while water damage 
could be estimated based on the expected sprinkler activation or Fire Service 
operations. Damage due to these mediums is definitely worthy of consideration and 
therefore can not to be ignored. 
 
2.4.3  Consequential Loss 
Consequential loss is loss that occurs after the fire has been extinguished and is 
surplus to the direct loss from fire damage. It is comprised of business loss, loss of 
production time and any other downstream effects. Described as an under-researched 
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topic [3] it can be an extremely important component of loss for a business and must 
be planned for. A 1979 study by Hicks and Liebermann [3] resulted in a simple model 
that gave good results. Based on a statistical study they came up with an empirical 
relationship to convert direct loss into an estimate of consequential loss. This was 
performed with success for five of the six occupancies. However the validation 
indicated poor agreement for warehouses. A considerable amount of time has passed 
since this work and it may be that sufficient data exists to estimate the empirical 
constants more accurately. This could then lead to a useful model being created. In 
lieu of this it is recommended that consequential loss be estimated on a case by case 
basis in consultation with appropriate parties such as actuaries and loss adjustors. 
 
2.5  Conclusions  
From the literature review it is evident that there is the need for a methodology that is 
specific to predicting realistic warehouse loss estimates. These occupancies are a 
considerable concern for property owners, insurance companies and engineers. The 
current situation does not offer any set approach and proposed methods within the 
literature fail to account for warehouses or do not provide accurate results. Coupled 
with this is that the approaches are varied making it hard for concerned parties to 
obtain a clear idea of where to proceed should a loss estimate be required.  
 
In an effort to remove this uncertainty the following methods will be developed and 
investigated for application: 
1 A statistical methodology which has its grounding in the methods described 
previously. 
2 A deterministic model similar to that of Cosgrove [11]. 
3 An FDS model. 
 
The results of these models will then be compared against each other with a 
description of their relative merits and drawbacks. Finally conclusions will be made 
as to which is the best approach and how further work may lead to improvements in 
each of the methodologies. 
 
 25
2.6  References 
1. Zalosh, R.G., Industrial fire protection engineering. 2003, New York: Wiley. 
2. New Zealand Building Industry Authority and Standards Association of New 
Zealand., Approved document for New Zealand building code: fire safety clauses: C1, 
C2, C3, C4. 2000, Wellington [N.Z.]: Standards New Zealand. 
3. Ramachandran, G., The economics of fire protection. 1998, London: E & FN 
Spon. 
4. DiNenno, P.J., National Fire Protection Association and Society of Fire 
Protection Engineers, SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering. 3rd / ed. 2002, 
Quincy, Mass. Bethesda, MD.: National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire 
Protection Engineers. 
5. Cote, A.E., P. Powell, and National Fire Protection Association., Fire 
protection handbook. 19th ed. 2003, Quincy, Mass.: National Fire Protection 
Association. 2 v. 
6. Moore, J., "Warehouse and Storage Operations". 19th ed. Fire protection 
handbook, ed. A.E. Cote and P. Powell. 2003, Quincy, Mass.: National Fire 
Protection Association. 2 v. 
7. Golinveaux, J.E. and J.B. Hankins, "Sprinkler Systems for Storage Facilities". 
19th ed. Fire protection handbook, ed. A.E. Cote and P. Powell. 2003, Quincy, Mass.: 
National Fire Protection Association. 2 v. 
8. Hisley, B.W., "Storage Occupancies". 19th ed. Fire protection handbook, ed. 
A.E. Cote and P. Powell. 2003, Quincy, Mass.: National Fire Protection Association. 
2 v. 
9. Delichatsios, M.A., A Scientific Analysis of Stored Plastic Fire Tests. Fire 
Science and Technology, 1983. 3: p. 73-103. 
10. Delichatsios, M.A. and Y. Chen, Asymptotic, Approximate, and Numerical 
Solutions for the Heat-up and Pyrolysis of Materials Including Reradiation Losses. 
Combustion and Flame, 1993. 92: p. 292-307. 
11. Cosgrove, B.W. and University of Canterbury. School of Engineering., Fire 
design of single storey industrial buildings. 1996, Christchurch, N.Z.: School of 
Engineering University of Canterbury. xiv, 159. 
 26
12. McGrattan, K. and D. Sheppard. Sprinkler, Vent and Draft Curtain Interaction 
- Experiments. in Proceedings Sixth International Symposium. 2000: International 
Association of Fire Safety Science. 
13. Quintiere, J., Surface Flame Spread. 3rd / ed. SFPE handbook of fire 
protection engineering, ed. P.J. DiNenno, National Fire Protection Association., and 
Society of Fire Protection Engineers. 2002, Quincy, Mass. Bethesda, MD.: National 
Fire Protection Association ;Society of Fire Protection Engineers. 1 v. (various 
pagings). 
14. McGrattan, K., A. Hamins, and D. Stroup. Modelling of Sprinkler, Vent and 
Draft Curtain Interaction. in Proceedings Sixth International Symposium. 2000: 
International Association of Fire Safety Science. 
15. Rutstein, R., The estimation of fire hazard in different occupancies. Fire 
Surveyor, 1979. 8(2): p. 21-25. 
16. Holborn, P.G., P.F. Nolan, and J. Golt, An analysis of fire sizes, fire growth 
rates and times between events using data from fire investigations. Fire Safety 
Journal, 2004. 39(6): p. 481-524. 
17. Ramachandran, G., Properties of extreme order statistics and their application 
to fire protection and insurance problems. Fire Safety Journal, 1982. 5(1): p. 59-76. 
18. Rogers, F.E., Fire Losses and the Effect of Sprinkler Protection of Buildings in 
a Variety of Industries and Trades. Current Paper 9/77. 1977, Borehamwood, Herts.: 
Building Research Establishment. 
19. Ramachandran, G., Exponential model of fire growth. Proceedings First 
International Symposium, 1986: p. 657-666. 
20. Thomas, P.H., Fires in Model Rooms, B.R.E.C.P.N. 32/74, Editor. 1974: 
Watford, UK. 
21. Heskestad, G.,Engineering Relations for Fire Plumes. Fire Safety Journal 
Smoke - Its Chem, Phys and Control through Eng, Feb 16-18 1983, 1983. 7(1): p. 25-
32. 
22. Butcher, G., Nature of Fire Size, Fire Spread and Growth. Fire Engineers 
Journal, 1987. 47(144): p. 11-14. 
23. Ramachandran, G., Probabilistic Approach to Fire Risk Evaluation. Fire 
Technology, 1988. 24(3): p. 204-226. 
24. Ramachandran, G., Stochastic Models of Fire Growth. 3rd / ed. SFPE 
handbook of fire protection engineering, ed. P.J. DiNenno, National Fire Protection 
 27
Association., and Society of Fire Protection Engineers. 2002, Quincy, Mass. 
Bethesda, MD.: National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection 
Engineers. 1 v. (various pagings). 
25. Berlin, G.N., Managing the Variability of Fire Behaviour. Fire Technology, 
1980. 16: p. 287-302. 
26. Dusing, J.W.A., A.H. Buchanan, and D.G. Elms, Fire spread analysis of 
multi-compartment buildings. 1979, Christchurch, N.Z.: Dept. of Civil Engineering 
University of Canterbury. viii, 142 leaves. 
27. Platt, D.G., et al., Modelling fire spread: a time based probability approach. 
1989, Christchurch, N.Z.: Dept. of Civil Engineering University of Canterbury. 113. 
28. Buchanan, A.H., et al., The effects of fire resistance ratings on likely fire 
damage in buildings. 1988, Christchurch, N.Z.: Dept. of Civil Engineering University 
of Canterbury. ii, [1], 21 leaves. 
29. Buchanan, A.H., Structural design for fire safety. 2001, Chichester, England ; 
New York: Wiley. xxii, 421. 
 
 
 28
Chapter 3 Literature Review – Engineering Approach 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Warehouses are just like any other occupancy in that an understanding of the basic 
principles is essential for accurate predictions of fire behaviour. For most 
conventional buildings these principles are well understood and the fire engineer has 
many tools available to model fire therefore gaining insight into the possible fire 
consequences. From this analysis they can make an informed assessment of the 
building and specify appropriate fire protection measures. Unfortunately the use of 
these common methods is inappropriate for a warehouse fire as they give non-
conservative estimates for critical parameters such as gas temperature, flame height 
and heat release rate [1]. To better understand how warehouse fire can be understood, 
a review of previous research relating to this topic is required. Of particular concern 
for making loss estimates are the following; heat release rate, flame height, plume 
characteristics, and the ceiling jet. A review of the relevant theory within the literature 
is presented in the following sections. 
 
3.2 What’s the difference? 
Before going any further it is important to first consider why warehouses present such 
a challenge to fire engineers. Coupled with this is a necessary awareness of what 
makes warehouses different to normal occupancies with the most important features 
being the compartment size and use of rack storage. A review of these facets and the 
related challenges is given below: 
3.2.1 Compartment Size  
By nature warehouses are large buildings with floor areas typically greater than 
10000m2 and ceiling heights exceeding 10m not uncommon. When compared to the 
C/AS1 maximum allowable firecell floor area of 1500m2 [2] we gain an 
understanding of the sheer magnitude of these buildings. Most relationships 
developed for fire engineering are developed from tests in compartments on the scale 
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of an ISO room*. But how well does fire behaviour in these relatively small 
compartments compare to that of a warehouse? The obvious issue is scaling and how 
the larger dimensions affect important characteristics of fire behaviour. As will be 
explained below plume and flame height correlations developed for regular 
compartments do not predict these phenomena well for warehouse fire. Similarly 
there are large differences between fire size. An ISO Room will experience flashover 
at approximately 4 MW, whereas warehouse fires can reach greater than 15 MW 
without involving anything but the rack of origin [3]. So not only are there differences 
in magnitude, the applicability of a concept such as flashover is brought into question. 
Unless evidence suggests that relationships for fire in smaller compartments can be 
extended to warehouses then the use of these methods is ill-advised. 
 
3.2.2 Fuel Load and Configuration  
The norm in warehouses is for extremely high fuel loads (>1500 MJ/m2 [2]) and this 
alone requires special consideration by the fire engineer. However the arrangement of 
the fuel can present a problem when comparing fire behaviour to that of a regular 
enclosure. Within warehouses there are typically three types of storage; solid piled, 
palletised, and rack storage. Solid piled storage involves stacking cartons on top of 
one another with no space between the cartons in each stack. Therefore only the 
vertical surfaces and top surface of the stack are exposed. In addition the relative 
instability of the stack limits the heights to which goods can be stored, typically 4m 
according to Zalosh [3]. As such solid block storage does not present a major threat 
due to limited surfaces for flame spread and a comparatively small fuel load. Slightly 
worse is palletised storage which involves stacking pallets on top of each other. In this 
arrangement the pallet surfaces as well as the vertical and top surfaces of the stack are 
exposed while the pallets can provide ventilation to burning horizontal surfaces [3]. 
Furthermore higher stacks can be made thus providing greater fuel loads. Fortunately 
the restricted ventilation to the horizontal surfaces means that growth rates are 
comparable to solid piled storage [3]. Representing the worst case is rack storage 
where pallets of goods are placed on shelves within a steel rack. The structurally 
                                                 
* An ISO Room is a standard compartment used for fire tests. They come in a range of sizes however 
the most common measures 2.4m wide x 3.6m long x 2.4m high. 
 30
sound nature permits storage to greater heights (>12m) and the top and the sides of 
each pallet are available for flame spread. The end result is a well ventilated stack that 
permits flame spread both vertically and horizontally thus allowing the fire to spread 
in three directions simultaneously. The 3-dimensional nature of this flame spread is 
peculiar to rack storage and as such requires alternative means of expression than the 
common t-squared fire relating to spread in two dimensions.  
 
Another problem of this fuel configuration is the potential for shielded fires to occur. 
In this instance a deep-seated fire relates to one that occurs in the bottom tier of the 
rack, away from the flue space in a position where the tiers above shield the fire from 
ceiling mounted sprinklers. The fire can then build to a point where the protection 
systems are over-whelmed. A further complication is the type of fuel. For example 
stored thermoplastics burning in a shielded fire may melt and lead to large pool fires, 
or small items may spill from boxes and lead to unpredictable behaviour with new, 
unthought-of paths for flame spread. The unique nature of this fuel load therefore 
requires careful consideration by the engineer when modelling fire behaviour. 
 
3.2.3 Compartment Height  
In general warehouses are characterised by high ceilings. This is driven by a desire to 
store as much as possible in the smallest possible area. Although understandable this 
presents a number of problems for the fire engineer and while the increased fire load 
is foremost an additional concern is that of entrainment. The combustion gases have a 
long distance to travel before they reach the ceiling. During this time they will be free 
to entrain large quantities of air leading to a greater volume of smoke and gas. This 
will in turn lead to greater cooling of these products when compared to smaller 
compartments. As a result the commonly applied assumption of a well defined, layer 
of gases at the ceiling may not be applicable as the temperature difference between 
the upper and lower layer may not be adequate for the upper layer to maintain 
buoyancy. Unless accounted for this behaviour may provide an increased threat to life 
safety and greater smoke damage due to a faster descent of the smoke layer. This 
behaviour also suggests that zone models may not provide a good representation of 
conditions within the compartment and that they be used with caution. 
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3.2.4 Time frame 
There are a number of key differences in time frames between “normal” 
compartments and warehouses. For instance when modelling the initial growth for a 
conventional fuel loads the growth phase may be the order of minutes, however for 
rack storage it is seconds. This extremely rapid propagation of fire in rack storage 
results in commonly applied methods being unconservative. Furthermore it is often 
assumed that a transition to steady burning occurs at the end of a t-squared growth 
phase, however a warehouse fire will continue to grow and may take a very long time 
before a steady phase is observed. If a steady phase is reached the abnormally large 
fuel load will then lead to very long fires. This makes application of the standard 
enclosure heat release curve consisting of a growth phase, steady ventilation 
controlled phase, and a decay phase invalid. As a result an alternative model of the 
heat release rate over time is required. 
 
3.2.5  Summary 
It is evident that warehouses are truly a unique form of compartment that require 
specific engineering tools. The differences in size, behaviour, fuel loads, and time 
frame all present challenges that common methods fail to deal with appropriately. For 
the purposes of this study it is therefore imperative that alternative methods are 
investigated and if necessary developed. Only then can a true representation of 
possible loss be formulated. 
 
3.3 Heat Release Rates 
3.3.1 Introduction 
A number of studies have been performed in this area which try and formulate an 
expression for heat release rate based on experimental data relating to rack storage 
fires. Regrettably confidence in the available methods is reduced due to a lack of data 
available for validation. The available methods can be split into power law and 
exponential correlations. A description of the available methods within each of these 
categories follows. 
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3.3.2  Power Law Correlations 
The most common representation of a fire’s heat release rate is that of the t-squared 
fire [4]. It has been found that the post ignition growth rate of most commodities can 
be represented as a relationship proportional to the square of the time. A growth factor 
is also incorporated to represent the different growth rates that occur between 
commodities. It is therefore only natural that various researchers would make an 
attempt at expressing the heat release rates of rack storage systems in a similar way. 
Not surprisingly there is evidence of this within the literature with some authors even 
extending to a t-cubed relationship. The strengths and weaknesses of these approaches 
are discussed below. 
 
One of the first t-squared models presented for this storage was that of Delichatsios 
[5] which was based on full scale tests of a two-tier high rack storage array conducted 
at Factory Mutual Research. These tests were part of Factory Mutual’s original 
plastics storage programme that became the Fire Products Collector Commodity 
Classification Tests [3]. The intent of these tests was to classify warehouse goods on 
the basis of heat release rate data. From an analysis of the associated data Delichatsios 
came up with a standard t-squared equation of the form 
max
2
0 )( QQforttaQ <−=  
Equation 3-1 
The variables a (kW/s2), t0 (s), and Qmax (kW) are empirical constants estimated from 
fitting curves to experimental data. However the constants were estimated by using 
theoretical heats of combustion and weight loss histories. With the added advantage 
of new technology in the form of calorimetry Lee [6] and Spaulding [7] have 
performed work that yields more accurate parameters.  
 
Although this work is useful in some respects it is very limited in its application due 
to its commodity-specific nature; Equation 3-1can not be used without the appropriate 
variables and these are only obtainable from experiment. It could be said that using 
the values for the plastics would result in a conservative estimate for a product with a 
slower growth and a lower peak heat release rate. However this would fail to 
represent the commodity accurately and therefore not meet the aim of this work to 
provide realistic estimates. Another limitation is the inability to incorporate the effect 
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of the presence of additional tiers. The values presented are for a 2 tier high array and 
it would not be conservative to use these values for larger stacks [8]. As a result the 
limited applicability of this approach means it is not suited for the purposes of this 
research. 
 
An additional power law correlation is that presented by Yu and Stavriandidis [9] 
which describes the early fire growth for the standard plastic commodity* as a t-cubed 
relationship. Based on full-scale tests they found that the convective heat release rate 
was directly proportional to tier height and the curve fit can be described by the 
following equation,  
( ) 61,26030 ≤≤<−−= NsttforttNQc α  
Equation 3-2 
where Qc is the convective heat release rate (kW), t0 is the incubation time between 
ignition and self-sustained burning (s), and N is the number of tiers of storage. The 
data fit then gave α as 0.0448 kW/s2/tier and a limiting value of Qc as 800kW/tier. 
The limits relate to the fact that after 26 seconds the heat release rate tended towards 
linear behaviour and that no stacks were tested that exceeded six tiers. Although 
promising the equation is only valid for one commodity and therefore more tests are 
required to determine additional α values as well as to determine if a dependence on 
the number of tiers applies for all commodities. 
 
3.3.3 Exponential Correlations 
An alternative to expressing the heat release rate as a power law expression is to use 
an exponential equation. Hakuur Ingason of the Swedish National Testing and 
Research Institute has performed the most recent work in this field and suggests that 
an exponential representation of early fire growth is superior to that of a power law 
correlation. In general Ingason’s work is more extensive than that previously 
mentioned and includes representations for a number of commodities and stack 
heights. It is therefore appropriate to perform a review of the calculation methods he 
provides. 
                                                 
* The standard plastic commodity has been used extensively in rack storage tests and consists of 
polystyrene cups packaged in compartmented, single-wall corrugated paper cartons [6].  
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The earliest representation given by Ingason is one based on free burn tests of 
multiple wall corrugated paper cartons in rack storage four tiers high [10]. The tests 
were primarily performed as a 1/3-scale model with some full-scale verification. The 
expression for heat release rate was derived based on the full-scale data [11] and is as 
follows 
)(102.0 027.2 ttc eQ
−=Δ  
Equation 3-3 
where ΔQc = Qc-Qc,0, and Qc is the convective heat release rate (kW) and Qc,0 is the 
convective heat release rate at t0. In this instance t0 is defined as the time in seconds 
when the convective heat release rate started to increase notably in size, as opposed to 
the time from incubation until self-sustained burning. Unfortunately the actual times 
are not given, however Ingason found that his definition of t0 results in a better fit to 
the data when compared to Equation 3-2 and suggests the different definition may be 
the cause. Despite obtaining a better fit, the same problems as for the power law 
correlations arise in that the equation can only be applied for N equal to 4 and for one 
commodity. So while giving a better representation the increased benefit is minimal 
and additional methods must be considered. 
 
Fortunately Ingason [12] has recognised this and provides an equation that can be 
applied for a number of stack heights and commodities. The formula is based on full 
scale testing performed under a 10MW Industry Calorimeter and is intended for 
engineers designing fire protection systems for warehouse and industrial buildings. A 
large number of tests were performed and Ingason proposes the following expression 
as a representation of the fire growth 
MWQforbtaeHQ c
t
c 7)( ≤+= βα  
Equation 3-4 
where α, β, a and b are empirical constants determined from curve fits and H is the 
total height of the rack. An additional paper by Ingason [13] defines what these 
variables physically relate to. It was found that α relates to the heat release rate per 
square metre of burning material and the height of the initial pyrolysis zone, β relates 
to the flame length, flame radiation, and thermal properties of the burning material, 
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while a corresponds to the width of the initial pyrolysis zone and b relates to the 
horizontal flame spread on vertical surfaces.  
 
The array itself was two pallet loads wide by two pallet loads deep and two to five 
tiers high with the ignition source placed in the central flue space. No consideration of 
the incipient time t0 was included in the derivation of Equation 3-4. The limit on the 
convective heat release rate is imposed due to the maximum capacity of 10MW 
chemical heat release rate of the calorimeter. Ingason suggests that it is possible to 
extend it beyond this limit but that this should be done with caution. Similar concerns 
are expressed by Babrauskas [8] who suggests that, in general, extending heat release 
results beyond those measured is not recommendable. Upon inspection Ingason 
observed that the data fit into 3 groups; 1-fast, 2-intermediate and 3-slow. Empirical 
parameters were established for each group, the values of which are presented below 
in Table 3-1.  
 
Table 3-1: Fire growth parameters for Equation 3-4 as taken from Ingason [12]. 
Group α (kW/m2) β (s-1) A (m) B (m/s) 
1 1.41 0.036 0.4 1.57 
2 0.65 0.015 0.4 4.50 
3 0.36 0.024 0.4 0.99 
 
Additional inspection of the data showed that the various groups could be further 
defined by commodity type. Group 1 consisted of polystyrene chips in paper cartons, 
Group 2 includes mainly plastic commodities both in and without paper cartons, and 
Group 3 is made up of natural materials including cartons with thick walls and wood. 
A plot of the different groups is included for N = 2-5 with a tier height of 1.5m and 
can be viewed below as Figure 3-1.  
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Figure 3-1: Convective heat release rates based on Equation 4. 
 
The advantages of this model are immediately apparent; the ability to model a number 
of commodities and storage heights provides good versatility. Obviously the method 
could be extended by including more data and developing additional curves for a 
wider range of commodities. Another drawback is the 7 MW limit for Qc as it results 
in the model only being useful for the early stages of fire growth. Unfortunately 
Ingason falls short of providing any description of the heat release rate above the  
7 MW limit, either quantitative or qualitative, which may have provided further 
insight for the reader. 
 
Although not explicitly an expression of heat release rate a method proposed by 
Alvares et al [14] provides a method for determining the mass loss rate of burning 
parallel walls of cardboard. An expression for the heat release rate can then be 
determined by multiplying the mass loss rate by the heat of combustion of the 
material. The equation is exponential in form as follows 
)(
0
0ttbbemm −
• =  
Equation 3-5 
where m0 is the initial mass of the panels (kg) and b=4.1/d+0.013 where d is the 
distance between the panels (mm). This equation was found based on derivation from 
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flame spread correlations and it was thought that the walls of cardboard would 
approximate the parallel faces of adjacent boxes within the rack.  
 
This work was completed as investigation of a malicious warehouse fire and as a 
result does not leave room for widespread application. The parallel faces do not 
approximate the critical flue space very well and the ignition source was seemingly 
based on information provided by the arsonist. However it is worth noting in that an 
exponential relationship was derived. 
 
3.3.4  Other approximations 
Delichatsios [5] also came up with a model that provides a solution for mass loss rate. 
This was developed based on work focussing on flame spread through a porous 
assembly and takes the form of 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
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⎛=
fe
fe
ff V
S
tAum
dt
dm φ"  
Equation 3-6 
where m” is the specific burning rate per unit surface area (kg/m2/s) burning at time t, 
uf is the flame spread rate over the exposed fuel surface, Af is the flame surface area 
within the fuel array, φ is the fuel volume fraction in the storage array, and Sfe/Vfe is 
the exposed surface area of fuel per unit volume of storage. Unfortunately the original 
article is commercial and as a result the information presented here comes from 
Zalosh [3] who states that the equation is based on very limited data. This coupled 
with its dependence on values obtained from experiment means that the method is of 
little use for this project. 
 
3.4 Flame Height 
An important factor affecting damage for a warehouse fire is the spread of flame both 
within the rack and between racks. By having an understanding of this behaviour the 
accuracy of the fire loss estimate can be improved as flame damage is one of the main 
components of loss. Modelling this variable is particularly beneficial for the design of 
in-rack sprinkler systems; by modelling the progression of the flame front, and the 
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response of in-rack sprinklers, one can verify that sprinkler activation occurs before 
the flame passes. Apart from ad hoc approaches derived from first principles the 
engineer currently has two models available for predicting flame height within rack 
storage. 
 
The earliest representation was developed by Ingason and deRis [15] who developed 
their model based on an investigation of heat transfer within rack storage. The tests 
used non-combustible steel towers as a crude representation of the rack geometry and 
therefore did not include any possible effect from the horizontal flue spaces. However 
the effect of the vertical flue spacing was included and the flame height was found to 
be dependent on this variable. Their relationship is defined as follows 
wQL f 54.3315.0
52 −=  
Equation 3-7 
where Lf is the flame height (m), Q is the chemical heat release rate (kW) and w is the 
width of the vertical flue (m). The equation was obtained from a curve fit with R = 
0.986, indicating that it can be used with confidence. However it is important to note 
that using Equation 3-7 for flame heights greater than the total rack height is 
inadvisable. This makes sense, as above this height the flame is no longer confined by 
the flue space and different behaviour would be observed. The only concern relating 
to this method is the absence of horizontal flues within the test array. This would limit 
the available oxygen supply when compared to a real life situation and therefore may 
be more appropriate for solid piled storage. 
 
The alternative method is also presented by Ingason [1] and is based on scale model 
and full scale free-burn tests of multiple wall corrugated paper cartons. It is expected 
that this will be the better of the two methods as the horizontal flues are included. 
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the model will be more accurate than one 
derived from an approximate geometry. As it happens the resulting model is of a 
similar form to Equation 3-7 and is expressed as the following 
wQL f 73.3343.0
52 −=  
Equation 3-8 
Once more the dependence on heat release rate and vertical flue width is apparent 
however the empirical constants have been adjusted slightly. It is thought that this is 
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partly due to the involvement of the boxes and the effect of the horizontal flues. Once 
again it is not recommended to use this equation for Lf > H. It is worth noting that 
Equation 3-8 was derived in the same way as Equation 3-7.  
 
Despite this it is important to realise that Equation 3-8 is only applicable for certain 
combinations of w and h, where h is the dimension of the horizontal flue space. 
Ingason found that the above equation represented the flame height for w = 50, 100 
and 150 mm and h = 50 mm in the 1/3 scale tests and w = 150 mm and h = 300 mm 
for the full scale. Yet when h was increased to 75 mm and 100 mm with w = 50 mm 
the data was found to deviate from the stated relationship. Ingason could not explain 
this citing the need for more testing to establish the effect of h as well as to verify the 
validity of Equation 3-8. 
 
As a remedy to the lack of data Ingason performed additional full-scale tests with the 
same commodity [11]. When this additional data was plotted against Equation 3-8 it 
was found that the agreement was poor for Q2/5/w > 65 (Figure 3-2). From 
investigation of Figure 3-2 it is clear that above this limit the flame heights were 
under predicted, resulting in non-conservative estimates should Equation 3-8 be 
applied outside for Q2/5/w > 65. This problem is alluded to by Ingason who makes 
comment citing the need for a “more rational correlation” to fully describe in-rack 
flame height. Still this does not prohibit the use of Equation 3-8 if the correct 
geometry exists. 
 
Figure 3-2: Non-dimensional flame height reproduced from Ingason [11] where the 
solid line represents Equation 3-8. 
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3.5 Plume Correlations 
Another important feature of a fire is how the plume behaves and develops. The most 
common way to describe a plume is in terms of the gas temperature, velocity and 
plume width. These parameters can be used to give an indication of conditions within 
the enclosure and allow the response of protection measures exposed to the plume to 
be determined. This is particularly critical for very high rack storage systems where 
in-rack or suppression-type sprinklers are required as conventional systems have the 
potential to be overcome in this situation. It would appear that there is a lack of work 
in this area however those that are available provide useful information. 
 
3.5.1 Gas Temperatures 
One of the most important features of the plume is the gas temperature. By knowing 
this variable it is possible to model the response of a heat detector within the plume. 
The most common way of representing the plume temperature is as the excess 
centreline temperature, ΔTc. This is a prediction of the temperature at the centre of the 
plume and is expressed as an excess to that of the ambient temperature. 
Disappointingly only two attempts at expressing this quantity were discovered in the 
literature. Fortunately they are both sound in principle and the user is free to make an 
assessment of which is more appropriate for their situation.  
 
Not surprisingly Ingason [1] has developed an expression for the plume temperature. 
As for his other offerings the approach is based on empirical data with a consideration 
of first principles. Presented here as Equation 3-9 the curve fit was based on full-scale 
data with an R-value of 0.975 and valid for (z-z0)/Qc2/5 > 0.20. For values below 0.20 
ΔTc reaches a limiting value of approximately 840°C which is to be expected as 
flames have a tendency to reach a maximum temperature [16]. The actual equation is 
as follows 
( ) 3/50
3/2
3/1
2228 zz
Q
gc
TT c
p
c −⎥⎥⎦
⎤
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⎡=Δ
∞
∞
ρ  
Equation 3-9 
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where T∞ is the ambient temperature, g is the gravitational constant (kg/m/s2), cp is the 
specific heat of air (kJ/kg/K), ρ∞ is the density of the ambient air (kg/m3), z is the 
elevation within the rack and z0 is the virtual source of the plume and is found from 
5/25/2
5/3
1
0 343.073.3 QT
TA
wz
fL ⎟⎟
⎟
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⎞
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⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
Δ−+−=
∞ χ  
Equation 3-10 
where A1 = CT[1/gcp2ρ∞2T∞2]1/3, and the ratio χ = Qc/Q. This ratio is in the range of 
0.6-0.7 for free burning objects however this range widens to 0.4-0.7 for rack storage 
fires [1]. Ingason then makes a substitution based on work by Heskestad [17] and 
accepted values for the properties of ambient air to suggest that the virtual source is 
better represented by the following simple relationship 
5/2
0 083.073.3 Qwz +−=  
Equation 3-11 
Which is then advocated as the most appropriate expression in more recent work [11, 
13]. Although based only on full-scale data Equation 3-9 still provides an 
approximate fit to that of the small-scale tests. This fit tends to be conservative and 
gives limited confidence that the method is applicable for other geometries. When 
validated against additional full-scale data [11] it was found that Equation 3-9 did 
provide a reasonable fit (Figure 3-3). Despite this, improvement could be made by 
allowing for the effect of plume width as higher temperatures were observed with 
narrower flues. Alternatively Equation 3-9 could be adjusted by a shift in the positive 
direction of the x-axis thereby including all the data points and serving as a 
conservative estimate of the upper limit for ΔTc. An approximation of this is displayed 
as a dotted line in Figure 3-3. Unfortunately Ingason stops short of providing this 
additional analysis.  
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Figure 3-3: Plot of centreline temperatures reproduced from Ingason [11] where the 
solid line represents Equation 3-9. 
 
The other method found within the literature is that of Kung et al [18] and is based on 
correlations from testing of warehouse storage arrays. Unfortunately although cited by 
Zalosh [3] this report is not available in the public domain. As a result the following 
equations are not taken from the original source and any additional insight into their 
derivation that may have been obtained is lost. Nevertheless, according to Zalosh it 
was found that the plume centreline temperature could be represented as  
[ ] ( ) 3/503/23/1 −− −=Δ zHQTcAgT caapc ρ  
Equation 3-12 
where A = 0.0279m4/kJ/s2 and H is the distance to the ceiling from the top of the  
array (m). In this case the virtual source is found from 
5/2
000 095.0 cQzz +=  
Equation 3-13 
and z00 = -1.6m for N = 2 and –2.4m for N = 3, 4. This indicates that the equation was 
not validated for racks with greater than 4 tiers. It is also important to realise that the 
correlation is only applicable when the following limit applies 
( )
110 <<⎟⎟⎠
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Equation 3-14 
When this limit is not satisfied a non-steady plume representation is required, or the 
equation must be adjusted to allow for the lag time in gas travel. 
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3.5.2 Plume Velocity 
An equally important property of the plume is the centreline velocity. Knowledge of 
this quantity allows greater insight into the mass transport and heat transfer conditions 
involved with the fire. This in turn leads to a better understanding of conditions within 
the compartment as variables such as transport times can be predicted with greater 
accuracy. As mentioned previously there is a considerable lack of work in this area 
and therefore the options for predicting this quantity are very limited. Nevertheless 
the existing methods do provide useful tools for investigating this phenomenon. 
 
The most versatile of these methods is put forward by Ingason [1]. He measured the 
centreline velocity in both small and full-scale experiments. Froude scaling was then 
used to normalise the data and a curve fit, similar to that of Heskestad, for the full-
scale data yielded the following equation  
( )
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which is valid for z < H and z0 is given by Equation 3-11. It is also important to note 
that for Qc1/3/(z-z0)1/3 >3.4 Equation 3-15 is invalid. Above this limit the data appears 
to reach a maximum of u/H1/2 approximately equal to 5.  
 
It is also worth noting that the equation is based on limited full-scale data. Unlike that 
of the curve fit for Equation 3-9 the correlation with small-scale data is not good. It 
appears that curve fits for the small-scale results yield an equation with a similar 
slope, however the coefficients change markedly. This is explained in part by an 
inability to simultaneously preserve important non-dimensional parameters such as 
the Reynolds, Froude, and Grashof numbers. Additional full-scale testing [11] showed 
a weak trend following Equation 3-15 for Qc1/3/(z-z0)1/3 < 3 kW1/3/m1/3. The observed 
scatter was quite high with narrower flues providing higher velocities (Figure 3-4). As 
for the representation of ΔTc, Equation 3-15 does not fully represent the effect of flue 
space. Similarly a shift, this time in the negative direction, along the x-axis would 
provide a conservative limit for expressing the centreline velocity. Once again an 
approximation of this shift is shown as a dotted line in Figure 3-4. Therefore until 
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further analysis occurs the above equation may only be applied with caution as an 
approximate method. 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Plot of centreline temperatures reproduced from Ingason [11] where the 
solid line represents Equation 3-15. 
 
The other method that gives a solution for centreline velocities within the plume is 
once again given by Kung et al [18], however it was once again obtained from Zalosh 
[3]. In this case the relationship was derived to calculate the velocity impinging on the 
ceiling and is found as follows 
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with z0 obtained from Equation 3-13 and valid for the limit described by Equation 
3-14. Once again the equation is of a similar form to that of Heskestad [17] however 
rather than giving the velocity at various heights within the rack we are limited to a 
single value where the plume hits the ceiling. Although this is useful for modelling 
the response of conventional, ceiling mounted protection systems it is not easily 
applicable to that of in-rack systems. Another drawback of this method is that it is not 
bounded by a maximum value, rather it relies on the engineer to use judgement in 
defining a maximum value. In light of this it can be recommended that this method 
only be used as recommended by Kung et al and that the user reviews the results with 
a critical eye. 
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3.5.3  Plume width 
This is another essential characteristic that helps describe the plume geometry. It is 
defined as the distance from the plume centreline at which the temperature of the 
plume gases are half of ΔTc or alternatively the velocity is equivalent to half of Uc. If 
these properties are assumed to have a Gaussian distribution across the plume then, 
given their inter-related nature, they should coincide at approximately the same 
ordinate. Therefore the calculated value should be independent of the chosen 
definition. Yet again we are met with methods proposed by Ingason and Kung et al to 
calculate this parameter. 
 
Unlike the other plume characteristics which come solely from Ingason [1] the 
calculation for plume width comes from earlier work by Ingason and deRis [15]. In 
fact it is a notable omission that an expression for plume width is not given in the later 
paper. In this case Ingason and deRis defined the plume width as the point at which 
the gas temperature is equal to half the centreline temperature. The expression was 
found from a curve fit to experimental data and is as follows 
zLb fc
1.0177.0=  
Equation 3-17 
where b is the width in metres and Lf is given by Equation 3-7. However when 
compared to results obtained from full-scale tests [11] Ingason found that Equation 
3-17 gave poor results. In this work a Gaussian distribution was used to provide a 
curve fit for the data. The curve fit yielded the following equation with R = 0.947. 
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where x is the radial distance from the plume centreline (m). By substituting x equal to 
bc and ΔT/ΔTc equal to 0.5 it can be shown that Equation 3-18 becomes an expression 
for plume width as follows 
12.0
0 )(149.0
Q
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−=  
Equation 3-19 
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To investigate Ingason’s comments that Equation 3-17 gave poor agreement with 
Equation 3-19 a plot was formed comparing both to Heskestad’s relationship for the 
plume (Figure 3-5). This clearly demonstrates the poor behaviour of Equation 3-17 
and it is recommended that this correlation is not applied in any situation. On the 
other hand Equation 3-19 exhibits encouraging behaviour and increased confidence is 
gained for the application of this method. 
 
Figure 3-5: Comparison of representations of the plume half-width. 
 
The method given by Kung et al [18] is based on the definition relating to velocity 
and is calculated by 
( ) ( )[ ] 2/13/503/20 106.01107.0 −−+−= zHQzHb cc  
Equation 3-20 
where z0 is given by Equation 3-13 and it is valid for the limit given by Equation 3-14. 
As for the other equations derived from this work it is only applicable out of the rack 
and therefore of little use for anything other than modelling conventional protection 
systems. 
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3.5.4  Ceiling Jet 
Although not strictly a plume property the resulting ceiling jet that occurs once the 
plume has impinged on the ceiling is important to consider. If the jet can be defined 
the response of protection measures within the ceiling jet can then be modelled. This 
is of particular use when concerned with the response of detector elements not 
directly within the plume. Unfortunately only one model for the properties of a ceiling 
jet, as a result of a rack storage fire, is available within the literature. Presented by 
Kung et al [18] this approach describes the ceiling jet in terms of temperature and 
velocity as  
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Equation 3-22 
where r is the radial distance from the plume centreline (m) and the limit r/bc > 1.5 
applies. Regrettably no discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach 
can be performed for the reasons described earlier and what is presented here is 
simply what can be found in Zalosh [3]. 
 
3.6 Protection Measures 
3.6.1 Introduction 
Now that we have an understanding of the early fire behaviour within a warehouse it 
is important to consider the effect of various protection measures. By providing 
protection it is possible to mitigate the effects of a fire and therefore reduce the 
overall loss. The most relevant systems for our purposes are sprinklers, 
compartmentation, and heat and smoke vents. Sprinklers, although not without fault, 
are an excellent form of defence and have long been accepted as the most effective 
form of protection. On the other hand the use of smoke and heat venting is a topic of 
hot debate and not yet fully resolved. Another topical feature is the effect of Fire 
Service response and whether they are able to be relied upon as a form of loss 
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prevention. The following will therefore discuss the merits of these mitigation 
strategies and how they are able to affect fire behaviour. 
 
3.6.2 Sprinklers 
3.6.2.1 Introduction 
In general terms sprinklers are used to provide protection from fire by using water to 
control or suppress the heat release rate. When acting in control mode the sprinklers 
simply halt the growth in heat release rate and prevent the fire from increasing in 
intensity, comparatively when acting in suppression mode the heat release rate is 
reduced, sometimes to the point of extinguishment. Invariably the Fire Service will 
become involved early enough after sprinkler operation that either mode is acceptable. 
Regardless of this, it is important to ensure adequate water is supplied to the fire to (a) 
ensure that the fuel surface is sufficiently cooled to prevent combustion, (b) limit the 
oxygen supply and (c) pre-wet any adjacent combustibles to prevent ignition. When 
this is achieved the sprinkler system will be effective and the loss will be significantly 
reduced. 
 
However significant problems can occur when sufficient water supply is not achieved. 
In this situation the sprinkler system may become overwhelmed and the fire will 
continue to grow, leading to much larger losses. This is a particular problem for rack 
storage as the fuel arrangement can prevent water from reaching the fire. If a fire 
occurs within a bottom tier then the goods stored above may shield the fire from the 
spray of a ceiling mounted system. If this happens the fire can grow to the stage at 
which too many sprinkler heads are opened and the system is overwhelmed. Other 
situations in which the sprinkler system may be overwhelmed are when the type of 
commodity has changed to a higher hazard or the storage restrictions applying to 
height and aisle width are violated. The water demand is based on these parameters so 
when changes are made the original design discharge may no longer be sufficient. In 
any case, when the system is overwhelmed the fire can often lead to the loss of the 
entire warehouse [3]. 
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Due to the problems associated with warehouse fire a number of alternative sprinklers 
and systems have been developed. Rather than choosing a conventional ceiling 
mounted sprinkler system it is now possible to specify alternatives such as Extra 
Large Orifice (ELO), Large Drop, and Early Suppression Fast Response (ESFR) 
heads. These sprinklers all work in different ways but their primary goal is to ensure 
that adequate water reaches the seat of the fire. ESFR sprinklers have an additional 
goal in that they aim for “early suppression” as opposed to the others which can be 
used in systems designed for control only. An alternative to a ceiling mounted system 
is an in-rack system. As the name suggests these sprinklers are located within the 
racks themselves thus reducing the response time and allow more effective water 
application. While these systems provide better protection they are still capable of 
failure if poorly designed. For example if in-rack sprinklers do not operate in a timely 
manner the rapid growth of flames may lead to the flame front passing the sprinkler 
before it activates [19]. In this case the sprinklers are ineffective and large losses will 
occur. 
 
Although these dangers do exist and sprinkler systems are capable of failure they are 
generally very reliable and provide the best means of fire protection. Nevertheless it is 
necessary to have an understanding of these weaknesses so that any sprinkler system 
is designed to avoid such failure. When designed properly they are by far the most 
effective and versatile form of protection and will significantly reduce loss. How the 
loss is actually reduced is important to understand and the topic of the following 
sections. 
 
3.6.2.2 Effect on heat release rate 
The most important influence that a sprinkler has is that on heat release rate. It is only 
by reducing this variable that sprinklers can have any effect on the damage that would 
otherwise be caused. This is achieved through the water’s ability to cool the fuel 
surface, limit the oxygen supply and, to a certain extent, cool the flame and reduce 
radiative feedback. There has been a reasonable amount of research that aims to 
quantify or at least describe these effects yet there has been little done that relates 
specifically to warehouse fire or lends itself to simple practical application. 
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The most common analysis of water as an extinguishment agent is to use an energy 
balance model at the fuel surface. This type of approach calculates the required heat 
to evaporate the applied water. Once the required heat reaches a critical value the 
flame can no longer sustain itself and extinguishment is deemed to occur. If the water 
application rate is known then it is a simple task to calculate the altered heat release 
rate based on an energy balance. Nevertheless these methods do not lend themselves 
to practical application and are more suitable for an investigation concerned with first 
principles. If the reader cares to know more, methods of this type have been presented 
by Beyler [20] and Heskestad [21].  
 
In contrast Yu et al [22] have taken a “global energy balance” equation and developed 
a model to determine the sprinklered heat release rate. The work was carried out as 
part of the Factory Mutual Research Corporation sprinkler research program. Over 
100 full-scale tests were carried out for racks with up to five tiers. Both the standard 
plastic and standard class II commodity+ were used as the fuel source and a 
specialised water applicator was used to provide suppression. The energy balance 
equation was then manipulated to obtain the following relationship between the heat 
release rate at time of sprinkler activation, Qa0 (kW) and the heat release rate at a 
time, t, after activation, Qa.(kW) 
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Equation 3-23 
Where t0 is the time of sprinkler activation (s) and k is an empirical constant named 
the fire suppression parameter dependent on fuel density, the fuel’s specific heat, 
ignition temperature, heat of combustion, burning rate, heat of pyrolysis and water 
application rate. It is obtained from curve fits and calculated as follows 
0040.0536.0 " −= wmk  
Equation 3-24 
for the standard class II commodity in the range of 0.006 < mw” < 0.024 kg/m2/s and 
0131.0716.0 " −= wmk  
Equation 3-25 
                                                 
+ The standard class II commodity has been used extensively in rack storage tests and consists of empty 
metal-lined double triwall corrugated paper cartons [6]. 
 51
for the standard plastic commodity in the range of 0.012 < mw” < 0.041 kg/m2/s. The 
variable mw” is the water application density and it is calculated by assuming the 
water applied to the top of the burning array is distributed evenly over all exposed 
vertical surfaces of the array and the top surfaces of the top tier.  
 
It is evident that this approach lends itself to real-life applications. By knowing the 
discharge density and modelling the thermal response of the sprinkler the sprinklered 
heat release rate can be predicted. A theoretical scenario was modelled to investigate 
the model’s performance. The scenario consisted of a 2x2x2 array and the 
uncontrolled heat release rate was modelled using Equation 3-4 for both the plastic 
and class II commodities. The protection was modelled as a ring of four 92˚C 
standard response sprinklers at 3m centres with a nominal RTI of 200m1/2s1/2 and 
discharge density of 25mm/min. The results are presented below in Figure 3-6. 
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Figure 3-6: Sprinklered heat release rate for theoretical scenario. 
 
When compared to actual heat release rate graphs presented in the literature [3, 23, 
24] reasonable agreement was found. In particular, the time to activation for the 
sprinkler and the heat release rate at time of activation was remarkably well modelled. 
The post activation heat release rate gave good results however it lacked ability to 
predict a sharp drop at the time of activation. Nevertheless this is not overly important 
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as it is conservative to assume a slower initial decay. The comparison to actual data 
gives increased confidence in the model’s applicability and the approach is deemed 
appropriate for use. 
 
Although this approach may seem ideal it is not without its faults. Unfortunately the 
model has only been developed relative to two commodities. While it can be taken 
that these are representative of their various classes it is possible that the fire 
suppression parameter will vary for other commodities of the same class. Similarly 
only two commodities were tested; this means that k values for lower class 
commodities have not been established. Admittedly applying a k value for that of a 
higher class will be conservative but on the other hand it may be overly so. The heart 
of the problem lies with the fact that the fire suppression parameter is something that 
needs to be developed from extensive testing yet the testing does not appear to have 
been conducted. This is understandable it is neither practical nor economical to 
perform for every commodity. Therefore it shall be taken that those developed 
provide an adequate approximation for other commodities in their Class. How the 
parameter for lower Classes will be defined is something still to resolve. 
 
Problems also occur when comparing the method of water application used during 
testing to that of a real sprinkler. The specialised water applicator consists of a grid of 
pipes with a total of 64 spray nozzles located 30.5 mm above the top surface of the 
fuel array. This was to ensure that the water applied to the burning array was easily 
quantifiable. But when we compare this to a sprinkler, which may be metres above the 
array, we can not guarantee that the discharge density at the head will be the density 
received at the burning surface. This is described by the terms Required Delivered 
Density (RDD) and Actual Delivered Density (ADD). The RDD is the discharge 
density at the sprinkler head required to extinguish an item. The ADD is the actual 
density received at the fuel surface and is always less than the RDD due to a number 
of factors including evaporation and plume effects. For the tests the ADD and RDD 
were equivalent however for the model to be realistic it is important to account for the 
ADD. Therefore the discharge density from the head must be modified to an ADD. 
This is a complex phenomenon to try and model and the important parameters are 
discussed in the following section. 
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A model of a similar functional form to Equation 3-23 was developed for 
incorporation into FDS by Hamins and McGrattan [25]. As for that of Yu et al the 
model was developed based on experimental data, although in this instance on a 
reduced scale and only for the standard plastic commodity. This work was needed as 
Yu et al’s method was inappropriate because their solution provides a global heat 
release rate while FDS requires an expression for the local heat release rate. Hamins’ 
and McGrattan’s model therefore predicts the heat release rate on a local scale and 
also allows for fires that redevelop after an initial decrease in heat release rate. While 
important to mention, this method is deemed inappropriate for the purposes of this 
research. This is due to the fact that we require a global heat release rate, only one 
commodity was tested and issues arise when applying the results to full scale 
scenarios. Therefore this approach will be investigated no further. 
 
Before proceeding it is important to recognise the paucity of methods available for 
expressing the sprinklered heat release rate. This is in part due to Factory Mutual 
Research Corporation’s dominance in anything involved with sprinkler testing and 
research. From various citations in the literature it would appear that numerous 
reports exist that may provide additional insight into this problem. Unfortunately 
these reports are not available in the public domain and any attempts to obtain them 
proved fruitless. 
 
3.6.2.3 RDD v ADD: Plume penetration 
The RDD is the all important variable for any sprinkler system. Usually specified by 
the relevant standard or code it is this value that defines the requirements for all 
components associated with the system. It is either determined by experience, 
historical performance or, more increasingly, through experiment. The push to 
determine experimental RDDs is more common in the United States of America and 
is usually related to special types of head such as ESFR. Regardless of how the value 
within the standard is obtained it can be taken that it shall provide adequate protection 
for the relevant situation but nevertheless of this a certain amount of fire damage will 
occur and this needs to be quantified. 
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If Equation 3-23 is to be applied to calculate this damage then we need to determine 
how much of the RDD is actually reaching the top of the array, or in other words we 
must quantify the ADD. The ADD differs to the RDD due to the updraft of the plume 
preventing some of the spray from reaching the fire. A sprinkler spray’s ability to 
penetrate the plume can be categorised in terms of gravitational or momentum 
penetration [26]. Gravitational penetration occurs when the terminal velocities of the 
falling drops exceed the velocity of the plume gases, or the drop size is greater than a 
minimum drop size that will be stopped by the plume flow. Conversely momentum 
penetration occurs when the thrust of the sprinkler spray is able to overcome the 
upward thrust of the plume flow. Evaporation of the spray will also have an effect on 
ADD however it is these two types of penetration that have the greatest influence. 
This is an obvious problem for warehouse fire as the fire plume is strongly buoyant 
[1] and therefore harder to penetrate. Similarly the often high ceiling clearance within 
a warehouse will mean the spray has further to travel to reach the fire and is therefore 
required to penetrate the plume for larger distances in order to reach the fire. Research 
by Bill [27] indicates that this is an important effect to consider with penetration being 
inversely proportional to ceiling clearance. The obvious remedy is to develop a 
correlation between the RDD and ADD. 
 
This relationship is defined as the penetration ratio, P, where P is equivalent to the 
ADD divided by the RDD. When P has a value of unity the penetration is absolute 
however this is physically unreasonable during a fire and therefore only a theoretical 
concept. But while perfect penetration is not feasible the concept is valid and shall be 
used to define the relative effectiveness of sprinkler sprays in different situations. 
There has been some effort made to quantify this relationship through experiment and 
computer simulation yet the offered solutions fall short of providing a comprehensive 
solution.  
 
Experiments were conducted by Chan et al [28] at FMRC to investigate the 
phenomena of ADD and its ability to be measured. The tests used a fire plume 
simulator calibrated to simulate the plume of a 6.1m high rack storage fire of standard 
class II commodity. Three upright standard response sprinklers were used to supply 
the spray and a number of different discharge rates were tested. A relationship for P 
was developed however it is only relevant for the gravity penetration regime. Not only 
 55
is it limited in this extent but it is only applicable for one ceiling height, and one 
commodity. It also requires a number of empirical constants that change relative to 
the type of head used. Needless to say their approach does not provide the remedy that 
is required. Still it does provide some insight into important parameters that will affect 
the penetration within the gravity realm. As expected the important parameters are the 
temperature and velocity of the plume gases and the characteristic drop size of the 
sprinkler spray. Although not overly useful for this research there is at least 
confirmation that the theory behind spray and plume interaction holds true. 
 
While the above approach of Chan et al appears to be the only piece of research that 
has produced an equation attempting to quantify the penetration ratio there are a 
number of computer programmes that have been developed [27, 29, 30]. Invariably 
drawing on a Lagrangian particle tracking method to describe the sprinkler spray 
these numerical solutions have attempted to model the ADD obtained in experiment 
and therefore the penetration ratio. Nevertheless the results of the model are usually 
quite poor and in one case the author even admits that the solution is highly 
questionable and requires a significant amount of validation before being applied as a 
design tool [29]. It is also worth noting that all these authors are associated with 
FMRC and the results used to validate their models generally came from in-house 
experiments and are not available for public scrutiny. 
 
Evidently a solution to quantify P for different situations does not exist. Although 
some work has been performed it is limited in application. Also frustrating were the 
comments from various authors citing plans to further quantify P and eventually 
provide a suitable solution. When searched for these models were not found and one 
can only speculate as to why they never eventuated. This is unfortunate, but 
understandable as the only true concern for protection is that the RDD causes 
suppression of the fire. As long as suppression occurs the ADD is simply a 
phenomenon that would be interesting to quantify yet not essential. This is clearly a 
concern for this research as it is an important input into Equation 3-23 and how this is 
to be dealt with needs to be decided.  
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3.6.3 Smoke and Heat Vents 
As alluded to earlier the use of smoke and heat vents in sprinklered buildings is 
contentious at the very least with differences of opinion regarding their use wide 
ranging. This is based in part on conflicting results from experiment and, it would 
seem, industrial ties to those who manufacture the different systems. It is argued that 
vents can exacerbate the damage caused by a fire and hinder sprinkler effectiveness. 
However the literature indicates that this may not be the case. The wide ranging issues 
relating to this topic would cover a thesis in themselves and as a result the following 
is a review of three comprehensive summaries of the important issues. However, 
before discussing the findings it is important to first describe the operating principles 
behind vent systems. 
 
The primary aim of a vent system is to reduce the quantity of combustion products 
within the fire compartment. This is achieved by removing hot smoky gases from the 
upper layer and introducing uncontaminated air into the lower layer. The removal of 
gases is either driven by buoyancy forces, mechanical forces or a combination. In 
removing the gases it is aimed to provide better means of escape, facilitate fire 
fighting operations by improving visibility and reduce property damage from 
exposure to excessive temperatures and smoke. Provided that the vents operate as 
designed they can be a very valuable tool for limiting the severity of damage. 
However when employed in combination with sprinklers their effectiveness is brought 
into question. This is because the sprinklers change the conditions within the 
compartment and these conditions differ from those for which the vents were 
designed. Alternatively if the vents operate first they may alter the conditions for 
which the sprinkler system is designed. In either scenario it is hard to predict the 
possible consequences and as a result there has been considerable research performed 
to investigate the interactions between the two systems. 
 
The convoluted nature of this research has already been mentioned and it is therefore 
proposed that a review of three comprehensive summaries will suffice as adequate 
coverage within this thesis. The reviews in question are those of Beyler and Cooper 
[31], Cooper [32] and Heskestad [33]. All three of the reviews approach the problem 
from a slightly different angle and therefore provide excellent coverage of the relevant 
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issues. Most importantly the reviews are conducted from a seemingly neutral 
standpoint and therefore should be free of bias. 
 
Beyler and Cooper [31] conducted an extensive peer review of 34 reports from 13 
different experimental studies. These studies were comprised of those that used vents 
and sprinklers separately as well as combined systems. (Those tests that included 
combined systems also made use of draft curtains to some degree.) Their aim was to 
try and identify core issues and eliminate biases, therefore developing a more 
reasoned approach to the problem. As a result the following key claims both for and 
against combined systems were recognised.  
 
Claims for; 
• Smoke and heat vents limit the distribution of combustion products within the 
compartment regardless of sprinklers operating. 
• Smoke and heat vents reduce the number of sprinklers activated. 
• Smoke and heat vents allow easier identification of the seat of the fire for fire 
fighters. 
 
Claims against; 
• Smoke and heat vents will cause increased burning rates. 
• Smoke and heat vents will delay sprinkler operation. 
• Smoke and heat vents increase the number of activated sprinklers. 
• Smoke and heat vent flows are not sufficient to provide any benefit. 
 
These claims were then tested against the results of the 34 reports under review and a 
number of conclusions were reached. The most important of which are; 
• Venting does not have a negative effect on sprinkler performance. 
• The success of sprinkler performance is not dependent on reduced oxygen 
concentrations in the lower layer. 
• Venting has no effect on the time to operation or the number of operating 
sprinklers. 
• Venting does limit the spread of products and visibility is increased both for 
egress and fire fighting operations. 
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• Venting does limit the damage due to heat and smoke. 
• Draft curtains can provide additional benefit by limiting the spread of smoke 
and increasing vent effectiveness. 
 
Overall it was found that the contradictory nature of results was largely due to each 
test lacking thoroughness. In short, the tests were not comprehensive and left too 
many variables uncontrolled or used misguided approximations. Unfortunately this 
may be the nature of such research as it could be too expensive and impractical to 
carry out adequate full scale testing. Nevertheless based on the reasoning of Beyler 
and Cooper it is still possible to employ combined systems that provide increased 
protection to that which would otherwise be obtained. How exactly this should be 
done is covered in more depth by Cooper [32]. 
 
Cooper’s offering comes to us from the SFPE Handbook {Cooper, 2002 #32} in his 
section on the design of smoke and heat venting systems which concludes with a 
section on designing systems that successfully combine vents and sprinklers. Cooper 
indicates that it is not clear whether it is possible to combine both systems and receive 
both sets of benefits as the performance of one affects the performance of the other. 
This is in part blamed on the conflicting results of past studies and clear evidence of 
bias within some reports. However based on the review described above he then 
suggests the following criteria that could be applied in a methodology for successful 
design using vents only; 
• Sufficient venting should occur so as to provide adequate visibility for egress 
and reduce the descent of the upper layer to an acceptable level. 
• If the use of draft curtains is also employed then venting should restrict the 
spread of smoke to the curtained area thereby reducing the risk of damage to 
the contents of the building. 
 
To achieve these goals with a combined system becomes problematic. The main 
problem identified is trying to determine the performance of vents after sprinklers 
have operated and altered conditions within the compartment. This is then broken 
down into allowing for interaction of the sprinkler spray and smoke layer, computer 
modelling of “specific phenomena”, and resolving issues with sprinkler and vent 
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skipping. It is proposed that once these variables are better understood the 
combination of both systems will drastically limit fire severity and damage to 
property. Clearly this is advantageous for all parties and considering the possibilities 
with an open mind is essential if any progress is to be made. Cooper’s methodology 
seems very sound in principle and would be an excellent starting point for anyone 
who attempts to solve this conundrum in the future. 
 
Although not as extensive as that of Cooper, Heskestad’s review [33] provides further 
insight into a very complicated problem. For simple venting problems a number of 
equations are presented alongside guidelines for system design. These complement 
the work of Cooper nicely and would serve any reader well. However the differences 
come when considering the combined effects of sprinklers and vents. Unlike Cooper, 
Heskestad limits his discussion to the work contained within only 8 papers and 
provides in-depth information about the merits of each. The claims assessed are 
essentially the same as those listed above and Heskestad finds that the research is 
largely inconclusive. In addition the cost effectiveness of combined systems is 
questioned. Nevertheless Heskestad is not given to making any definite assertions 
and, like Cooper, simply suggests more research is required within the field. 
 
From these reviews it is apparent that the criticism of vent systems has been unjust. 
The motivation for such an attitude can only be guessed at; however it is certain that 
research citing poor performance of venting systems must be used cautiously. In a 
similar way caution must also be applied when specifying combined systems. The 
authors all recommended that if vents are used then they should have an option for 
manual operation. Cooper even goes so far as to suggest that early and ganged 
operation is advisable. Whatever system is finally chosen it is important to apply 
sound engineering principles and give adequate consideration to the relevant 
variables. 
 
3.6.4 Fire Service Response 
The New Zealand Fire Service has a legal obligation to protect persons and property 
exposed to fire and it can be said that they are very adept at performing what is 
required. However, the unusual nature of warehouse fire has a potential to reduce 
 60
their effectiveness; this is highlighted by comments from Zalosh[3] and Ingason [34]. 
Both of these authors describe the problems that may be encountered during Fire 
Service operations and how these will hinder their ability to perform an aggressive 
attack. The most important of these factors are extremely rapid growth rates and 
difficulty in locating, and accessing the seat of the fire. Nevertheless there is still 
potential to rely on the Fire Service for reducing loss levels. As a result a review of 
relevant literature was performed in conjunction with interviews of senior members 
within the New Zealand Fire Service. The aim of this investigation was to develop a 
true representation of the Fire Service capabilities for limiting economic loss. 
 
The most pertinent reference discovered was that of Sardqvist and Holmstedt [35] 
who performed a large statistical study on 307 non-residential fires. The aim of the 
study was to investigate any correlations that exist between fire fighting operations 
and fire area. This was investigated by splitting the time from ignition to 
extinguishment into a number of discrete intervals by defining a number of critical 
events; (i) Preheating Starts, (ii) Ignition, (iii) Discovery, (iv) Fire Service Arrival,  
(v) Intervention, (vi) Spread Stopped, (vii) Flames Out and (viii) Fire Dead. Data on 
fire area was obtained at three stages during the fire; Detection, Fire Service Arrival 
and Spread Stopped. A statistical analysis was then performed that related the fire 
area to various time intervals defined by the previously stated events. The correlations 
or lack thereof are as follows: 
• The time from preheat to ignition was found to have a weakly inverse 
relationship to final fire area. 
• The time from ignition to detection was not correlated to final fire area. 
• The time from detection to FS arrival was not correlated to final fire area. 
• The time from arrival to intervention was not correlated to final fire area. 
• The time from ignition to intervention was not correlated to final fire area. 
• The time from intervention to the stop of spread was positively correlated to 
final fire area. 
• The time from stop of spread to putting the flames out was positively 
correlated to final fire area. 
• The time from putting the flames out to fire dead was positively correlated to 
final fire area. 
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The conclusion drawn from these results was that most fires have become self-
contained by the time of FS arrival. This refers to fires that have either not spread 
beyond the object of origin, area of origin, or compartment of origin by the time of FS 
arrival. In fact it was discovered that 49% ± 6% of fires spread no further after 
detection and 74% ± 5% spread no further after FS arrival. This was taken as 
indication that the contents of the compartment and construction details are far more 
important than the FS response time. Even so this is no fault of the Fire Service, the 
overwhelming majority of response times were within 5-10 minutes; while the time to 
intervention after arrival was generally less than 5 minutes, and if we are being 
realistic, these times are more than commendable. Therefore the authors decided to 
investigate the portion of fires where the fires were still spreading upon FS arrival. 
This additional investigation found that the time from Ignition to Fire Service Arrival 
had a weakly positively correlation to final fire area. Although this correlation is not 
particularly strong it is significant in that when all fires were included, no correlation 
was found. 
 
While the data used for this analysis does not differentiate between different types of 
occupancies it has important implications for warehouses. The data suggests that for 
small, self-contained fires the FS can be effective in putting out the fire and reducing 
loss regardless of response time. However for any fires that spread beyond this and 
involve one or more racks, the response time does become critical. This is only 
exacerbated by the possibility of extremely rapid growth rates. In fact Sardqvist and 
Holmstedt [35] state that fires with final area greater than 40-80 m2 are usually greater 
than 1 m2 by detection and greater than 10 m2 by FS arrival. It is also worth noting 
that these fires are observed to continue spreading after FS arrival and a ten-fold 
increase in the total fire area is not uncommon. Warehouse fires easily have the 
potential to reach this magnitude and it is therefore important to gain insight into how 
the NZFS view the threat of warehouse fire and how they would go about managing 
such an event. 
 
To obtain a representation of the NZFS attitude to warehouse fire it was decided to 
interview senior members of the Service with operational experience and, if possible, 
an engineering background [36-39]. It is hoped that this will prevent any bias and 
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findings that may prove too optimistic. The common thread among these discussions 
is that warehouse fire is viewed as an extremely high risk event; the large fuel loads 
and compartment sizes all result in a fire that is difficult to attack. Nevertheless it was 
thought that upon arrival the first intent is to perform an aggressive interior attack and 
for the majority of situations it is thought that this will be the first course of action. 
However the effectiveness of this attack is brought into question and depends largely 
on the size of the fire. It is believed that once the heat release rate has reached 10-20 
MW the FS will be operating at their full capacity [36, 38]. At this heat release rate it 
is thought that, if still growing rapidly, the potential to halt the fire’s progress is 
almost non-existent. These comments appear to support the findings described above 
for fires with final area greater than 40-80 m2. 
 
Despite this there is still potential for the FS to be effective: the corollary being that 
the FS do have the potential to extinguish fires below this threshold. Therefore we can 
expect that the FS will be able to limit the flame damage for fires with a maximum 
heat release rate less than 10-20 MW. The most likely of these being small isolated 
fires or those that are sprinkler controlled. Unfortunately the effects of smoke damage 
are, in all cases, beyond their control and this is freely admitted, yet the FS fully 
believe in their capabilities to protect the structure from total loss. Provided the fire 
has not become too large and that there is adequate access from the perimeter, it is 
thought that the upper layer can be cooled sufficiently to limit the extent of structural 
damage. While this is clearly important to the building owner in reducing loss it also 
has benefits for the FS; if fire fighters are within the building, maintaining structural 
integrity is critical for the safety of those individuals. It could then be suggested that 
the FS will maintain preventing structural collapse as a high priority, therefore 
increasing their reliability for preventing structural loss. An upshot of this may be 
increased effectiveness in saving the contents as their ability to stay within the 
building and fight the fire is improved. 
 
Based on their comments it is plain to see that the FS do have the ability to reduce the 
total loss for warehouse fire, provided the fire is below 10-20 MW upon arrival, and 
particularly if the fire has stopped growing. The question that now needs to be 
answered is: at what stage does the fire reach this threshold and how does this 
compare to the time taken for FS intervention? If we simply take an estimate of time 
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to intervention from the times given above by Sardqvist and Holmstedt the time taken 
would be 6 minutes at best and 20 minutes at worst. With reference to Figure 3-1 we 
can see that this corresponds to heat release rates exceeding 10 MW. This does not 
bode well for the FS. However if we are being fair, this is a crude way of estimating 
response time and as a result AS1668.3:2001 [40] was used to calculate the time to 
intervention. This standard covers the design of smoke control systems within single 
compartment buildings or smoke reservoirs. Appendix C of the standard, Fire Control 
Time, describes calculations used to determine the time for a fire to come under 
control, either due to automated systems or manual intervention. The shortest possible 
time for FS intervention was found to be approximately 11.5 minutes. These 
calculations can be found in Chapter 9. One should be aware that the time of 10 
minutes has been made unrealistically prompt by reducing travel times to an absolute 
minimum. This was done to give the FS every chance of responding before the fire 
became too large. Despite this the implications for the FS are not good as the heat 
release rate on arrival is predicted to be well above the 10MW limit. It is important to 
remember Figure 3-1 is a worst case-scenario involving instantaneous ignition in the 
most critical location. For fires that start elsewhere, have a slower ignition or become 
self-contained below 10 MW more favourable results may be obtained.  
 
Another way to improve the capabilities of the FS is to provide appropriate protection 
measures. Not only do these features have the ability to provide the FS with an 
improved chance of successful intervention but they also have the ability to halt the 
progress of the fire entirely. In order to gauge the relative benefits it was decided to 
ask the FS what protection measures they would like to see in warehouses and why. 
Their responses are summarized as follows: 
• Sprinklers: Control the fire size with the potential for extinguishment, and 
even when their capacity for control has been exceeded their ability to slow 
the spread of fire is valuable. There was no strong preference given with 
respect to the type of system used, however ESFR and in-rack sprinklers were 
recognised as optimal. 
• Vents: These were strongly recommended for a number of reasons; improved 
visibility, lower compartment temperatures, reduced smoke spread/damage 
and potential for use in an external attack. These are all critical factors for fires 
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that are marginally controlled as their features greatly improve the chances of 
the fire coming under complete control. Systems based on fusible links and 
panels were preferred although there was a strong distrust of using non-rated 
components such as skylights. There was also the suggestion that wall 
mounted vents would provide additional benefits as opposed to a system 
comprised solely of ceiling mounted vents. 
• Separations: Improve the chances of the fire becoming self contained, thereby 
limiting the spread of flame and combustion products hence reducing loss. The 
resultant limited fire size also improves the ability of the FS to intervene. 
• Draft curtains: Once again these are favourable because they limit the spread 
of smoke and hot gases. This increases visibility and helps reduce flame 
spread through radiant feedback from the upper layer. Although never actually 
witnessed in a New Zealand warehouse their potential benefits were 
considered valuable. 
• Internal hydrants: By providing an easily accessible water supply within the 
compartment the time required for running hose is reduced as well as 
improving the ease with which the FS can perform their operations. 
• Detection: The earlier the brigade is notified the greater the chances of being 
able to perform an aggressive attack. 
• First aid equipment: If the fire is caught in the early stages the FS may not 
even be required, yet should the fire exceed the capabilities of those attacking 
it, the growth may have been sufficiently halted to improve the chance of 
effective FS intervention. Needless to say the importance of training occupants 
in the use of such equipment was strongly recommended. 
• Structural protection: Any measure that improves the integrity of the structure 
under fire loading will therefore improve the ability of the FS to carry out 
operations. 
 
3.7 Conclusions 
Although the above discussion does not uncover a great deal of work relating to 
useful representations of warehouse fire, that which has been found provide some 
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useful results. From the previous discussion the following equations have been 
selected as appropriate for this research: 
 
Heat Release Rate – Equation 3-4 from Ingason [12] was selected as the 
representation of the initial growth rate. This was due to its versatility and its basis on 
a large number of different commodities. 
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Despite its versatility this equation is limited by its applicability for relatively low 
heat release rates. Rack storage fires will generally reach a 7 MW convective heat 
release rate in less than two minutes. How the heat release rate should be calculated 
beyond this limit is not described within the literature. So while this method is 
excellent for describing the early heat release rate it is necessary to carry out further 
investigation to describe higher heat release rates. 
 
Flame Height – The representation for flame height is taken as Equation 3-8 from 
Ingason [1]. Although some limitations were established it provides a more 
conservative estimate than the alternatives. 
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Plume Temperature – The two available options for calculating plume temperature are 
hard to compare as one represents the temperature within the rack, and the other the 
temperature above the rack. It may be that a model linking the two can be developed 
thus providing a representation for plume temperature at all heights. For the sake of 
completeness the two equations are reproduced below with 
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giving the in rack temperature and  
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providing the temperature out of the rack. 
 
Plume Velocity – When modelling this variable we are presented with a similar 
situation as that for plume temperatures. The limited choice of methods means that no 
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comparisons can be drawn however they still appear to be valid for their 
recommended applications. Therefore the in rack plume centreline velocities will be 
calculated from Equation 3-15  
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while the centreline velocity where the plume impinges the ceiling is given by 
Equation 3-16. 
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Once again it may be that a model combining these two expressions can be developed 
to give values at all heights. 
 
Plume width – The expression for plume width is that given by Ingason [11] and 
manifests itself as Equation 3-19 
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Ceiling Jet – Only one model exists for describing this feature. Therefore no 
comparisons to additional methods can be made. As a result the equations given by 
Kung et al [18] will be applied. Due to the fact that no comparisons can be made these 
methods will be applied with caution. 
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Sprinklered Heat Release Rate – The method of Yu et al [22] was chosen for 
representing the sprinklered heat release and although no comparison to other 
methods could be made it is thought that this approach provides excellent results. 
Therefore the sprinklered heat release rate is calculated using the following equation 
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with 
0040.0536.0 " −= wmk  
for the standard class II commodity in the range of 0.006 < mw” < 0.024 kg/m2/s and 
0131.0716.0 " −= wmk  
for the standard plastic commodity in the range of 0.012 < mw” < 0.041 kg/m2/s. 
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Chapter 4 Statistical Approach 
 
4.1  Introduction 
4.1.1 Risk based analysis 
Risk based analysis has experienced a “coming of age” in recent times with its 
applicability to almost any field providing valuable insight for a range of different 
problems. This has become particularly apparent with the development of standards 
such as AS/NZS 4360:2003 [1] which gives an excellent methodology for the risk 
management process. Further to this development have been fire specific standards 
such as PD 7974-7:2003 [2] and PAS79:2005 as a structured approach to decision 
making under uncertainty, they describe a fire risk analysis using the following steps; 
 
1 Identify fire hazards. 
2 Quantify consequence and probability of fire hazards. 
3 Identify hazard control options. 
4 Quantify impact of options on risks of hazards. 
5 Select appropriate protection. 
 
It is the aim of this investigation to develop a tool for quantification of fire risk and 
probable outcomes. The tool can then be used to aid the process described above and 
allow the engineer and property owner to make informed decisions when undertaking 
Step 5 of the process. 
 
4.1.2 Event tree analysis  
An event tree is a statistical device that allows one to calculate the likelihood of 
different scenarios; as such it provides an excellent instrument for our means. More 
formally it is described as a graphical logic model that identifies and quantifies 
possible outcomes following an initial event [3]. In our case the initiating event is a 
fire, this is then followed by a temporal sequence of events which can lead to a variety 
of outcomes. A sample event tree is presented below in Figure 4-1. By assigning each 
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event a probability we can move through the tree and calculate the resultant 
probability for each outcome.  
 
Initiating 
Event
Automatic 
Suppression
Brigade 
Control? Outcome
Yes Minimal Loss
Yes
No Extensive Loss
Fire
Yes Extensive Loss
No
No Total Loss  
Figure 4-1: Sample Event Tree. 
 
4.2 Probabilities 
4.2.1  Background 
The utility of an event tree is reliant on the probabilities assigned to each event; if 
erroneous inputs are specified one can only expect erroneous results. It is an 
unfortunate circumstance that the data relevant to this problem is questionable in 
nature. In some cases the data-sets are very small and in other cases the probabilities 
are only a best estimate. This is a serious problem that needs addressing within the 
literature however it is not the purpose of this research to establish accurate statistics. 
Instead we are simply investigating the ability of event trees to provide useful loss 
estimates. As such the form of the tree is our main focus and any results produced are 
theoretical. This then allows comparison of different protection measures for each 
specific case but the results themselves should not be taken as a true quantification of 
the possible outcomes. While this is regrettable it is thought that the final result is a 
useful tool and can provide valuable information about the different levels of risk 
faced when specifying a range of protection measures. 
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4.3 Distributions 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Point estimates of system reliability are useful however they are limited in that they 
give only one outcome. Unfortunately uncertainties are not accounted for when 
making a point estimate and as such the calculated answer may differ drastically from 
the real-life scenario. Alternatively it is possible to specify each variable as a 
probability function. In this way with the distribution of each variable includes any 
uncertainty relating to the point estimate providing a realistic representation of the 
reliability.  
 
4.3.2 Calculating the distribution 
A normal distribution truncated at the limits of [0, 1] was assigned to the majority of 
the point value probabilities detailed below. This distribution was chosen for a variety 
of reasons; 
 
• It is a very common distribution and a wide range of phenomena are observed 
to exhibit this behaviour. 
• Enright [4] applied normal distributions and although reliability measures are 
often described with a Pareto function we lack sufficient data to describe such 
a distribution.  
• It is adequate for the purpose of illustration and will provide useful results. 
 
Accepting that a normal distribution is appropriate the next step is to define the 
distribution in terms of its mean and standard deviation. To estimate the mean it is 
assumed that a point value estimates of probability can be applied. Estimating the 
standard deviation is hard to do arbitrarily and as a solution the concept of confidence 
level is applied. For example if one is 90% confident that the mean probability of a 
function is 0.9 then 90% of the distribution will fall within 1.6449 standard deviations 
of the mean. The value of 1.6449 relates to a z-score which is found by the following 
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σ
μ−= xz  
Equation 4-1 
Where z is the z-score, μ is the mean, σ is the standard deviation and x represents the 
number of z-scores from the mean. This equation presents a problem as there are two 
unknowns; σ and x. Therefore we need to define one of these variables and because 
there is little information giving insight into the true standard deviation it was decided 
to define x as a user determined variable. The most appropriate expression of x was 
determined to be in the form of error limits. For the example above the mean 
probability is 0.9 however if we are confident that this value is correct to ±0.05 we 
can then say that we are 90% confident that the mean is 0.9±0.05 and therefore 90% 
of the distribution will fall between the limits of 0.85 and 0.95. These values can then 
be substituted into Equation 4-1 to calculate a standard deviation of 0.03. This process 
was applied to determine the distribution of all input variables. It is important to note 
that this is done purely on the author’s confidence in the source material and where 
possible the distributions should be based on actual statistical data. Unfortunately this 
could not be performed for this research. Nevertheless the chosen values are deemed 
useful for the purpose of illustration and give a clear indication of the method’s 
potential. 
 
A uniform distribution was assigned for those variables not best described by a 
normal function. In these cases the distribution is described by maximum and 
minimum limits. Uniform distributions were chosen for those variables where 
particular uncertainty relating to the point estimate probabilities exists such as for 
successful Fire Service intervention. 
 
A summary of the input distributions is presented below. They are based on point 
estimates of reliability from within the literature and the method of assigning 
distributions described above. Note that for each distribution the mean is chosen to 
provide a conservative estimate of the component reliability, and therefore coincides 
with the lowest value of the probabilities discovered within the literature. They are 
also chosen to provide a means of comparing different protection options and as such 
are only considered useful to provide a relative measure of the resultant loss. 
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4.3.3 Fire Start 
The fire incidence data in New Zealand is not dependable for our purposes and as 
such was not relied upon in specifying the probability of a fire start. This is primarily 
because warehouses are not an individual property classification; rather they come 
under the heading of “General Storage”. This class also includes occupancies such as 
hay barns and garages and applying a probability that included these fires as well 
would not be acceptable. Further to this the relevant data only included 21 warehouse 
fires thus providing too small a sample. Fortunately two international standards 
provide the necessary information to determine the probability of a fire starting in a 
warehouse occupancy. The Australian Fire Safety Engineering Guidelines [5] 
presents the following equation which is based on a number of statistical studies. 
 
25 //103.3 myrp −×=  
Equation 4-2 
 
where p is the probability of a fire start. On the other hand the British PD 7974-
7:2003 [2] provides Equation 4-3 for the same purpose 
 
5.04107.6 bi AF
−×=  
Equation 4-3 
 
Where Fi is the annual frequency of ignition and Ab is the total floor area of the 
building.  
 
Equation 4-2 was chosen as the most suitable method for calculating the probability 
of warehouse fire. This was because the Fire Engineering Guidelines are an accepted 
document within the New Zealand fire community. 
 
4.3.4 Detection 
An important component of any fire protection system is the method of detection. 
Appropriate selection of the detection system can lead to much earlier detection and 
increase the potential to limit fire loss. The most appropriate source for this data was 
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once again the Australian Fire Safety Engineering Guidelines [5]. This document 
provides probability data for a range of detection systems and it is reproduced below 
in Table 4-1. The values chosen were for that of a non-flashover fire as flashover is 
not considered a valid concept for warehouse fires. 
 
Table 4-1: Probability of successful activation for various detection systems. 
Detector Non-flashover fire
Heat 0.90 
Sprinkler 0.95 
Smoke -  
      Smoke Alarm 0.75 
 
The resulting distributions used for analysis are summarised in the following figures. 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Distribution for probability of successful heat detection. 
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Figure 4-3: Distribution for probability of successful sprinkler detection. 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Distribution for probability of successful smoke detection. 
 
4.3.5 Manual Suppression 
The probability of manual suppression has long been a contentious issue within the 
fire engineering community as it is a hard variable to quantify. This is mainly because 
if successful intervention occurs the fire is generally not reported to the Fire Service. 
Research for the New Zealand Fire Service suggests that at least 80% of all fires are 
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successfully extinguished by building occupants [6]. However this figure relates to 
residential dwellings and can not be directly applied to warehouse occupancies. 
Moreover the low occupant loads of most warehouses would suggest that manual 
suppression is unlikely as the opportunity for discovery is reduced. Conversely it 
could be said that warehouse fires are often started by activities of the building 
occupants and therefore they are in close proximity to intervene should the correct 
equipment be supplied. The conflicting implications of these statements highlight the 
need for appropriate research into the problem, nevertheless this does not solve the 
problem of specifying an appropriate probability. In an effort to address this problem 
the following conservative assumptions are made; 
 
• Warehouses are only occupied for eight hours per day, equivalent to a typical 
working day. 
• They have low occupant loads; 0.03 people per square metre [7]. 
• On a typical day no work will be performed that could directly result in 
ignition of combustible items. 
 
Due to these assumptions the probability of successful manual intervention is 
considered to be low. Enright [4] suggests a probability of 0.125 for hotel fires and it 
is considered that warehouses will be even lower than this value. As such a 
probability of 0.0625 was chosen and a uniform distribution applied (Figure 4-5). This 
value was chosen due to the low occupant loads, a lack of any other data and a need to 
be conservative. It may be that in certain cases the user wishes to specify a higher 
probability and should justification for doing so exist then they can make the required 
changes.  
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Figure 4-5: Distribution for probability of successful manual suppression. 
 
4.3.6 Automatic Suppression 
Automatic suppression is considered to occur when sprinklers activate and stop the 
fire growth, leading to either control or extinguishment of the fire. This means it is 
only applicable to buildings where sprinklers are installed and in a usable state. As 
such it is assumed that on a typical day, should a sprinkler system be present, it will 
be able to act as designed. This means that failure to operate due to maintenance 
works is not specifically considered in the analysis. It is also assumed that sprinklers 
have a very high reliability within New Zealand due to a strict regimen of installation, 
commissioning, maintenance and brigade connectivity. This is backed up by 
comments and data obtained from Marryat [8] who states that sprinklers have a 99.5% 
reliability within New Zealand. In addition to this the FSEG recommend a reliability 
of 99% [5]; Enright [4] also advocates this figure as a means of conservative analysis 
and as such it is the value applied for this analysis. 
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Normal(0.99, 0.013) Trunc(0,1)
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Figure 4-6: Distribution for probability of successful automatic suppression. 
 
4.3.7 Fire Service Intervention 
The probability of successful Fire Service intervention is a controversial issue; 
especially when considering the arguments outlined previously (Section 3.6.4). 
Nevertheless for completeness their possible effect should be accounted for.  
 
New Zealand Fire Service data for the period of 2000-2004 indicates that 88% of a 
total of 362 reported warehouse fires required brigade intervention. Of these fires 
15% were extinguished before flaming conditions, 43% were confined to the room of 
origin and 30% were a total loss. If “confined to the room of origin” is taken to mean 
that a total loss did not occur then 58% of the 88% resulted in successful intervention 
and the reliability is approximately 70%. On the other hand warehouses are often 
single cell compartment and as such “confined to the room of origin” could still mean 
a complete loss of the contents and severe structural damage. If this is assumed to be 
the case then the FS is successful in only 15% of the 88% of fires. In this case the 
resultant reliability is approximately 20%. It is believed that the actual reliability is 
probably somewhere between 20% and 70% however the form of the statistics does 
not allow further analysis. Therefore it was decided to investigate other sources to see 
if they gave any agreement with New Zealand data. 
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One such source is a report on the threat to life and property in a bus garage [9] cited 
within [2]. Unfortunately the source document could not be obtained but it would 
appear a similar analysis to the one proposed in this research was performed. In any 
case the probability of the Fire Brigade exhibiting control was deemed to be 30% and 
this figure was reached based upon statistical analysis and expert opinion. It is 
encouraging that this value falls in the range described by the New Zealand data and 
as such gives a measure of confidence to the values described. Other than this value 
no other results were obtained from statistics relating to other countries. 
 
Due to the lack of statistical data other methods were considered for determining this 
probability. There is the potential to calculate a timeline as you move through the tree 
and base the probability of FS success on the time to intervention. This would then 
result in a bi-modal, yes/no type probability; if the FS arrives before the fire reaches 
10 MW then we can assume that successful intervention occurs and the probability of 
success is 1. If they do not arrive before 10 MW then the probability of success is 0. 
Unfortunately this does not lend itself well to our purpose; as the need to calculate the 
timeline over complicates the event tree. In addition this method assumes perfect 
performance of the Fire Service and does not consider the influence of unknown 
factors that may limit their effectiveness. Due to this lack of sensitivity this method 
was not explored. 
 
As a means to complement New Zealand data an expert survey was conducted. This 
was the approach conducted by Fardell and Kumar [9] and is therefore deemed 
appropriate here. The survey was put to senior members of the NZFS, with 
operational and/or engineering knowledge, asking them to estimate the likely loss 
should Fire Service intervention be effective in the case of a warehouse fire: they 
were asked to do this for a number of scenarios where different protection measures 
are employed. This was deemed necessary as the available data does not include an 
allowance for the type of protection systems present and it is thought that these will 
have a significant influence on the ability of the FS to perform their operations. In 
total they were asked to consider four different scenarios and the resultant loss. They 
were then asked to estimate efficacy of the Fire Service for each scenario where 
efficacy is defined as the likelihood that they will perform as expected. 
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The results of the survey for efficacy are presented in Table 4-2 while the loss levels 
specified are discussed in a later section. Upon inspection of Table 4-2 values it is 
clear that there are some serious discrepancies between the estimates with ranges of 
up to 60%. This clearly highlights the uncertain nature of warehouse fire as well as 
demonstrating a certain level of disagreement about how the Fire Service views 
warehouse fire. However, it is not an aim of this research to develop a cohesive stance 
on warehouse fire for the New Zealand Fire Service and therefore the results will be 
taken at face value. It is important to realise that these values are not intended as 
absolute probabilities but instead provide “best guess” data that is adequate to perform 
our analysis. Only extensive statistical analysis can give accurate values but as 
mentioned previously it is not within the scope of this analysis to perform such work. 
 
Table 4-2: Efficacy of the New Zealand Fire Service for various scenarios. (The 
events that make up each scenario can be obtained from Figure 4-18.) 
Scenario Mean Std Dev Max Min
E (automatic detection, vents, brigade intervention) 0.75 0.18 0.50 0.90
I (automatic detection, brigade intervention) 0.65 0.15 0.50 0.85
O (vents, brigade intervention) 0.65 0.17 0.50 0.85
S (brigade intervention) 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.85
 
Based on these values the following distributions were then applied for the efficacy of 
the Fire Service. 
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Figure 4-7: Distribution for probability of successful Fire Service intervention for 
Scenario E. 
 
 
Figure 4-8: Distribution for probability of successful Fire Service intervention for 
Scenario I. 
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Figure 4-9: Distribution for probability of successful Fire Service intervention for 
Scenario O. 
 
 
Figure 4-10: Distribution for probability of successful Fire Service intervention for 
Scenario S. 
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reliability as the system will possess a number of failure modes. Fortunately the 
smoke control system in a warehouse usually consists of a simple arrangement 
involving only smoke and heat vents and possibly one or two other components such 
as a manual operation feature. As a general guide Klote and Milke [10] provide 
figures of 0.99 and 0.94 respectively for the reliability, before commissioning, of 
HVAC fans and “other” components. As such the resultant reliability of a vent system 
is calculated by assigning a reliability of 0.94 to each component with a distribution 
described as shown below. 
 
 
Figure 4-11: Distribution for probability of successful vent operation. 
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A properly constructed and maintained fire separation can be an extremely effective 
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that most fires have become self-contained by the time of FS arrival. Unfortunately 
the seemingly obvious advantages of fire separations are often hampered by poor 
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door the reliability can be drastically reduced. Therefore we must examine both the 
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reliability of the walls themselves and the different types of penetrations to gain an 
understanding of the wall system reliability. 
 
A number of sources were discovered containing estimates of the operational 
reliability of fire separations. Disappointingly none are based on statistical data and 
are instead the product of expert survey or an author’s best-guess. Nevertheless the 
estimates are all of the same order and do not appear to be unreasonable. The figures 
are presented below in Table 4-3 . 
 
Table 4-3: Reliability of fire separations. 
 Form of Construction 
Reference Masonry Plasterboard and Stud Concrete 
[2]1 0.75 0.65 - 
[12] 0.7 0.4 0.95 
1 The values given are for the probability that the separation will achieve at least 75% of the design fire 
resistance. 
 
The resulting distributions based on these values are presented as follows. 
 
 
Figure 4-12: Distribution for the probability that a masonry separation is successful at 
containing fire spread. 
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Figure 4-13: Distribution for the probability that a plasterboard separation is 
successful at containing fire spread. 
 
 
Figure 4-14: Distribution for the probability that a concrete separation is successful at 
containing fire spread. 
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Table 4-4: Reliability of fire separation penetrations. 
 Form of Construction 
Reference Masonry Plasterboard and Stud Concrete 
[2]2 0.7 0.7 - 
[12] 0.7 0.81 0.7 
2 Flexibility in the wall construction was considered to improve the reliability. 
 
Upon inspection of Table 4-4 it is clear to see that in most cases the reliability of 
penetrations is the critical factor when determining the resultant reliability of a wall 
system. Ideally fire separations would not contain such features however in general 
this is not practical for economic reasons and functional requirements of the 
warehouse. Consequently it is important that penetrations are accounted for when 
determining the separation reliability. To ignore them would be non-conservative and 
would give erroneous results. The distribution applied for each of these variables is 
shown below. 
 
 
Figure 4-15: Distribution for the probability that a penetration in a masonry separation 
is successful at containing fire spread. 
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Figure 4-16: Distribution for the probability that a penetration in a plasterboard 
separation is successful at containing fire spread. 
 
 
Figure 4-17: Distribution for the probability that a penetration in a concrete separation 
is successful at containing fire spread. 
 
It is worth noting that even an imperfect separation may provide considerable benefits 
by reducing the spread of fire however there is no way of allowing for this in the 
analysis. Therefore it is conservative to assume that once the separation is 
compromised it permits uninhibited spread of fire and associated products.  
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4.4 Scenario Analysis 
In developing the event tree an extensive scenario analysis was performed. The aim of 
this investigation was to consider all possible outcomes when a variety of protection 
systems were employed. As a product of this a clear sequence of events was 
established and the final event tree was tailored to fit the identified sequence. The 
final event tree is presented below as Figure 4-18. 
 4-91
 
Figure 4-18: Event tree for scenario analysis. 
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4.5 Consequence Analysis 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Risk is often described as a function of likelihood and consequence. For this 
investigation the likelihood of each scenario is described by the probabilities within 
the event tree and the resultant loss is the consequence. Unfortunately the literature 
does not contain values for the likely loss associated with the scenarios described by 
Figure 4-1. As a result the likely loss must be estimated based on the knowledge 
gained from this research. 
 
In his study on life safety in hotel fires Enright [4] quantifies the risk to life in terms 
of a Theoretical Annual Loss of Life (TALL). For the purposes of this research this 
concept was adapted and a Theoretical Annual Property Loss (TAPL) was established 
for each scenario. The TAPL is given units of dollars and found by calculating the 
building cost per square metre and multiplying it by the expected fire area associated 
with each scenario. The Total TAPL for a particular warehouse is then calculated by a 
summation of the TAPL for each individual scenario. 
 
Each scenario in the event tree will have its own unique loss that is a function of the 
events preceding it; therefore an explanation of the derivation of the loss for each 
scenario is presented in the following sections. The 21 scenarios described in Figure 
4-18 may prove to be confusing to the reader and a description of the events described 
by every scenario is cumbersome and unnecessary. Instead we shall examine the 
chain of events leading to Scenario C as an example: Fire Start → Automatic 
Detection → No Manual Suppression → No Automatic Suppression → Vents 
Operate → Contained in Firecell → Fire Service Control and Extinguish. By 
following this example the reader can establish the events that lead to all other 
scenarios. 
 
4.5.2 Scenario A & L 
The loss for Scenarios A & L considers the worst case scenario of ignition in the 
centre flue and makes the following assumptions; 
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• Any contents touched by flame are lost.  
• Manual suppression can only occur if the occupant is intimate with the fire at 
the time of ignition due to the fast growth rate.  
• The occupant will not have motivation to attack a fire which could be deemed 
threatening to their physical safety. 
 
These assumptions mean that the fire size at the time of manual suppression will not 
be large. Consequently it is thought that the fire will be contained low in the rack and 
will not spread beyond the centre flue. Accordingly the loss is set equivalent to the 
floor area taken by 4 pallets as the fire will not spread through the lateral flues to 
include adjacent boxes. 
 
4.5.3 Scenario B & L 
The loss value assigned to this scenario is based on the assumptions listed below; 
 
• Any contents touched by flame are lost. 
• Any contents subject to the sprinkler spray are lost. 
 
Therefore the associated loss is equivalent to the design floor area covered by 4 
sprinklers. This is based on data from Marryatt [8] that suggests approximately 90% 
of fires are controlled by the operation of 4 heads or less. 
 
4.5.4 Scenario C, G, M & Q 
These scenarios all involve the successful use of fire separation. As a result the 
resultant loss has been set equivalent to the area of the largest firecell. This is based 
on the conservative assumption that the fire will originate in the largest cell and cause 
the greatest possible amount of damage. It is also based on comments from the NZFS 
which indicate that the attending officers will aim to contain the fire within the firecell 
and that an aggressive interior attack within the compartment of origin is highly 
unlikely [6, 13].  
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4.5.5 Scenario D, F, H, J, N, P, R & T 
In the case of these scenarios 100% loss is considered to occur. Regardless of which 
systems activated or failed if the Fire Service could not exhibit control then it is 
conservative to assume that the fire will continue to burn until the building is 
destroyed. 
 
4.5.6 Scenario E, I, O & S 
The loss for these scenarios is based solely on the results of the FS survey which are 
presented below in Table 4-5. Once again there are some very large discrepancies in 
the FS estimates however as described previously we are forced to take these 
estimates at face value. In this case the loss level applied will be equivalent to the 
mean of each scenario. 
 
Table 4-5: Loss estimates based on New Zealand Fire Service survey. 
Scenario Mean Std 
Dev 
Min Max 
E (automatic detection, vents, brigade intervention) 0.25  0.06  0.15   0.30  
I (automatic detection, brigade intervention) 0.45  0.11  0.35  0.60  
O (vents, brigade intervention) 0.35  0.15  0.20  0.50  
S (brigade intervention) 0.65  0.19  0.40  0.80  
 
4.5.7 Scenario U 
In the event that no fire occurs in a given year there is zero property loss to fire. 
 
4.6 Results 
4.6.1 Introduction 
The advantage of this model is that the user has the ability to specify any combination 
of protection measures they desire and run the model. They can then look at the 
resultant TAPL and make an informed decision about the optimum protection system 
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for the warehouse of concern. In practice there are only a few combinations of system 
that might be specified and these are determined by code requirements, the needs of 
the building owner and economics. As a result a select number of protection 
combinations were chosen to give a representation of the loss that may occur when 
designing strictly to code requirements and for those that use commonly applied 
design methods under the category of specific fire engineering design.  
 
The possible outcomes are derived using a technique called Monte Carlo Simulation. 
Monte Carlo Simulation is a special form of analysis used to perform a number of 
“what-if?” scenarios. For each scenario the model takes a random value from each of 
the input distributions and calculates the outcome. This process is repeated a number 
of times and a distribution of the possible outcomes is formulated thus giving a 
realistic representation of the risk. The resultant distribution provides greater insight 
into the problem as the concerned parties get a clear idea of the types of risk they 
face; they are also able to specify acceptable levels of risk such as protecting 
themselves against the outcome associated with the 95th percentile. The resultant loss 
distribution for each combination of systems is presented below alongside a 
description of the design philosophy and a discussion of the results. 
  
4.6.2 Detection 
Under the fire safety clauses of the New Zealand Building Code (C/AS1 [7]) the only 
requirement for warehouse buildings is detection as the low occupant loads generally 
ensure rapid evacuation of the building occupants. Therefore the model was run using 
heat detectors as this is the most common type of detection in this type of occupancy. 
The resultant loss distribution and tornado plot are presented below. 
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 Distribution for Total TAPL/W49
 
V
al
ue
s 
in
 1
0^
 -4
Values in Thousands
0.000
0.200
0.400
0.600
0.800
1.000
1.200
          
 Mean=34513.79 
28 31.5 35 38.5 42
 5%  90% 5%
 30.271  38.6812  
Figure 4-19: TAPL distribution for heat detection only. 
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Figure 4-20: Tornado plot of sensitivities for heat detectors only. 
 
From the distribution (Figure 4-19) it is evident that the mean loss is approximately 
$34,500/year with a 95th percentile loss of approximately $38,700/year. The 
distribution itself is almost uniform and this is to be expected as the majority of input 
distributions were uniform themselves. Similarly the tornado plot (Figure 4-20) 
displays the expected results with the greatest sensitivity related to the probability of 
successful FS intervention for Scenario I with a Std b Coefficient of -0.985. The 
Standard b Coefficient is a regression variable measuring the sensitivity of the results 
to the relative inputs quantifying the change in standard deviation of the output for a 1 
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standard deviation change in the input. The maximum value possible is 1 and we can 
therefore say that the model has a very high sensitivity to Fire Service intervention. 
The other sensitivities are not deemed important as a Std b Coefficient with an 
absolute value less then 0.5 is considered insignificant [14]. It is worth noting that the 
sensitivities are inverse: as the probability of successful intervention increases it is 
logical that the TAPL decreases proportionately. Overall the results are very much 
expected with a high TAPL and the probability of successful FS intervention having 
the greatest influence on the likely loss. 
 
4.6.3 Detection and First Aid Firefighting Equipment 
In this case heat detection was also specified however the system was augmented with 
the supply of first aid firefighting equipment. This combination of systems is often 
employed in warehouses with the purpose of supplying means of early suppression 
should the occupants choose to fight the fire. Therefore this combination has the 
potential to limit property loss by extinguishing the fire before it grows too large. The 
results for this protection strategy are as follows. 
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Figure 4-21: Total TAPL distribution for detection and first aid equipment. 
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 Regression Sensitivity for Total TAPL/W49
Std b Coefficients
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Figure 4-22: Tornado plot of sensitivities for detection and first aid equipment. 
 
Upon inspection of Figure 4-21 we can see that the implementation of manual 
firefighting equipment has reduced the mean and 95th percentile loss to approximately 
$32,400 and $37,100 respectively. In addition the distribution of TAPL has itself 
changed, now more representative of a normal distribution. Once again the model is 
dominated by a sensitivity to FS intervention for Scenario I and it is thought this is for 
the same reasons outlined above. It is interesting that the inclusion of manual 
suppression does not exert enough influence to be considered significant with regard 
to model sensitivity. Based on the limit of 0.5 manual suppression is not calculated to 
be an important variable with a regression coefficient of -0.439 (Figure 4-22). This 
can be linked to the low likelihood of manual suppression that was specified as an 
input. As an aside, it may be that by taking measures to increase the potential for 
manual suppression the outcome will be more sensitive to this variable and the loss 
reduced accordingly. This is something that can be taken into consideration by the 
building owner and any steps taken to increase the chance of successful manual 
intervention may prove beneficial.  
 
4.6.4 Detection and Vents 
Should the property owner have a desire to provide protection of the building contents 
then they may specify the use of smoke and heat vents. These may also help to 
improve conditions for life safety however this of no concern in this instance. The aim 
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of the vents would be to keep the layer of hot smoky gases above the top of the racks 
thus limiting smoke and heat damage while improving the ability of the FS to achieve 
successful intervention. The theoretical resultant loss and influencing factors for this 
protection strategy are presented below. 
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Figure 4-23: Total TAPL distribution for detection and vents. 
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Figure 4-24: Tornado plot of sensitivities for detection and vents. 
 
This combination of systems further reduces the total TAPL with a mean and 95th 
percentile loss of approximately $26,400 and $32,500 respectively. This is a clear 
indication that vents may have a positive influence on the likely loss. The results are 
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strongly related to the probability of successful Fire Service intervention for Scenario 
E which makes sense as this relates to the most likely scenario and includes successful 
vent activation as one of the events. This is taken to mean that the true value of vents 
lies in their ability to improve the effectiveness of the Fire Service which makes sense 
as they are the only available means of suppression.  
 
4.6.5 Detection and Separations 
Separation of a building into separate firecells through construction of passive 
protection has the potential to be an extremely effective means of limiting loss. By 
reducing the compartment size the available combustibles reduce proportionately as 
does the potential loss. For this model the separation was designated as a concrete 
wall that separated the warehouse into two firecells of 900m2. This is in keeping with 
the assumption of tilt-slab construction and the requirements of insurers who 
generally specify a concrete wall of 240 minute fire resistance for property protection. 
The area of 900m2 was chosen arbitrarily and it is noted that specifying alternative 
sizes will lead to different results. However the chosen dimensions are considered 
suitable for illustration and the results are as follows. 
 
 Distribution for Total TAPL/W49
 
V
al
ue
s 
in
 1
0^
 -3
Values in Thousands
0.000
0.200
0.400
0.600
0.800
1.000
1.200
1.400
        
 Mean=15036.26 
14 15 16 17
 5%  90% 5%
 14.5681  15.5601  
Figure 4-25: Total TAPL distribution for detection and separations. 
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 Regression Sensitivity for Total TAPL/W49
Std b Coefficients
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Figure 4-26: Tornado plot of sensitivities for detection and separations. 
 
The implementation of separation provides a drastic reduction in the Total TAPL with 
a mean and 95th percentile of $15,000 and $15,600 respectively (Figure 4-25). This 
value would be reduced even further should smaller firecells be specified however the 
results obtained give a clear indication of the possible benefits. The results for this 
protection strategy are strongly influenced by the probability of successful 
performance of the concrete wall itself (Figure 4-26) and this makes sense as the wall 
is the primary means for avoiding a total loss event; without it we would simply gain 
the same results as when specifying detection only. 
 
4.6.6 Detection and separations with penetrations. 
The results presented in Figure 4-25 consider an ideal case where the wall used to 
divide the warehouse is not compromised by the presence of penetrations. In reality 
features such as service ducts and access doors may be present thus providing means 
of fire spread outside of the compartment of origin. As a result two doors were 
included in the concrete wall described above in an effort to gain an understanding of 
how penetrations may affect the TAPL. The change in the loss distribution and model 
sensitivities can be viewed below. 
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 Distribution for Total TAPL/W49
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Figure 4-27: Total TAPL distribution for detection and separations with penetrations. 
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Figure 4-28: Tornado plot of sensitivities for detection and separations with 
penetrations. 
 
In this instance we see a marked increase in the average and 95th percentile losses to 
approximately $24,400 and $28,300 respectively. This clearly shows how the 
presence of penetrations can compromise the possible benefits of compartmentation in 
a warehouse. It also shows that appropriate design that either avoids or limits the 
number of penetrations can be advantageous as well as ensuring best practice when 
installing seals around penetrations. Once again the results are most sensitive to the 
performance of the concrete wall however the reliability of this wall is now governed 
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by the presence of penetrations as they have a lower probability of behaving as 
intended. Note that the sensitivity to FS intervention has increased and this relates to 
the fact that there is increased opportunity for spread from the compartment of origin. 
The higher chance of spread results in a higher probability of total loss and therefore a 
greater reliance on FS intervention to reduce the loss. These results appear to be 
logical and are in keeping with the results for the other protection strategies described 
above. 
 
4.6.7 Sprinklers 
Often recognised as the most effective means of fire protection, sprinklers can provide 
both detection and suppression of a fire. When connected to the FS the sprinkler 
behaves as any other heat detector and the water released can then control or 
extinguish the fire. This automated suppression is the most advantageous feature and 
what sets sprinkler systems apart from other protection measures under investigation. 
The results for a sprinkler protected warehouse are shown in the following figures. 
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Figure 4-29: Total TAPL distribution for sprinklers. 
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 Regression Sensitivity for Total TAPL/W49
Std b Coefficients
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Figure 4-30: Tornado plot of sensitivities for sprinklers. 
 
The distribution shown in Figure 4-29 emphatically demonstrates the possible effect 
of sprinklers in a warehouse building. The TAPL has been drastically reduced to a 
mean of approximately $1800/year with a 95th percentile of $2400. These results are 
an order of magnitude less than those obtained with any other system. The skewed 
normal distribution also indicates a tendency for sprinkler fire to be limited to a 
certain size with a minority of fires leading to larger TAPLs. This can then be related 
to the very high probability of successful operation for sprinklered fires where very 
few fires will actually exceed the system capabilities. Further evidence of this 
influence is taken from Figure 4-30 where we see the strong influence of successful 
automatic suppression on the model results.  
 
4.6.8 Sprinklers and Vents 
This particular combination of systems was chosen in an effort to provide further 
insight into the sprinklers versus vents debate and whether a design incorporating both 
measures is practical. The results for the individual distributions above indicate that 
sprinklers are far more effective for reducing loss however there may be added benefit 
by using both systems. The results for this strategy are presented below. 
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 Distribution for Total TAPL/W49
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Figure 4-31: Total TAPL distribution for sprinklers and vents. 
 
 Regression Sensitivity for Total TAPL/W49
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Figure 4-32: Tornado plot of sensitivities for sprinklers and vents. 
 
The result shown in Figure 4-32 shows a very similar distribution to that using 
sprinklers alone, the most obvious changes being a reduction in the mean and 95th 
percentile to $1600/year and $2100/year respectively. This shows that a slight 
reduction in TAPL is possible if vents are employed in tandem with sprinklers. 
However the most telling statistic is that the sensitivity of the distribution is governed 
strongly by the probability of successful sprinkler operation, albeit slightly less 
sensitive to sprinklers alone. This strong correlation indicates that the use of vents 
does not have a significant effect on the loss outcome and that no real benefit is 
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obtained. It should also be remembered that this scenario is assuming ganged 
operation of vents thus maximising the ability of vents to reduce the likely loss. 
Different results may be obtained for a warehouse of different dimensions however it 
is thought that the results obtained in this simulation will hold true for most cases. 
 
4.6.9 Summary 
The results above convey a large amount of useful information however it is hard to 
draw comparisons between different combinations of systems. To remedy this 
situation summary results for each protection strategy are presented below in Table 
4-6. 
 
Table 4-6: Summary statistics for the different protection strategies. 
Protection Measures 5th 
Percentile 
Mean 95th 
Percentile 
Sensitivities 
Nothing $53,400 $53,400 $53,400  
Detection $30,300 $34,500 $38,700 FS intervention 
Detection and First Aid $22,900 $32,400 $37,100 FS intervention & 
First aid equipment 
Detection and Vents $20,200 $26,400 $32,500 FS intervention 
Detection and 
Separations 
$14,600 $15,000 $15,600 Separation, FS 
intervention 
Detection and 
Separations with 
Penetrations 
$20,900 $24,400 $28,300 Separation & FS 
intervention 
Sprinklers $1,300 $1,800 $2,400 Auto suppression 
Sprinklers and Vents $1,300 $1,600 $2,200 Auto suppression 
 
4.7 Discussion 
According to the summary results displayed in Table 4-6 it is evident that different 
protection systems have very different effects on the Total TAPL. When ranked from 
best-case to worst the protection options have the following order: Sprinklers and 
 107
Vents, Sprinklers, Fire Separations, Fire Separations with Penetrations, Vents, 
Detection and First Aid equipment, and Detection only. The range in means is 
$32,900/year while the range of the 95th percentiles is $36,500/year. These are quite 
large dollar amounts that could be expected to cause any warehouse owner concern 
and while it is thought the stated values may be close to that of reality it is important 
to remember that the values are theoretical. Hence the dollar values should be used 
only as a guide and the user should be more focussed on the relative differences 
between the various systems. Should statistically robust inputs be available then the 
results may be taken literally and they would provide excellent information for a 
Cost/Benefit Analysis. By specifying the protection options under consideration and 
running the model the user will obtain excellent data and be able to specify protection 
requirements that are in line with the risk with which they are willing to face; such as 
insuring themselves for the loss associated with the mean or 95th percentile. Insight of 
this nature allows the owner to make these decisions with confidence and proves the 
worth of the model. While it is unfortunate that the model is only theoretical at this 
stage, it is clear that there is potential to increase the benefit through this type of 
analysis and the results will be extremely valuable to the property owner. 
 
Further to the benefits gained by analysing the loss for various systems is the insight 
provided by the model sensitivities. By inspecting these sensitivities the fire engineer 
can make informed recommendations that will improve the overall protection. The 
possible advantages are clearly shown in this model by identifying four key 
sensitivities; FS intervention, Separation performance, Sprinkler performance and the 
supply First Aid firefighting equipment. Each of these forms of protection has a 
considerable effect on the total loss and an analysis of how they influence the results 
will be performed below. 
 
From Table 4-6 we can see that FS intervention is an influential component for five of 
the seven strategies, and of these five it is the dominant sensitivity for three. This 
highlights a significant reliance on the FS for limiting loss which makes sense as in 
they are the only means of fire suppression. The exception being the case where First 
Aid equipment is supplied, however even in this case the results are primarily 
influenced by FS intervention. For all these sensitivities the correlation coefficient 
possesses a negative value indicating that as the probability of successful intervention 
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increases the Total TAPL decreases. This is logical, as for those fires where 
successful intervention does not occur a total loss is deemed to occur. Therefore 
anything that can be done to increase the probability of successful Fire Service 
intervention becomes very important to the building owner. As a result the fire 
engineer should ensure appropriate design that makes all reasonable effort to improve 
their ability to fight the fire. Such features to consider have already been described in 
an earlier section however the main elements are access and water supply, while 
features such as analogue addressable systems that provide important information 
about the fire location may also improve their ability to suppress the fire. In an ideal 
world such recommendations would not be necessary however it may be the case that 
due consideration to the requirements of the FS is not often given. If nothing else the 
results of this analysis provide an effective argument requiring that all engineers give 
these features the attention they deserve. If it becomes a matter of economics then the 
increased cost of improving these facets of design can be included in a cost/benefit 
analysis and the building owner can have the final say based on their acceptable level 
of risk. Whatever the final specifications, due consideration should be given to FS 
requirements and the decisions made should be based on informed analysis. 
 
Another important input reliability is that of fire separation performance. According 
to Table 4-6 it was the dominant probability for the two cases where it was applied. 
These results are not unexpected as when performing as designed separations limit the 
spread of combustion products and therefore reduce the available area for damage. 
Once again the sensitivity has a negative value implying the same effect as that 
described above; as the probability of success increases, the loss decreases. In 
addition anything that can be done by the engineer to increase the probability of 
success is advantageous. Features such as parapets, appropriate detailing, good 
construction practice and avoidance of penetrations, or should they be necessary, 
proper treatment of penetrations with correctly specified seals and resistance ratings. 
All of these actions should be second nature and where they are not the engineer 
should make every effort to ensure that due care is taken. Therefore if the wall is 
designed and built correctly then great confidence can be taken in its ability to 
successfully contain the fire and therefore reduce loss. Once built appropriate 
maintenance should occur and regular inspection undertaken to ensure that the wall 
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has not been compromised. If these processes occur then the building owner can take 
great confidence that his exposure to fire risk has been suitably reduced. 
 
In a similar way to separations, sprinklers are the governing input when implemented 
(Table 4-6). This is due to their ability to limit the fire size and resultant damage 
which is reflected in the mean and 95th percentile values which are an order of 
magnitude less than any other system (Table 4-6). This effect alone could be seen as 
justification for installing sprinklers but one must not forget that the positive impact 
of sprinklers is largely attributed to their excellent reliability and that for a particular 
system this reliability can easily be reduced. This is reflected by the negative value of 
the sensitivity (Figure 4-30 & Figure 4-32) which indicates that any reduction in the 
probability of successful performance is potentially devastating. Therefore ensuring 
system reliability through proper design and installation, systematic maintenance and 
brigade connectivity is vitally important. By ensuring that these requirements are met 
the reliability of the sprinkler system is maximised and the risk of significant property 
damage is reduced. 
 
Although not as significant as the three other measures described above First-Aid fire-
fighting equipment has a moderate influence on the outcome. As for sprinklers this 
lies in the ability to suppress the fire and limit the total fire size. Unfortunately the 
probability of successful manual intervention is often much lower than any of the 
other inputs and this is related to scarcity of data as well as liability issues; can a 
building owner expect an occupant to put themselves at risk of harm or death in 
fighting a fire? Most often the answer is no, however the owner can take steps to 
increase the likelihood that an occupant will feel comfortable attacking a fire. By 
supplying adequate training in the use of equipment and ensuring easy access through 
sensible placement an employee may feel much more comfortable when approaching 
a fire. As a further measure the owner may wish to go so far as to train a private 
brigade however it is thought that this will not often be the case. Either way the 
probability of successful manual intervention will increase as a consequence. In this 
event the predicted TAPL will reduce according to the negative value of the 
sensitivity (Figure 4-22). Yet again the risk to fire will be reduced and the owner can 
investigate the impacts of such measures using a cost/benefit analysis. If the resulting 
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loss reduction is greater then the cost of training, supply and maintenance of 
equipment then the owner is well advised to implement this type of protection. 
 
A notable omission from the sensitivity analyses is the probability of successful vent 
operation; in the two cases where vents were specified the results were not found to 
be sensitive to this input. However, as previously alluded to, the sensitivity to this 
variable is embedded in the sensitivity to successful FS intervention (Figure 4-24). 
Because the vents improve the ability of the FS to limit loss this variable is in turn 
sensitive to vent operation. In fact if we inspect the sensitivities for only Scenarios I & 
S for both Detection and Vents, and Vents and Sprinklers we find that the loss is 
highly dependent on successful vent operation (Figure 4-33, Figure 4-34, Figure 4-35, 
Figure 4-36). It is thought that the reason these sensitivities do not have an influence 
on the overall results is due to the low likelihood of the scenarios where they are 
important. Now that we have a better understanding of the importance of successful 
vent operation it is important to ensure that this probability is maximised. As for 
sprinklers the best way in which to ensure their reliability is through correct design, 
installation and a strict regimen of testing and maintenance throughout their service 
life. Only then can they be relied on to reduce the possible loss from a fire. 
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Figure 4-33: Tornado plot of sensitivities for Scenario I with detection and vents. 
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 Regression Sensitivity for Scen. S/Q40
Std b Coefficients
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Figure 4-34: Tornado plot of sensitivities for Scenario S with detection and vents. 
 Regression Sensitivity for Scen. S/Q40
Std b Coefficients
 
 
 
 
                  
 plaster separation/G17  .008
 heat detection/G4-.441
 FS control Scen. S/G14  .471
 vent operation/G9-.681
-1 -0.75 -0.5 -0.25 0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
 
Figure 4-35: Tornado plot of sensitivities for Scenario I with sprinklers and vents. 
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 Regression Sensitivity for Scen. S/Q40
Std b Coefficients
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Figure 4-36: Tornado plot of sensitivities for Scenario S with sprinklers and vents. 
 
4.8 Conclusions & Recommendations 
Based upon the results and discussion above we see that this model provides an 
excellent means of expressing the risk to property from a fire. The user is able to 
specify any combination of protection systems they require and then calculate the 
distribution of TAPL. Once obtained, the distributions of different protection 
strategies can be compared to find the optimal combination of systems. Alternatively 
they can specify an acceptable level of risk and decide which protection measures will 
provide the required protection. The distribution of loss becomes particularly useful in 
this regard as it allows one to specify the percentile loss that is acceptable as opposed 
to a single point estimate. All of these features contribute to the value of the model 
and allow more informed decision making when specifying fire safety systems for 
property protection. 
 
An additional benefit of the model is the ability to investigate the sensitivity to the 
input parameters. By identifying which factors are critical for loss reduction the 
engineer or building owner can take appropriate action to ensure that the critical 
protection measures are given special attention. This is the equivalent of identifying 
risk-reduction factors however it is done in a quantitative form that ensures efficient 
reduction of the risk. 
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Although the results produced are considered extremely useful for any decisions 
regarding fire protection of warehouses it is very important to remember that the 
results are theoretical. Unfortunately some of the input data is questionable in nature 
and not based on large statistical studies. It may be that industry or organisation 
specific data collections need to be developed. In the event that better data becomes 
available then the model should be adjusted accordingly and once sufficient 
confidence is obtained then the TAPL can be changed to an Annual Property Loss and 
the results used as an input into Cost/Benefit Analyses. Until this point the dollar 
values for the TAPL should only be used as a guide and the relative changes by 
specifying different systems are of more use. 
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Chapter 5 Deterministic Model 
5.1 Introduction 
General models that give the probability and extent of loss for warehouse fire are 
useful, but on occasion the need may arise to assess the possible loss on a case by case 
basis. To this end it was deemed important to investigate the feasibility of a 
deterministic model of loss. The aim is to develop a model that takes the experimental 
correlations described previously and converts the expressions for heat release rates, 
temperatures and velocities into terms of loss. An analysis of this nature moves away 
from expressing loss in terms of likelihoods and instead becomes an absolute measure 
of loss. This may be advantageous to the property owner as they can couple this 
information with that gained from a risk analysis and make informed decisions when 
specifying their required protection. At the same time it is also advantageous to the 
insurer when setting premiums and for making stipulations on what protection 
measures will be acceptable. Exactly how the model will function is the topic of the 
following discussion. 
 
5.2 General Approach 
5.2.1 Assumptions 
In establishing the model there are a number of underlying assumptions that need to 
be made. Generally speaking they involve extending the application of the 
experimental correlations and then translating the results into an adequate 
representation of the resultant loss. In more defined terms they are listed as follows 
with the justification of each contained in the following discussion; 
 
1 It is assumed the correlations presented in Chapter 3 can be applied to describe 
a real-life warehouse fire scenario.  
2 It is assumed that the quantities described by these equations can then be 
converted to give an adequate description of conditions within the 
compartment. 
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3 It is assumed that the conditions as described above can then be transformed to 
represent the loss attributed to a fire.  
 
The correlations of Ingason and Kung et al (Chapter 3) are based on ideal 
experimental conditions which may not necessarily represent racks after years of use 
in a warehouse. For the experiments the boxes would have been carefully placed with 
dimensions measured to the nearest millimetre and the boxes themselves free of 
blemishes such as tears and creases. The fact that real life racks may not be in such 
pristine condition is not considered a major limitation. If anything the correlations 
would represent a worse case as the spacings are carefully measured and possibly 
more critical than the haphazard shelving of goods that may occur in reality. Despite 
this, the use of a two by two array is of some concern. The presence of additional 
pallets extending in either direction of the initial fire may result in altered ventilation 
conditions and the same could be said for racks that run parallel to the rack where 
ignition occurs. It is thought that the presence of these obstructions could result in 
unusual flow patterns and therefore alter the ventilation conditions. Whether this 
alteration would serve to limit the available oxygen or in fact “fan” the fire it is 
impossible to tell, however it seems reasonable that the presence of such large 
obstructions may limit the ventilation leading to slower growth rates. Nonetheless this 
is not concerning as the aim of the model is to provide a conservative estimate of the 
heat release rate.  
 
The presence of the boxes may not only affect the ventilation conditions but provide 
additional; fuel, paths for flame travel (primarily horizontal flues) and surfaces to re-
radiate. Spread to neighbouring boxes and the resultant re-radiation may result in a 
faster growth rate and higher peak heat release than that witnessed in experiment. If 
these effects were witnessed the correlations would soon become non-conservative. 
Fortunately the 10 MW limit provided by the Fire Service allows us to discount many 
of the problems outlined above. The implication of the 10MW limit is that beyond 
this value the fire becomes a total loss event unless the fire is somehow controlled 
either through water application or confinement. The fact that 10MW is reached while 
the fire is still confined to the initial array means that the presence of additional fuel 
and re-radiation from neighbouring rows become irrelevant: by the time these effects 
are witnessed the fire is already considered to incur a total loss. This simply leaves 
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flame spread along additional travel paths as the only problem. However the spread in 
the horizontal flues is opposed flow flame spread due to the flame within the rack 
drawing air along these channels. As such the spread is not likely to reach 
neighbouring boxes within the row by 10 MW and we can discount additional spread 
as a source of concern. 
 
The arguments outlined above serve as justification that the first of our assumptions is 
valid. By allaying some doubt we are left with an excellent set of equations to 
describe the fire properties in a conservative manner. The next step is to determine 
how these fire properties are converted to describe the compartment conditions. 
 
5.2.2  Zone modelling 
To anyone with knowledge of fire engineering it is clear that the best way to convert 
such correlations to a description of compartment conditions is through the use of a 
zone model. Although there are limits on the application of zone models and their 
validity for large compartments is in serious question there really is no other option 
when requiring a fast effective solution. There is some merit in the use of a CFD 
model however as discussed elsewhere current limits on computational power still 
result in inefficiencies. Therefore it is assumed that a zone model will give an 
adequate representation of the compartment conditions and all loss characteristics will 
be based on the given results. 
 
The third assumption is the most critical, and unfortunately, the most susceptible to 
debate. The common opinion amongst the literature is that loss models are very hard 
to develop. This is primarily due to the uncertainty when attributing the damage to 
smoke. Obviously the susceptibility of different products to smoke will vary greatly 
from commodity to commodity. This makes a “one model fits all” approach 
impractical. For example automotive parts may only require a quick clean before they 
are put back on the shelf however you would expect foodstuffs to be a complete loss 
due to smoke contamination. These thoughts are echoed by the opinions of various 
loss adjustors [1, 2] and it is clearly a problem that needs addressing. Fortunately the 
simplistic nature of a zone model means we can go some way in remedying this 
problem. Because the compartment is divided into two homogeneous layers we can 
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then apportion the goods into those exposed to the hot upper layer and those exposed 
to the cooler lower layer. Then upon consultation with the property owner the user 
can specify different susceptibilities for the goods and therefore establish a likely loss. 
For example if storing plastics that have a melting/decomposition point of 300°C any 
boxes exposed to layer temperatures equal to or exceeding this value can be 
considered as lost.  
 
There is one obvious flaw with the zone model approximation and it has been alluded 
to earlier; for large compartments the idea of a stable well defined upper layer is not 
generally valid. This is due to the large amounts of entrainment that occur and the 
resulting cooling of the layer. As the layer cools it loses buoyancy and in some cases 
may fall to the floor thus completely negating the two zone assumption. The 
implication of this cooling is that the damage due to hot layer temperatures will not be 
as pronounced further away from the origin of the fire. This may then make the 
estimated loss overly conservative however it is thought that this may be negated by 
damage in the lower layer, closer to the origin. Because the conditions in the lower 
layer will almost certainly be more severe in the region surrounding the area of origin 
it may compensate for the damage in the upper layer that may not be a reality further 
away from the fire. In this way it is thought that the loss will be averaged out and the 
resulting estimate still reasonable. Now that we have a means of estimating the loss, 
the final requirement is to find a satisfactory method of quantification. 
 
Although there are many possible ways of quantifying the loss based on the above 
method there are only a few that would provide estimates of an appropriate form for 
our purpose. The proposed methods are listed as follows; 
 
• Percentage loss of the building contents/value. 
• Absolute loss in square metres. 
• Absolute loss in cubic metres. 
 
Each of these methods has their various merits however only one shall be used in this 
investigation. When expressing the loss with regards to building contents it is thought 
that a percentage loss or loss in cubic metres would be the most appropriate. 
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Unfortunately matters are not quite as simple, as loss due to fire encompasses far 
more than solely the building contents. There is potentially a direct loss due to 
damage to features such as the building structure, building services, plant and office 
spaces. In addition to this there is indirect loss due to business interruption. All of 
these are important components to the loss from a fire and in many cases will be far 
more expensive then the loss of contents. Although possible to calculate the different 
types of direct loss individually by using similar methods to those outlined above, a 
far simpler method is to describe the loss in square metres. This simply involves 
calculating the total cost of the building and contents then dividing it by the building 
area providing a cost per metre squared. All that is then required is to multiply the 
damaged area by the cost per metre squared and a very useful loss estimate is 
obtained. A very similar approach is taken by quantity surveyors when fitting out a 
building and costs per metre squared for all of those items mentioned previously can 
be obtained from sources such as Rawlinson’s [3]. Unfortunately indirect loss is very 
complex and must be assessed on a case by case basis [4]. Nevertheless a model that 
calculates direct loss as described would be very useful for any building owner who 
wishes to gain an understanding of the threat fire places on their business. 
 
From the above discussion it is evident that a loss estimate can be calculated directly 
from engineering correlations. Admittedly some generalisations and assumptions need 
to be made, however these have been adequately justified. Even if the results are not 
completely accurate at least a general idea of the potential threat is obtained. This 
provides the insurer and building owner with a sound platform to assess the protection 
options and make informed decisions regarding fire safety. Nevertheless this 
discussion gives only a broad outline of the model and the justification required to 
make it work. The following section will therefore provide a specific description of 
how the model works and the necessary computation to develop an effective loss 
estimate. 
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5.3 The Model 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of the model is to provide loss estimates for warehouse fires where a 
range of different protection systems are being considered. By doing this the different 
losses according to the combination of protection systems can be compared. As a 
result the model is dependent on its ability to model the effect of the protection 
systems and the user specified inputs which describe the nature of the warehouse such 
as rack height and length. The value of the model output is determined by ensuring 
that these inputs are modelled correctly. Only then will the model be of any use for 
our purposes. Consequently we must give due consideration to the limits of the model 
and what protection systems we are capable of modelling. 
 
5.3.2 Protection Systems 
The following fire safety systems are to be considered when calculating the 
foreseeable loss: 
• Sprinklers 
• Smoke and heat venting 
• Detection systems 
• Fire Service Response 
 
The necessity of modelling the effect of sprinklers is obvious as they have the ability 
to control or suppress the fire drastically reducing the loss by limiting flame spread 
and the production of a hot upper layer. In the same way smoke and heat venting must 
be considered as venting will limit the depth and temperature of the upper layer thus 
reducing damage. In contrast, detection systems are included for their ability to give 
prompt notification to the Fire Service. There is potential to rely on the Fire Service to 
limit the loss and as such it is necessary to include the potential for their intervention. 
As described in section 3.6.4 the chance of effective intervention for an uncontrolled 
fire is almost non-existent however for fires where sprinklers provide marginal 
control or the fire growth is limited it is necessary to calculate the time to intervention 
if an accurate loss estimate is to be obtained. 
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First aid fire fighting equipment has not been included in the model as the aim is to 
provide a loss estimate in accordance with the normal loss expectancy. When 
considering the low occupancy loads of a warehouse and the potential for them to be 
uninhabited for the majority of a day it is conservative to ignore their effects. In 
addition to this a model to describe the heat release rate that occurs due to manual 
intervention does not exist. This is probably because successful intervention can only 
occur for small fires and for those fires that are not controlled by manual intervention 
the growth may not be drastically slowed. Another implication of successful 
intervention is that the resultant loss will be almost negligible and in most cases not 
result in an insurance claim. All these factors provide justification for ignoring the 
effect of first aid equipment within the model. 
 
Similarly there is no specific allowance for the use of fire separations within the 
model. However should the user wish to model the use of compartmentation then they 
need only to run the model for the firecell of concern and usable results will be 
obtained. So while no analysis pertaining to fire separations will be shown here it 
should be noted that the model is capable of such analysis if required.  
 
5.4 The model 
The model was developed using the software programme Microsoft Excel. The nature 
of this programme makes it very simple to take a set of user defined inputs, perform 
calculations based on this information and present the results in a variety of different 
ways. This is all done using simple arguments of logic yet the developer is capable of 
establishing complex relationships and therefore highly sophisticated models. 
Unfortunately time constraints limited the allowable complexity and as such the 
model presented below is only considered as preliminary and further development is 
advocated. 
 
5.4.1 Inputs 
As a first step the user is required to specify a number of inputs that adequately 
describe the warehouse, racking and protection systems. The type of information 
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required is as general as the height, width and length of the warehouse and as specific 
as the sprinkler RTI. The actual information required can be seen below as Figure 5-1. 
 
 
Figure 5-1: Model inputs. 
 
5.4.2 Calculations 
Although the primary aim of the model is to establish a loss estimate there are a 
considerable number of elements that must first be calculated. These calculations 
include those for the heat release rate, sprinkler response, and layer heights and 
temperatures within the compartment. Accordingly the following will describe the 
necessary calculations required in reaching the final goal of a loss estimate. While the 
reader should now be familiar with the equations used there is still need for 
explanation of how they fit together. 
 
5.4.2.1 Heat release rate 
The primary equation used to express the heat release rate is that established by 
Ingason. It has already been established as Equation 3-4 but is presented below as a 
reminder. The uncontrolled heat release rate is thus represented by this equation with 
the empirical constants selected based on the user’s determination of which category 
the commodity falls into.  
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The heat release rate as represented by this equation is one of the fundamental 
features of the model. All ensuing calculations are dependent on the form of the heat 
release rate and it is imperative to ensure that it is calculated correctly and that the 
user specifies the appropriate class for the commodity of concern. In warehouses 
where mixed categories of goods are stored all goods shall be assumed to have a 
growth rate of the highest class. This ensures a conservative estimate and is in 
keeping with standard practise [5]. 
 
5.4.2.2 Detector Response 
Accurate modelling of detector response is another key factor of the model. Through 
this process it is possible to determine the activation time of smoke and heat detectors 
as well as sprinklers. These times become extremely critical when considering Fire 
Service response and the effect of sprinklers. The extremely fast growth of the heat 
release rate can mean that errors of ten or fifteen seconds may lead to vastly different 
loss estimates. It is therefore important to model each type of detector as accurately as 
possible. How this is done within the model is outlined below. 
 
It is an unfortunate situation, but smoke detector response to fire conditions is not 
easily modelled. This is due to limited knowledge regarding the production and 
transport of smoke in the early stages of a fire, and a gap between the type of data 
recorded by smoke researchers and the type of data needed to model smoke detector 
response. There are also the many different types of smoke detector to contend with 
such as light obscuration, light scattering and ionisation detectors. If the reader wishes 
to know more Schifiliti et al [6] give an excellent description of the problems 
associated with modelling smoke detector response. Instead of calculating the detector 
response it is proposed that using values given by AS1668.3 2003 shall be 
satisfactory. This is because the response of smoke detectors is only relevant to Fire 
Service response and the calculation method within the standard is that used to 
determine response time. 
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The response of a sprinkler is modelled using the equation advocated by Schifiliti et 
al. This approximation uses a simple heat balance to calculate the change in 
temperature of the sprinkler over time. For each time step the change in temperature 
of the sprinkler is calculated and added to the temperature of the previous time step as 
represented by Equation 5-1. 
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Equation 5-1 
Where Td is the temperature of the detector, n is the time step and the change in 
detector temperature, ΔTd is found by 
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where DTc is the change in plume centreline temperature, Uc is the plume centreline 
velocity and RTI is the Response Time Index of the sprinkler (m1/2s1/2). The quantity 
DT/DTc is calculated as follows 
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Equation 5-3 
where r is the radial distance of the sprinkler from the plume centreline (m) and bc is 
the plume width (m). 
 
The above equations provide us with a way of calculating the sprinkler temperature 
over time, then at the time where the detector temperature equals the specified 
activation temperature the sprinkler is considered to activate. At this point it is then 
necessary to calculate the sprinkler’s effect on the heat release rate.  
 
 125
5.4.2.3 Sprinklered heat release rate 
The heat release rate that occurs after sprinkler activation is another important feature 
that must be dealt with in an appropriate manner. This is due to the profound 
reduction that sprinklers can have on the final loss. The potential to reduce loss is one 
of the many benefits of sprinklers however they have one drawback as they are 
relatively expensive to install and maintain. This expense is critical to a cost benefit 
analysis and can only be offset by the sprinkler system causing a substantial loss 
reduction. As a consequence it is vital that the sprinkler system is accurately 
modelled. Fortunately we have the means available to quantify their effect. The 
necessary equations have been described previously in Chapter 3 and are reproduced 
below. 
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It is important to remember that k is an empirical constant representing the fire 
suppression parameter. The experimental work of Kung et al led to its development 
however it was only established for two types of commodity which fell into the Group 
I and Group II categories respectively. As a result it is necessary to assume that each 
suppression parameter can be applied to all commodities within the same class. This 
is considered conservative as each of the tested commodities represents a typical 
worst case in their class. An additional assumption is required when considering 
Group III products. Because experimental work has not yet been performed no fire 
suppression parameter has been developed for these goods. As a result it is assumed 
that the k value for Group II goods can be applied to those commodities comprising 
Group III.  
 
5.4.2.4 Fire Service Response 
As alluded to above Fire Service Response is calculated using the method proposed 
by AS 1668.3 2003 and described previously in section 3.6.4. Comments have been 
made to suggest that the Fire Service can not be relied upon as a means of loss 
prevention and this could be taken as suggestion that it is unnecessary to include them 
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within the model. However these remarks are only valid for uncontrolled fire. When 
considering fires that have been suppressed by sprinklers the response time of the Fire 
Service becomes very important. In the case where sprinklers control the fire, rather 
than extinguishing it, compartment conditions can still become hazardous to property. 
Not only is it possible for temperatures to continue to rise but sprinklers can drag the 
hot layer down thus resulting in many more boxes becoming exposed to critical 
conditions. In addition to this the water discharged by the sprinkler will lead to an 
increase in damage due to water and steam. It is therefore important to calculate the 
time until Fire Service intervention to allow for the loss that will occur during their 
travel and set-up time. As it happens AS 1668.3 2003 provides an excellent method 
for performing this calculation and lends itself well to incorporation with the model. 
 
5.4.2.5 Zone model 
The zone model chosen for incorporation into the model was BRANZFIRE. This is a 
widely respected programme and incorporates an algorithm for dealing with large 
compartments. It is can also be operated from within Excel using macros designed 
using Visual Basic; this is a particularly useful feature for our purpose. Unfortunately 
time constraints meant that the necessary macros to link the Excel functions and 
BRANZFIRE could not be developed. As a result BRANZFIRE had to be manually 
operated and the necessary work required to write the macros put down to future 
development. While this degrades the user-friendliness it does not detract from the 
overall purpose of the model and the results produced are no less accurate provided 
the user is familiar with BRANZFIRE.  
 
It should be noted that an attempt was made to create a zone model specific to our 
purposes. While it gave useable results the model did not have the sensitivity to 
consider such phenomenon as sprinkler spray-layer interactions and vent flows. On 
top of this it was found that the results produced were non-conservative when 
compared to those of BRANZFIRE. These flaws meant continuing to develop a 
specific model was pointless and that BRANZFIRE should be the model of choice. 
 
 127
5.4.2.6 Vents 
The ability to incorporate the effect of vents is a very important element of the model. 
This is highlighted by comments from the Fire Service and becomes even more 
apparent when comparing loss distributions as calculated in Chapter 4. Smoke 
damage is the biggest unknown factor for any fire and can be the most harmful. The 
ability of a fire engineer to specify a venting system that creates a smoke layer above 
the racks, thus limiting smoke contact and reducing layer temperatures could be very 
valuable. Like sprinklers, a smoke and heat venting system is expensive to install and 
maintain therefore making the potential loss reduction an important input for a cost 
benefit analysis.  
 
An obvious requirement of including vent performance within the model is design of 
an appropriate vent system. The parameters defined by this work are then used as 
inputs into the BRANZFIRE part of the model. This then provides two benefits; not 
only are we provided with the necessary loss estimate but we also gain an evaluation 
of the vent system’s performance. This evaluation can then be used to identify flaws 
in the design and used as feedback for any necessary improvements. Although a 
secondary benefit the added insight gained serves to enhance the model’s value. 
When coupled with the simplicity with which the user can incorporate the effect of 
vents it is plain to see that this approach is very useful. 
 
5.5 Calculating loss 
If we make the assumption that the zone model gives a true description of the 
compartment conditions we are presented with a convenient way of calculating the 
loss. Because we effectively “know” the extent of smoke spread and the temperatures 
involved it is possible to calculate the absolute loss that will occur. In the case of this 
model the loss is separated into five components; 1. Flame Damage,  
2. Heat Damage, 3. Water Damage, 4. Smoke Damage and 5. Structural Damage. 
How the loss is calculated for each component will be the topic of the following 
sections. 
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5.5.1 Flame Damage 
The damage due to flame is calculated by applying the principle of an effective heat 
of combustion. According to [7] the heat release rate of a burning item can be 
represented by the following equation 
 
mhQ c &Δ=  
Equation 5-4 
where Δhc is the effective heat of combustion (MJ/kg) and m&  is the mass loss rate 
(kg/s). The implication of this relationship is that the heat release rate and mass loss 
rate are related by a constant however this is often not the case [7] and the author 
suggests that experimental techniques be used to directly measure the heat release rate 
in most cases. Unfortunately this is not possible for our purposes and we will 
therefore assume that the heat of combustion is a constant. Based on this assumption 
one can determine the loss based on the mass loss rate as we already have a 
representation of the heat release rate. All that is required is to look up the effective 
heat of combustion in a table or to approximate it from first principles [7] and we can 
calculate the loss of contents due to flame by the following method. 
 
Rearrangement of Equation 5-4 yields the following representation for the mass loss 
rate 
 
ch
Qm Δ=&  
Equation 5-5 
which in turn provides the following expression for the total mass of burned contents, 
mcontents, where 
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Equation 5-6 
The integral of Equation 5-6 can then be solved numerically as 
 
 129
tmmm
mn
n
nn
contents Δ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ += ∑=
=
+
0
1
2
&&
 
Equation 5-7 
which can then be converted to the total number of pallets burnt (NPB) as follows 
 
Ψ=
contentsmNPB  
where Ψ is the mass per pallet and the dollar loss due to flame can be found as 
 
)(Ω= NPBLoss flame  
Equation 5-8 
Where Lossflame is calculated in dollars ($) and Ω is the dollar value per pallet 
($/pallet). Note that NPB is always rounded up to the next whole number according to 
the assumption that any pallets touched by flame are considered lost. Additionally the 
minimum value of NPB is 4N where N is the total number of tiers. This is because the 
flue ignition will expose to flame all pallets that form the flue. 
 
5.5.2 Heat and Smoke Damage 
Heat damage is calculated based on the limiting temperature of the building contents. 
The inherent assumption is that once compartment temperatures exceed the limiting 
temperature the goods are damaged. Because the upper layer is considered to be of 
uniform depth we are provided with a simple way to calculate the damage, as soon as 
the layer drops to the top of the pallets in a tier that tier is considered lost. This is 
represented mathematically by 
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Equation 5-9 
In some instances there may be a residual value associated with the contents thus 
allowing the owner to recover a portion of the original value. As a solution three 
limits for heat and smoke exposure are defined below in Table 5-2 and Table 5-1 
respectively. When using the model the user will define both a limiting temperature 
and a susceptibility to smoke according to these classifications. Note also that a safety 
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factor is assigned to each classification. The purpose of the safety factor is to account 
for smoke damage outside of the upper layer. As described previously the concept of 
a well defined upper layer is not completely valid for compartments of this magnitude 
as the temperature difference between the two layers will most probably be 
insufficient to provide the required buoyancy. Instead considerable mixing may occur 
between the layers discounting the assumption of a well defined inter-layer boundary. 
Therefore the depth of the smoke layer is multiplied by the safety factor to give a 
conservative estimate of the damage.  
)%%100()( cov erresmokeorheat xBPTLoss −Ω=  
Equation 5-10 
where PPT is the number of pallets per tier and the loss is expressed in dollars. 
 
Table 5-1: Safety factors for heat damage. 
Classification Definition Safety 
Factor 
Negligible The goods have an infinite tolerance to heat. 1.0 
Recoverable After exposure to temperatures greater than the limiting 
temperature the goods have a residual value defined as a 
percentage of the original value. 
1.5 
Irrecoverable The goods have no tolerance to temperatures exceeding 
the limiting temperature and therefore no residual value 
once exposed. 
2.0 
 
Table 5-2: Classification of smoke susceptibility. 
Classification Definition Safety 
Factor 
Negligible The goods have an infinite tolerance to smoke damage. 1.0 
Recoverable After smoke exposure the goods have a residual value 
defined as a percentage of the original value. 
1.5 
Irrecoverable The goods have no tolerance to smoke and therefore no 
residual value once contaminated. 
2.0 
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5.5.3 Water Damage 
In a similar vain to smoke, some products may have an inherent resilience to water 
damage whereas others may be considered lost due to a few water spots. For 
sprinklered fires the area exposed to water damage can be approximated to the area 
covered by four sprinklers (section 4.5.3). Alternatively the loss of stock due to water 
applied during Fire Service operations is a lot harder to quantify. This is because there 
is no set area of operation as for sprinklers and the actions of the firefighters will be 
specific to each fire. However upon consultation with the Fire Service [8] it was 
suggested that a maximum hose-stream radius of 20m would be appropriate for this 
type of fire. It was also though that this radius would be applied through a maximum 
arc of 120°. This gives an effected area of 420m2. This area is taken as representative 
of the water-damaged area that may result due to Fire Service operation. Once again it 
is recognised as an ideal approximation and if the user believes that this is 
inappropriate for any reason it can be changed for the specific scenario. In the case of 
a sprinklered control fire it is assumed that the FS operations will be limited to within 
the area already damaged by the sprinkler spray. This is because the FS will be acting 
in a “tidy-up” mode where they apply simply enough water to extinguish the fire. 
Now that the area exposed to water damage can be quantified it is possible to 
prescribe classifications of water susceptibility in the same way as described above 
for smoke. These classifications are presented below in Table 5-3. 
 
Table 5-3: Classification of water susceptibility. 
Classification Definition Safety 
Factor 
Negligible The goods have an infinite tolerance to water damage. 1.0 
Recoverable After water exposure the goods have a residual value 
defined as a percentage of the original value. 
1.5 
Irrecoverable The goods have no tolerance to water and therefore no 
residual value once wet. 
2.0 
 
Then based on these assumptions the dollar value of loss to water is calculated as 
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)%%100()()( cov erre
building
waterwater A
NBPTAreaSFLoss −Ω=  
Equation 5-11 
where Awater is the area of water application from sprinklers or the Fire Service (m2) 
and Abuilding is the total area of the building (m2). 
 
5.5.4 Structural Damage 
Without resorting to advanced modelling of structural behaviour in fire such as that 
using the computer programme SAFIR it is hard to gain a true representation of the 
structural damage. Nevertheless comments from Buchanan [9] and Cosgrove [10] 
make suggestion that for fully developed fire in portal frame buildings, such as that 
considered, the area of structural damage is closely linked to the fire area. As a result 
the structural loss in dollars is approximated in the following way 
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Equation 5-12 
where Γ is the value of the building per metre squared ($/m2). 
 Example Calculation 
A step by step guide detailing the necessary actions from the user is described below 
and applied to a theoretical warehouse with the following characteristics; 
 
• Warehouse: 60m by 30m by 6m. 
• Racking: Back to back racking, 28m long, 1.5m aisle width, 0.15m flue width, 
2 tiers high and 1.5m per tier. 
• Goods: High hazard, pallet load measures 1m by 1m by 1m, value of one 
pallet load equals $100. 
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• Susceptibility: The goods are damaged at temperatures above 100°C, have a 
70% recoverability when exposed to smoke and a 40% recoverability when 
exposed to water. 
• Fire Service: Inner city location, closest fire station 3km, maximum external 
travel distance 90m, maximum internal travel distance 60m, underground 
street hydrants. 
 
It is recognised that this is very much an ideal warehouse. Admittedly the common 
approach is to store goods to greater heights and that pallets of goods are not exactly 
1m3. However the dimensions of the warehouse were chosen for reasons of simplicity, 
to illustrate the methodology and provide good comparison for the results of the FDS 
investigation (Chapter 6). Therefore while not a worst-case analysis of warehouse fire 
the results are deemed to provide valuable insight and demonstrate the utility of the 
model. 
 
Before proceeding further it is worth noting that the model was run for a total of four 
cases to determine the optimal protection option. The cases are listed below and the 
results for each case will be presented in the remaining steps of the model.  
 
Case 1 Detection only. 
Case 2 Detection and sprinklers. 
Case 3 Detection and vents. 
Case 4 Detection, sprinklers and vents. 
 
The total heat release rate for each case is presented in Figure 5-2. As you would 
expect the heat release rate for Case 1 is only calculated until a value of 10MW 
because at this point total loss is deemed to occur and there are no agents available to 
extinguish the fire. Case 2 and 4 show similar behaviour as the sprinklers activate at 
approximately 315s and cause a reduction in the heat release rate. The decay of the 
heat release rate would in practice be calculated until the time at which the FS are 
expected to gain control however for simplicity it is only displayed to 600s. Case 3 is 
similar to that of Case 1 however a 20MW limit is applied due to the presence of 
vents. 20MW corresponds to the upper limit of the fire size the FS believe they can 
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handle. Due to their belief that vents will greatly improve their chance of controlling 
the fire it is necessary to extend the fire growth beyond the 10MW limit. Admittedly 
this uses an application of Equation 3-4 outside its limits and applies a concept of a 
steady state burning which may not be valid yet no accepted design fire exists for this 
scenario. At the very least it is better then common practice which would most 
probably employ a t-squared growth. 
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Figure 5-2: Example HRRs from Excel for each case. 
 
Once the design fires have been specified the user then manually creates the 
warehouse within BRANZFIRE and inserts the appropriate heat release rate as the 
design fire. If more time was available this step would be automated using a VBA 
macro unfortunately this is not the case. Consequently the user must create a 
representation of the warehouse within BRANZFIRE and enter the heat release rate 
established in the Excel model. This is a simple matter for those familiar with 
BRANZFIRE and therefore not a great limitation of the model. The only crucial 
element is that the user must employ an equivalent volume approach. A reduction of 
the compartment volume must be made to allow for the presence of the racks as the 
boxes take up a considerable portion of the compartment and to ignore them would 
give non-conservative results for layer height and temperature. For example the 
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theoretical warehouse has a compartment volume of 10800m3 and 1632m3 of this is 
occupied by pallets resulting in a reduced volume of 9170m3. In response the floor 
area was reduced to 25m by 50m and the ceiling height increased to 7.3m giving a 
reduced volume of 9125m3. The ceiling height is increased to allow for the 
“reservoir” that exists between the top of the pallets and the ceiling where no pallets 
are present. Note that the difference of 35m3 between the actual reduced volume and 
the volume used for the model is due to rounding; when applying an equivalent 
volume approach it is conservative to round all measurements down. A sample 
BRANZFIRE input is included as Chapter 10. 
 
5.6 Results 
The BRANZFIRE results for Cases 1-4 are presented below alongside an explanation 
of the important phenomena and how they will affect the final loss estimate. Four 
graphs are shown for each Case and display the critical information for calculating 
loss; Heat Release Rate, Layer Height, Upper Layer Temperature and Lower Layer 
Temperature. 
 
The results for Case 1 are as follows: 
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Figure 5-3: Heat release rate for Case 1. 
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Figure 5-4: Layer heights for Case 1. 
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Figure 5-5: Upper layer temperature for Case 1. 
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Figure 5-6: Lower layer temperature for Case 1. 
 
The loss calculation for Case 1 is very simple as it is considered a total loss. The fire 
is observed to reach 10MW unimpeded and therefore, as assumed, cause a total loss. 
The 10MW limit was chosen due to comments from the FS however if we inspect the 
layer temperatures and layer heights it is clear that the entire building is smoke logged 
at temperatures exceeding 100°C upon FS arrival at 24 minutes. According to the 
prescribed properties the goods are destroyed at temperatures above this threshold 
therefore leading to total loss of contents. This is encouraging as it provides 
vindication of the FS comments and in fact we can see that the building is a total loss 
in less than 7 minutes.  
 
Although the fire was chosen to reach steady-state at 10MW the likely scenario is that 
the fire will continue to grow unhindered and cause localised structural failure. This 
will cause the fire to vent and most likely increase the heat release rate. It is then 
believed that progressive structural failure will occur as the fire moves throughout the 
building until the entire structure is destroyed . For this scenario it is virtually 
impossible to recover any of the original contents and therefore a total loss of 
$847,200 will result. 
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The results for Case 2 are as follows; 
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Figure 5-7: Heat release rate for Case 2. 
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Figure 5-8: Layer heights for Case 2. 
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Figure 5-9: Upper layer temperature for Case 2. 
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Figure 5-10: Lower layer temperature for Case 2. 
 
Flame Damage: The damage from flame is calculated using Equation 5-8 with 
 
)(Ω= NPBLoss flame  
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and 
 
Ψ=
contentsmNPB  
with 
tmmm
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where 
 
ch
Qm Δ=&  
 
Therefore by assuming a heat of combustion of 21MJ/kg [11] we can then calculate 
the total mass lost as follows; 
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and therefore the dollar loss due to flame is found by 
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Loss
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Heat Damage: Inspection of Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10 show that only in the upper 
layer does the temperature exceed 100°C. The upper layer temperature is greater than 
100°C between 4.5 minutes and 18 minutes and reaches a maximum depth of 2.70m 
from the floor. This corresponds to a loss of the entire top tier as 2.70m is less than 
3.0m but greater than 1.5m. In other words half the building contents are lost due to 
heat damage. Therefore the heat damage is calculated as 
 
600,81$
%)0%100(*1*/816*/100$
)%%100()( cov
=
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tiertierpalletspallet
xPPTLoss erreheat
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However this calculation does not allow for pallets in the upper layer that are already 
lost to flame damage. If we assume that the fire area is equivalent in both the upper 
and lower tiers then half of those pallets considered lost to flame have been included 
in the heat loss calculation. Hence the actual loss due to heat is found by the following 
 
200,81$
%)0%100(*1*/812*/100$
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Water Damage: The water damage in this case is equivalent to the area of sprinkler 
operation and found as 
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However once again we must remove the loss that has already been attributed to other 
types of damage. Because the entire top tier is considered lost to heat damage water 
damage is only of concern in the lower tier and in the lower tier we have already lost 
4 pallets to flame damage. Thus the actual loss attributed to water damage is  
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Smoke Damage: Inspection of Figure 5-8 shows that the smoke layer descends below 
1.5m at approximately 6 minutes thus exposing both the upper and lower layers to 
smoke. Because the entire upper layer is already lost to heat damage we are therefore 
only required to calculate smoke damage for the bottom tier. The calculation is as 
follows 
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However once again to prevent double counting we must remove from our 
calculations those pallets that have already been lost to flame and water damage. 
Consequently the actual loss to smoke damage is found by 
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Structural Damage: The low compartment temperatures and controlled heat release 
rate will not result in any structural damage or loss. 
 
The loss for Case 3 is as follows; 
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Figure 5-11: Heat release rate for Case 3. 
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Figure 5-12: Layer heights for Case 3. 
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Figure 5-13: Upper layer temperatures for Case 3. 
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Figure 5-14: Lower layer temperature for Case 3. 
 
Flame Damage: The flame damage is calculated in the same way as for Case 2 and is 
shown as follows 
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and the dollar loss is 
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Heat Damage: There is no damage due to heat in this scenario. Inspection of Figure 
5-12 shows that the layer height never drops to the top of the racking and information 
shown in Figure 5-14 indicates that the lower layer temperature never exceed 100°C; 
therefore no loss to is deemed to occur. 
 
Water Damage: For this scenario the FS are relied upon to extinguish the fire and the 
damage calculation is as follows; 
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However once again we must remove those pallets already lost to other types of 
damage. In this case the only other type of damage is that due to flame and therefore 
the actual loss due to water damage is 
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Smoke Damage: There is no damage due to smoke in this scenario. Inspection of 
Figure 5-12 shows that the layer height never drops to the top of the racking and 
therefore no damage to smoke will occur. 
 
Structural Damage: The large magnitude of this fire will lead to structural damage. 
The actual amount of damage is found as follows 
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The loss for Case 4 is as follows; 
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Figure 5-15: Heat release rate for Case 4. 
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Figure 5-16: Layer heights for Case 4. 
 
 149
-
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Time (minutes)
U
pp
er
 L
ay
er
 T
em
p 
(C
)
 
Figure 5-17: Upper layer temperature for Case 4. 
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Figure 5-18: Lower layer temperature for Case 4. 
 
Flame Damage: The input fire is that same as that used for Case 2 and the loss is once 
again calculated as follows 
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Heat Damage: There is no damage due to heat in this scenario. Inspection of Figure 
5-16 shows that the layer height never drops to the top of the racking and information 
shown in Figure 5-18 indicates that the lower layer temperature never exceed 100°C; 
therefore no loss to is deemed to occur. 
 
Water Damage: The water damage in this scenario is equivalent to that of Case 2 
however there is no component of heat damage to remove from the calculation, only 
that due to flame.  
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Now removing the flame damage we find that the actual loss due to water damage is 
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Smoke Damage: There is no damage due to smoke in this scenario. Inspection of 
Figure 5-16 shows that the layer height never drops to the top of the racking and 
therefore no damage to smoke will occur. 
 
Structural Damage: The low compartment temperatures and controlled heat release 
rate will not result in any structural damage or loss 
 
5.6.1 Results summary 
To allow easy comparison of results for the different protection strategies a summary 
of the results is presented below in Table 5-4. 
 
Table 5-4: Summary of results for the deterministic model. 
Loss Type Case 1 
(Detection 
Only) 
Case 2 
(Detection and 
Sprinklers) 
Case 3 
(Detection and 
Vents) 
Case 4 
(Detection, Sprinklers 
and Vents) 
Flame $163,200 $800 $3,000 $800 
Heat - $81,300 - - 
Smoke - $24,000  - 
Water - $1,300 $32,300 $2,600 
Structural $684,000 - $12,700 - 
Total $847,200 $107,400 $48,000 $3,400 
% of 
Total 100% 13% 6% 0.5% 
 
The total loss for each scenario is shown below in Figure 5-19 
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Figure 5-19: Total loss for Cases 1-4. 
 
The percentage breakdown of the loss for each Case is shown below in Figure 5-20. 
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Figure 5-20: Relative percentage loss for each case. 
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5.7 Discussion 
The results outlined above give a clear indication of how the different protection 
strategies affect the resultant loss both in monetary terms and components of damage. 
Table 5-4 shows that the smallest loss results for Case 4: Sprinklers and Vents and, as 
you would expect, the greatest loss comes form Case 1 which employs detection only. 
While these results make intuitive sense it is important to examine each Case 
individually for particular features of concern. Most important is the percentage 
breakdown of the loss; by knowing which types of damage are critical it may then be 
possible to design to minimise such damage. 
 
By assuming a complete loss at a heat release rate of 10MW Case 1 results in a total 
loss. The rapid fire growth and comparatively slow FS response time ensures that a 
total burn-out of the warehouse will occur and that the entire structure will be lost. 
Therefore this Case serves to advocate the use of protection measures, additional to 
detection, in warehouse buildings. It is not often that a building owner will tolerate a 
complete loss and therefore they need to be aware that this is a likely result should 
they employ the bare minimum for fire protection. In effect, the results of Case 1 
serve as excellent justification for the investigation of alternative protection options 
such as those that will be discussed below. 
 
Case 2 relates to a sprinklered protected building and gives a much improved result to 
that of Case 1. The reduction of loss from 100% to 13% (Table 5-4) gives a clear 
indication that sprinklers are a valuable protection tool. In addition the components of 
loss are limited to heat, smoke, water and flame with heat damage far outweighing the 
damage of the others combined. Structural damage is notably absent and the types of 
damage are limited to effects on stock only. This indicates that the warehouse itself is 
left intact which is very advantageous if examining business interruption: provided 
the company still has sufficient stock to meet demand then they can function as 
normal in a relatively small timeframe, possibly even the same day. Although it is not 
the aim of this research to quantify the benefits of this lack of interruption one can at 
least gain an understanding of the positive implications. Similarly the owner may be 
able to take steps, based on these results that improve the stock’s resilience to heat 
damage and in doing so further reduce the potential loss. Alternatively they may 
 154
employ fast response sprinklers that provide early suppression and therefore restrict 
the temperature of the upper layer. This type of insight makes this model very useful 
to the building owner and clearly displays the benefits of a sprinkler protected 
building. 
 
By installing a smoke and heat vent system, as detailed by Case 3, the building owner 
can obtain considerable benefit. In this Case the loss is equivalent to 6% of the entire 
value of the building and composed primarily of water damage with structural and 
flame damage following in that order. As is the intention of vents no smoke or heat 
damage was deemed to occur meaning that all stock outside the FS area of operation 
is completely undamaged. However what is discouraging is that the structure is 
damaged which will almost certainly result in the warehouse being deemed unfit for 
purpose over a reasonable period of time. The resultant interruption to business could 
be crippling, especially if no redundancy exists in the form of storage at other sites. 
Yet again we see the value of the model as the identification of possible structural 
damage will allow the building owner to employee measures such as structural 
protection or the use of multiple warehouses. Before moving further one must 
remember that the results for this case are possibly based on a non-conservative 
design fire. The concept of a steady state fire at 20MW is not necessarily valid and 
was chosen due to a lack of knowledge regarding the heat release rate after 10MW. 
Therefore these results should only be taken as a possible indication of what might 
happen and it may be best for the user to investigate a number of different design fires 
and assess a range of possible outcomes. 
 
The smallest loss, equivalent to 0.5% of the total building value, was found to occur 
for Case 4 which employed both sprinklers and vents. In this Case the loss was 
compromised primarily of water damage with the remainder attributed to flame. 
These predictions may be misleading as they have no allowance for smoke damage. 
While the layer height is shown as above the goods it is believed that the sprinkler 
spray will cause a localised down-drag of the smoke layer around the area of sprinkler 
operation. Although the resultant loss is in part accounted for by pallets already 
damaged due to water, it may be that the smoke will spread beyond the area of 
sprinkler activation. This may be crucial for goods that have a tolerance to water, but 
no tolerance to smoke as goods that should be considered damaged are not. 
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Unfortunately the inability to account for the down-drag is a flaw of BRANZIRE and 
therefore the model can not calculate damage of this type. Subsequently it is 
recommended that the user add an additional loss term to that already calculated by 
the model should they deem this phenomenon as critical. Other than this drawback the 
model is thought to provide useful information to someone considering this scenario. 
 
The focus of the above discussion is on the level of loss and its make-up specific to 
each Case. However the utility of the model lies in its ability to draw comparisons 
between the different protection strategies and while some knowledge is gained from 
comparing the different loss levels the critical difference lies in the benefits that result 
from the initial investment. Most commonly calculated by means of a cost/benefit 
analysis this approach allows one to compare the costs of installation and maintenance 
of a system, or systems, to the relative benefit gained. Generally the inputs are 
expressed in a dollars per year and the return calculated as such however the loss 
calculated by this model is not expressed in such a way therefore requiring conversion 
of the expected total loss into a per year figure. This can be done by establishing the 
probability of a fire start during the return period, assuming that any fire start will 
result in the worst case loss, and then multiplying one by the other. In this way 
conservative estimates are obtained for the loss and the maximum return on the 
system will be calculated. Analysis of this type is extremely useful for comparison of 
different systems and the ability of this model to lend itself to such techniques is 
considered advantageous. 
 
It has already been mentioned that the warehouse used for analysis is a highly 
idealised scenario and that some of the techniques applied have been beyond their 
limits of application but despite this it is thought that the results produced are 
reasonable. Even if we accept that the figures produced may not be completely 
accurate, and possibly even optimistic, we can still see the relative benefits of each 
system and obtain an understanding of the likely loss reduction. This is taken as 
indication that the deterministic approach presented above is a useful tool for loss 
estimation and that provided the user is suitably cautious then valuable knowledge 
relating to warehouse fire loss can be gained. 
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5.8 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Overall it was found that the deterministic model developed produced reasonable 
results for loss estimation of a rack-storage fire in a warehouse. The ability to specify 
different protection systems and the vulnerability of goods to different types of 
damage allow accurate figures to be calculated and comparisons to be made. In 
addition to allowing comparison between the total loss for different scenarios the loss 
can also be broken down according to the different components of damage. This in 
turn allows informed decision making regarding different protection options and 
planning for unknown factors such as business interruption. Most importantly it gives 
building owners the opportunity to be proactive rather than reactive to the 
consequences of fire. It is also thought that the best way in which to make these 
decisions is through the use of a cost/benefit analysis and it was found that the results 
of the model lend themselves well to such a calculation. 
 
While the model is thought to be useful for its intended purpose it is still 
recommended that care be taken in its application. The warehouse used for purposes 
of illustration is highly idealised and it may be that different warehouses may not 
produce realistic results primarily due to the use of equations outside their 
recommended limits. In response to this potential problem it is strongly suggested that 
the model be only used by someone with adequate knowledge regarding fire 
behaviour and warehouse fire loss. In this way it is believed that the user’s knowledge 
will allow them to interpret the results correctly and identify any anomalies or 
problems that exist. Also recommended is comprehensive testing against an 
assortment of different warehouses, and if possible, comparison to loss from real-life 
fires. Unfortunately time constraints did not permit such an analysis in this research.  
 
In addition to the recommendations above further automation of the model is strongly 
advocated. At present this method is laborious and significant room for error exists if 
used by an inexperienced individual. Once again time constraints prevented such 
development for this research however it is believed that a software package using 
Microsoft Excel and VBA can be developed that provides fully automated loss 
calculations. This would further enhance the model’s utility and allow useful loss 
estimates to be made in a timely fashion. 
 157
5.9 References 
 
1. Sneddon, R., National Chief Adjuster, GAB Robins. June 2005. 
2. Allot, N, McLaren Toplis. June 2005. 
3. Rawlinson and Co.(Ed), Rawlinsons New Zealand construction handbook. 
2003, Wellington: Rawlhouse Publishing. 
4. Ramachandran, G., The economics of fire protection. 1998, London: E & FN 
Spon. xvi, 230. 
5. New Zealand. Building Industry Authority. and Standards Association of New 
Zealand., Approved document for New Zealand building code : fire safety clauses : 
C1, C2, C3, C4. 2000, Wellington [N.Z.]: Standards New Zealand. 236 (loose-leaf). 
6. Schifiliti, R., B. Meacham, and R. Custer, "Design of Detection Systems". 3rd 
/ ed. SFPE handbook of fire protection engineering, ed. P.J. DiNenno, National Fire 
Protection Association., and Society of Fire Protection Engineers. 2002, Quincy, 
Mass. Bethesda, MD.: National Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire 
Protection Engineers. 1 v. (various pagings). 
7. Babrauskas, V., Heat Release Rates. 3rd / ed. SFPE handbook of fire 
protection engineering, ed. P.J. DiNenno, National Fire Protection Association., and 
Society of Fire Protection Engineers. 2002, Quincy, Mass. Bethesda, MD.: National 
Fire Protection Association; Society of Fire Protection Engineers. 1 v. (various 
pagings). 
8. Shelley, J., New Zealand Fire Service. 04/05/2005. 
9. Buchanan, A.H., Structural design for fire safety. 2001, Chichester, England ; 
New York: Wiley. xxii, 421. 
10. Cosgrove, B.W. and University of Canterbury. School of Engineering., Fire 
design of single storey industrial buildings. 1996, Christchurch, N.Z.: School of 
Engineering University of Canterbury. xiv, 159. 
11. Hammins, A. and K.B. McGrattan. Reduced-Scale Experiments on the Water 
Suppression of a Rack-Storage Commodity Fire for Calibration of a CFD Model. in 
Fire Safety Science-Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium. 2002: 
International Association for Fire Safety Science. 
 
 158
Chapter 6 FDS Modeling 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) is a Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) computer 
programme developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology in the 
United States of America. The programme numerically solves a form of the Navier-
Stokes equations for fire-driven fluid flow. The equations in question are appropriate 
for low-speed, thermally-driven flow and place an emphasis on smoke and heat 
transfer from fires [1]. Behaviour within the compartment is modelled by creating a 
mesh that divides the entire domain into a large number of control volumes. The 
Navier-Stokes equations are then solved for conservation of energy, mass, momentum 
and species for each control volume through time. Once a simulation is complete a 
series of outputs such as compartment temperatures, smoke spread and gas 
concentrations can then be visualized or point measurements of the same variables 
taken. These visualizations give a valuable insight into compartment conditions over 
time. It is clearly apparent that outputs of this nature would be valuable for predicting 
loss estimates. The ability to see exactly which boxes will burn and where the smoke 
may travel could lead to very accurate loss estimates. 
 
Before going further it is important to note that there has already been work 
performed in this area. Kevin McGrattan, the creator of FDS, has based a number of 
algorithms within FDS on results from rack storage tests. Mention of this work has 
already been made within Chapter 3, and the Technical Reference Guide for FDS [2] 
references two pieces of work that were used to develop the model for FDS [3, 4]. 
The following discussion heavily references the Technical Reference Guide and 
sections that relate to this work.  
 
6.2 Feasibility 
As with any modelling programme it is first important to understand how the 
programme works and gain an awareness of any limitations that exist. This 
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knowledge ensures that the results are valuable and that the programme is used 
correctly. Although the underlying mathematics is quite complex it is relatively 
simple to gain an understanding of the governing principles. Engineers with a 
background in fluid dynamics will already be familiar with the concepts of 
Conservation of Momentum, Energy, Mass and Species. FDS uses Large Eddy 
Simulation (LES) to describe the flow and solves these conservation equations using a 
low Mach number approximation. Air is treated as a thermally expandable ideal gas 
and the flow is driven by a heat source, the governing equations are then solved to 
describe the resulting transport of smoke and hot gases and the associated mixing with 
surrounding air [5]. While these principles are easy to grasp the most important 
feature of the model is how the fire and heat transfer are modelled. This is particularly 
important for warehouse fire as the unique nature of the fire growth may not be 
adequately represented. Therefore this section is a review of the inner workings of 
FDS covering important facets from the combustion reaction to the effects of 
suppression. 
 
Before we move further it is worth noting that one of the most critical factors 
determining the utility of FDS is computational time. The equations used to determine 
conditions within the compartment are solved iteratively. Therefore the longer the 
simulation, the longer the computer will take to perform the required calculations. In 
addition the equations are solved iteratively for each control volume, for each time 
step; consequently the finer the mesh, the longer the computational time. Yet coupled 
with this is the need to have a fine mesh to ensure accuracy. For a typical 
compartment the grid resolution may need to be as fine as 50mm to provide reliable 
results and the simulation may run for several days. Warehouses are not typical 
compartments. A simulation using this resolution in a warehouse would run for weeks 
or even months. While this can be countered in part by stretching the grid, parallel 
processing or the use of multiple meshes, there is still a requirement for considerable 
computing power and the reduction in computation time may not be great. It could be 
argued that a resolution of 100mm would be sufficient for a warehouse but when you 
consider that flue spaces can be as narrow as 100mm it is clear that there will be a 
considerable loss of accuracy. This is further compounded by the work of Ingason [6] 
who identified the importance of flue space in determining the initial heat release of a 
rack storage fire. The ultra fast growth rates of these fires make the early stages 
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extremely critical; a loss in accuracy here may lead to completely erroneous results. 
Despite these problems most of that discussed above is conjecture. It was therefore 
decided to test the capabilities of FDS and as a result determine its utility for 
determining loss estimates for a warehouse fire. 
 
FDS uses two different models for combustion and the type of model used depends on 
the grid resolution. For exceptionally fine grids using direct numerical simulation 
(DNS) the diffusion of fuel and oxygen can be modelled explicitly. In this case a one 
step, finite rate chemical reaction is advocated. Conversely for LES models, where the 
grid is of insufficient resolution to model diffusion, a mixture fraction based 
combustion model is used [2]. No DNS was used in this study and therefore we will 
concentrate solely on the mixture fraction combustion model. This model assumes 
that combustion is mixing controlled and this is based on an assumption that large 
scale convective and radiative processes can be modelled directly and processes that 
occur at small time and length scales can be approximated. This approximation is due 
to uncertainty regarding the phenomena involved and insufficient computing power 
[2]. The underlying implication is that all important species can be described in terms 
of a mixture fraction. This relates to a conserved quantity that represents the fraction 
of material, at a given point, that originated in the fuel stream [2]. An additional term, 
referred to as a ‘state relation’, describes the relationship between the mass fraction of 
each species and the mixture fraction. By assuming that the heat release is directly 
proportional to the consumption of oxygen [7] we are provided with a convenient way 
of calculating the heat release. The flame itself is considered as an infinitely thin sheet 
where fuel and oxidiser can not coexist. This is allowed for by assuming that the 
chemistry describing the combustion reaction is infinitely fast [2]. Consequently the 
two dimensional surface that represents the flame is embedded into a three 
dimensional space: thus defining the region which is considered as the fire. By 
calculating the local oxygen consumption rate at the flame surface we are given 
sufficient detail to calculate the heat released.  
 
It is thought that calculating the heat release rate in this way will provide good results 
when simulating a warehouse fire. This is because the solution is not dependent on the 
fuel geometry or properties. Although the actual heat release may be affected by 
phenomena such as convection and radiative feedback, which will be a function of the 
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fuel geometry, the fundamental model described above considers only the oxygen 
consumed. Admittedly the supply of oxygen may be limited, due to the confined 
nature of the fire it is not a ‘freeburn’. However this works in the model’s favour. 
Rather than using an empirical method based on a pan fire approximation or the 
familiar t-squared representation the heat release rate is based on the oxygen 
consumed. This should result in an accurate representation of the heat release rate 
and, for the case of warehouse fire, provide better results. As for the effect of the fuel 
itself, oxygen consumption calorimetry indicates that the heat released due to oxygen 
consumption is independent of the fuel involved. When you consider the many 
different fuel sources present within a warehouse (cardboard, polystyrene, wood etc) 
it is clear to see that this assumption provides a particularly neat solution and that 
FDS will be capable of handling such a scenario. 
 
Based on the above discussion we can take confidence in the mixture fraction model 
for combustion. However as previously mentioned the heat transfer is also a very 
important component of the fire and when using LES FDS attempts to model the 
radiative and convective processes directly. The important nature of these features for 
warehouse fire has already been mentioned: a strong relationship was discovered 
between the width of the vertical flue space and the heat release rate. It involves the 
conflicting effects of radiative feedback, preheating through convective flow and 
limiting the oxygen supply. More specifically, for a narrow flue the rising plume 
gases preheat the cardboard boxes therefore accelerating vertical fire growth, 
similarly the effects of radiative feedback are pronounced, however the oxygen supply 
is limited thus hindering the fire growth. On the other hand a wide flue space will 
reduce the preheating of combustibles as the plume gases will be cooler due to 
entrainment. Correspondingly the increased flue space reduces radiative feedback 
limiting the heat release rate. Furthermore we have a larger supply of oxygen and this 
will in turn increase the heat release rate. These conflicting phenomena make for a 
very complex scenario, and when in the right ratio will lead to a worst-case fire 
growth that may have drastic consequences. Whether FDS has the sophistication to 
handle such a complex situation will be the topic of discussion in the following 
sections. 
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Radiant heat transfer is dealt with by using an adaptation of the Radiative Transport 
Equation (RTE). This equation is applicable for an absorbing/emitting and scattering 
medium. In calculating the heat transfer it allows for spectral variations of the 
medium requiring a number of separate RTEs be solved to allow for the different 
wavelengths of the radiation. Fortunately in large scale situations soot is the most 
important product contributing to radiant heat from the fire and smoke. This is lucky 
because the radiation spectrum of soot is continuous, meaning that separate RTEs 
need not be solved to approximate the spectrum [2]. Instead we can assume the 
combustion gas behaves as a grey medium simplifying the calculation immensely. In 
the same way that the gas is considered a grey medium all fuel surfaces are modelled 
as grey diffuse walls. The RTE is then solved using a technique known as the Finite 
Volume Method (FVM). Put simply the FVM calculates the net radiant energy gained 
by a cell as the difference between that which is absorbed and that which is emitted 
[2]. These approximations are considered appropriate for modelling warehouse fire. 
There is nothing to indicate that the gases and fuel surfaces associated with a 
warehouse fire scenario can not be simulated as grey entities. However there is 
something to suggest that problems may occur in the vicinity of the flame sheet. The 
temperature of each cell is calculated according to the temperature of those cells 
adjacent. In the case of cells cut by the flame sheet, the modelled temperature may be 
lower than one would normally expect as cells outside the flame sheet may incorrectly 
reduce the cell temperature. This effect is magnified in scenarios with a low resolution 
and as a remedy a source term is included in the RTE for those cells cut by the flame 
sheet [2]. The source term ensures appropriate temperatures are obtained and serves to 
reinforce the importance of having sufficient grid resolution to obtain meaningful 
results. 
 
Convective heat transfer is also very important for determining the conditions within 
the compartment and the spread of fire. When using DNS the convective heat flux is 
obtained directly from the gas temperature, however in LES a combination of natural 
and forced convection correlations are used. These correlations are based on the 
temperature gradient at the boundary and the fluid properties. The ability to model 
forced convection is deemed important as it is expected to be the dominant form of 
convective heat transfer due to the confining nature of the fuel arrangement. While 
this is advantageous the sensitivity to grid size is highlighted once more. The 
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temperature gradient is based on the difference between the wall temperature and the 
temperature at the centre of the adjoining cell. Therefore any temperature variations 
across the flue space may be important for accuracy. So while the calculations used 
are deemed appropriate for warehouse fire we see once again the importance of 
investigating sensitivity to grid size. 
 
Yet another important facet of the model is the representation of the fuel properties. In 
a warehouse fire there are a number of available fuels such as cardboard, wood, 
expanded foams and plastics. While the actual heat release from the flame sheet is 
calculated independent of the fuel, fire spread is highly dependent on the fuel 
properties. This makes the fuel properties responsible for the all important rate of heat 
release. If the fuel is prescribed as combustible then the user must assign appropriate 
properties to define it as a thermally thin or thermally thick solid. An ignition 
temperature is also assigned and once a grid cell reaches this temperature it is 
considered to ignite. (There are issues regarding the validity of this approximation as 
real-life spread does not occur in discrete intervals but is a continuous process. 
However for the purposes of this model, and the lack of a better solution, it is deemed 
sufficient.) Once ignited the heat release is governed by a user specified “Heat 
Release Rate per Unit Area” or a “Heat of Vaporisation”. The choice of which is 
dependent on what one is trying to model and for our situation either is acceptable 
however one must never specify them in tandem [2]. The purpose of specifying either 
of these quantities is to account for the additional heat required for pyrolisation of the 
fuel; as the fuel converts from solid to gas chemical bonds must be broken requiring 
massive amounts of heat. Homogenous fuels are better specified by a Heat of 
Vaporisation as the response to the heat feedback from the fire can be modelled. 
Unfortunately cartonned goods are far from a homogeneous fuel source and as a result 
a HRRPUA must be specified to approximate the vaporisation properties. The 
technique of applying approximate properties arises as FDS lacks the sophistication to 
model composite fuels accurately. When describing the geometry it is not efficient, 
nor feasible to describe both the box and contents in detail. On the other hand it may 
be incorrect to model the fuel as a solid cardboard box and therefore it is necessary to 
use an approximation. Fortunately the properties that must be specified are easily 
obtained through experiment and techniques are available that allow an “averaged” 
approximation accounting for the properties of the box and contents. How these 
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techniques are applied is of the utmost importance as improper assumptions may lead 
to erroneous results. 
 
Now that a certain level of confidence can be gained in the abilities of FDS to model 
uncontrolled warehouse fire it is important to investigate how the phenomenon of 
sprinklered fire is modelled. While it is easy to obtain a reasonable understanding of 
the principles of FDS it is far harder to obtain a comprehensive knowledge of how 
sprinklers are modelled. The relative difficulty of understanding the sprinklered 
model lies in the need to simulate a number of different interactions. These include 
the sprinkler activation, drop size distribution, droplet trajectories, droplet transfer on 
a surface, mass transfers, energy transfers, and the effect on the heat release rate. The 
summary presented here will be a brief rundown of the fundamentals and those who 
wish to know more are recommended to consult the Technical Reference Guide [2]. 
 
Sprinkler activation is calculated using an adaptation of a commonly applied 
differential equation developed by Heskestad and Bill [8]. Activation is based on the 
interaction between the sprinkler properties and conditions within the compartment. 
The important sprinkler properties are the Response Time Index (RTI), the C-factor 
and the activation temperature of the sensing element. As for the conditions within the 
compartment, the temperature of the gas stream in which the link sits, the fraction of 
liquid water in the gas stream and the velocity of the gas stream are the important 
variables. The differential equation is then solved to determine the temperature of the 
sensing element. When the temperature reaches the activation temperature the 
sprinkler is considered to activate and a sprinkler spray is released. Determining the 
spray characteristics is therefore the next step. 
 
Upon activation the sprinkler releases a spray consisting of spherical drops. Drops are 
then tracked as they move through the domain. In tracking their trajectory it is 
necessary to prescribe the initial size and velocity of each droplet. A Cumulative 
Volume Fraction (CVF) is used to express the initial size distribution and it relates to 
the volume of water transported by droplets less than a given diameter [2]. FDS 
represents this distribution by using a combination of log-normal and Rosin-Rammler 
distributions [2]. The distribution itself is dependent on the diameter of the sprinkler 
orifice, the water temperature, and mass flow rate at the sprinkler orifice. Velocity is 
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usually modelled by a random distribution but where specific information relating to 
the sprinkler is known, the user may specify an alternative distribution. Using each 
droplet’s velocity and mass it is possible to determine droplet momentum which 
defines the resultant trajectory. 
 
While momentum is a very important component necessary to describe the path of a 
falling drop it is not the only determinant. Within FDS trajectory is actually taken as 
function of the force required to move through the gas stream and the effects of 
gravity. The force required to move through the gas stream is then dependent on the 
momentum transfer between the gas and the droplet as well as the effects of friction, 
which are governed by a drag coefficient. This sensitivity is important as the model 
can then allow for drops that fail to penetrate the plume or which are swept away by 
strong lateral currents. In doing this the model becomes more realistic and the 
accuracy is increased. By tracking droplets in such a way it is possible to obtain 
excellent representations of a droplet’s trajectory through the air. The next step is to 
determine where these drops go once they hit an obstruction. 
 
Upon striking a horizontal surface each droplet is assigned a random horizontal 
direction. The drop then moves in this direction at a fixed velocity until it hits the 
edge; at this instance it then falls straight down at the same fixed velocity [2]. This 
process repeats itself until the water evaporates or it reaches a vertical obstruction. In 
addition a special allowance is made for porous materials. If a solid is deemed porous 
a user assigned fraction of the water drops striking the surface will be assumed to go 
straight through the solid at a slow velocity [2]. McGrattan admits that this 
assumption is crude and neither the fraction nor velocity has been validated. However 
it is up to the user to define solids as porous and therefore becomes the user’s 
responsibility to validate the authenticity of their assumption. 
 
Now that the movement through the compartment can be described it is necessary to 
consider how the compartment conditions affect the droplet properties. This includes 
such variables as mass transfer, energy transfer and interactions with thermal 
radiation. The concepts of mass and energy transfer are dealt with by considering 
evaporation. As a droplet moves through the air it will evaporate as a function of the 
droplet equilibrium vapour mass fraction, the local gas phase vapour mass fraction, 
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the heat transfer to the droplet, and the droplet’s motion relative to the gas [2]. While 
the interaction of these parameters allows for transfer of water from the droplet to the 
surrounding gas it is necessary to consider the accompanying transfer of energy. This 
is represented by heating of the droplet which is taken as the resultant of the 
convective heat transfer across the droplet surface minus any energy required to 
evaporate the water [2]. It is vital to consider these transfers as they are of primary 
importance in water’s effectiveness as a suppression agent and to ignore such 
important interactions would reduce the validity of the model considerably. 
 
Of similar importance is the interaction of the droplets with thermal radiation. Water 
based suppression systems and in particular mist systems, are able to moderate 
thermal radiation through a combination of scattering and absorption [2]. This 
increases their effectiveness in controlling fire spread which is an important 
consideration in warehouse fire. It is considered necessary to calculate the droplet-
radiation interaction to provide an accurate simulation of the radiation field and for 
the droplet energy balance [2]. FDS calculates these effects through a separate, spray 
specific RTE. This altered RTE which allows for the local absorption and scattering 
coefficients which are taken as a function of the local droplet density and average 
droplet diameter. Complex mathematics that incorporates Mie theory is then used to 
solve for the actual scattering and absorption that occurs. From these calculations an 
accurate prediction of the altered radiation field is obtained. As alluded to earlier, the 
resulting nature of this field is important for calculating fire spread. Once again 
considering such effects is of the utmost importance and ignoring them severely 
reduces the authenticity of the model. 
 
The foregoing descriptions have described how the droplet travels within the 
compartment and the changes it undergoes as a result. However there has been no 
mention of how the sprinkler spray affects the fire itself. As it happens, simple heat 
transfer correlations can not be applied when describing the relationship between the 
spray and burning surfaces. This is because in addition to limiting oxygen, and 
cooling the burning surface and combustion gases, the spray also reduces the 
pyrolysis rate of the fuel [2]. While it is possible to estimate the reduction in pyrolysis 
rate for planar surfaces, most fuels possess complex geometries at scales irresolvable 
on grids used for LES [2]. As a result it is necessary to specify parameters that can 
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describe the suppression rate in local terms. The method applied is based on the work 
of Yu et al [9] and has already been described in Chapter 3. 
 
Despite the above discussion highlighting some concerns with FDS, there is nothing 
to suggest that investigating its capabilities is pointless. Instead the areas of concern 
have been highlighted and we are aware of the potential limitations. This means that 
any modelling can be tailored to explore these potential pitfalls and once explored it is 
then possible to confidently rate the performance of FDS in predicting loss for 
warehouse fire. 
 
6.3 Modelling 
To investigate the applicability of FDS for modelling warehouse fire it was decided to 
first model some smaller fires to test the programme’s capabilities. Therefore a 
number of models were run covering important features such as the combustion 
reaction, tier height and effect of sprinklers. This section describes the modelling and 
examines the results in an attempt to evaluate the feasibility of performing full scale 
modelling. 
 
When investigating a CFD package it is best to model a set of experiments that have 
already been performed. In doing this one can perform a quantitative assessment of 
the model’s capabilities. This is far better than modelling a hypothetical scenario as 
this requires qualitative judgment regarding the model’s capabilities. Although 
hypothetical models can be appropriate in unusual applications they are unacceptable 
for this investigation because the situation is very common, and more importantly, 
there has been extensive experimental investigation of rack storage fire. Most notably 
the research programme at Factory Mutual Research Corporation (FMRC) and its 
sister programme at the Swedish National Testing and Research Institute (SP) are 
useful sources of comparison data. The structured nature of these programmes and 
simple experimental arrangement make them ideal standards for assessment of FDS. 
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6.3.1 The Experiments 
The experimental set-up used by FMRC is displayed below in Figure 6-1. The typical 
arrangement is that of cardboard boxes containing the appropriate commodity stacked 
two boxes wide by two boxes deep by two boxes high on a wooden pallet. These 
pallets are then arranged in a two pallets wide by two pallets deep arrangement with 
the number of tiers varied from one to five. The separation is such that a 150 mm flue 
is created between the stacks. Ignition is then obtained by special ‘igniters’ consisting 
of cellucotton rolls 75 mm in diameter and 75 mm long soaked in 120 ml heptane and 
wrapped in a polyethylene bag. Four igniters are then placed in the flue space, one at 
the base of each stack, and lighted with a small pilot flame. The combustion products 
are collected by a large calorimeter to determine the heat release rate and instruments 
placed strategically to obtain temperature and velocity measurements. Such a simple 
arrangement is well within the capabilities of FDS and as a result these experiments 
were chosen for replication. 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Experimental set-up used by FMRC. 
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6.3.2 Geometry 
A three dimensional model of the set-up was created based on the available 
information. A representation of the rack was created within a computational domain 
measuring 5m wide by 5m long by 5m high. The mesh was defined as cells 0.05m 
wide by 0.05m long by 0.10m high and split the domain into 500 000 control 
volumes. All dimensions have therefore been rounded to the nearest 0.05 m to 
coincide with the defined grid. It is thought that rounding the measurements will have 
no dramatic effect on the results due to the comparatively large dimensions of the 
model and that behaviour in the flue space is the most critical to obtaining useful 
results. In using a grid with these dimensions no rounding was required in the flue 
space therefore giving an accurate representation of the geometry. The domain can be 
seen below as Figure 6-2.  
 
 
Figure 6-2: FDS geometry for feasibility modelling. 
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6.3.3 Materials 
The specification of materials for the simulation was straightforward as there were 
only two fuel types to model: the boxes and their contents, and the wooden pallets. 
Fortunately FDS has a database of materials listed with appropriate properties for 
modelling different fuels. As it happens the database contains a representation titled 
“FMRC Standard Plastic Commodity”. The data used to describe the thermal 
properties of this fuel come from experiments conducted by NIST that were used to 
develop earlier versions of FDS [3, 5]. It was decided that a slight modification of the 
database description would be used. This involved removing an alteration of the heat 
release rate that accounted for the burning of ‘shrink wrap’ which is commonly used 
to secure the boxes to the pallet. This ‘shrink wrap’ was not mentioned in any 
experimental description and as a result removed. The secondary importance of the 
wooden pallets in determining the heat release rate meant that they were modelled 
using generic properties for wood. Once more the properties came from the FDS 
database and in this case related to the properties of “Spruce”. The actual properties 
specified for both fuels are presented below in Table 6-1. 
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Table 6-1: Input Parameters for FDS modelling. 
 
Fuel Parameter Value 
Box and 
Contents HRRPUA              500 
 C_DELTA_RHO         1 
 TMPIGN              370 
 E_COEFFICIENT       0.5 
 DENSITY             12.5 
 HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION  40000 
 POROSITY            0.5 
   
Pallet PHASE CHAR' 
 MOISTURE_FRACTION 0.01 
 DELTA 0.028 
 TMPIGN 360 
 HEAT_OF_VAPORIZATION 500 
 DENSITY 450 
 CHAR_DENSITY 120 
 WALL_POINTS 30 
 BACKING EXPOSED' 
 
6.3.4 The Fire 
Modelling the fire requires specification of the combustion properties and an ignition 
source. The default combustion reaction in FDS is that for Methane. This means that 
the combustion chemistry of all burning fuels will be modelled as such. Unfortunately 
FDS lacks the capability of specifying a number of different reactions. The most 
important information that comes from specifying the reaction is the species yield. As 
we are only concerned with the heat release rate, velocities, temperatures and not the 
toxicity of the smoke, it is believed that specifying only one reaction will not 
significantly alter the results. As discussed earlier a number of fuel are present within 
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the model and exactly what reaction is the most appropriate to specify will be a 
subject of investigation. 
 
The complex igniters used in the experiments do not easily lend themselves to 
modelling within FDS, nor is the ignition phase described or quantified within any 
publications. This is deemed of little importance as we are not concerned with ignition 
behaviour and as a result a HRRPUA was specified at the base of the centre flue. The 
fire area was equivalent to the plan area of the flue and the HRRPUA set to account 
for a 100 kW fire. In an effort to retain a sense of reality the “RAMP” function was 
used to give the fire a t-squared growth and decay rate equivalent to a fast fire. The 
magnitude of 100 kW was chosen as it is similar to that of a small pane of heptane or 
a burning wastepaper basket [10]. This was deemed appropriate due to the use of 
heptane within the original experiments and the possible build up of rubbish due to 
poor housekeeping is a feasible cause of fire in warehouse occupancies. It was also 
thought that the 100 kW peak was insignificant compared to the 10 MW heat release 
rate expected of the burning array. The gross difference between these two values 
would thereby make the model insensitive to the form of ignition. This was 
convenient because, as previously mentioned, we are not investigating the ignition 
behaviour. It is therefore believed that the chosen ignition source is suitable for this 
investigation. 
 
6.3.5 The Combustion Reaction 
The physical properties of a fire such as heat release rate, temperatures and soot yield 
are highly dependent on the combustion reaction. This reaction has already been 
defined as the mixture fraction combustion model however the user must specify 
appropriate parameters to define the gas phase reaction of fuel and oxygen. Simply 
put the combustion reaction is defined by specifying the ideal stoichiometirc 
coefficients for O2, CO2 and H2O, and yields for CO and soot. In addition the user 
must decide on which fuel to specify the coefficients for as FDS is only capable of 
modelling one combustion reaction. This is an obvious problem for the scenario 
considered in this analysis as we have a fuel comprised of approximately 50% 
cellulosic material and 50% polystyrene. In order to examine which reaction best 
represented the fuel both polystyrene and wood (cellulose) were modelled against 
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methane. Methane was chosen as the control as it is the default reaction within FDS 
and is recommended for use when there are uncertainties regarding the governing 
combustion reaction. The relevant parameters were chosen from the FDS database as 
is advised in the User’s Guide [1] and are presented below in Table 6-2 
 
Table 6-2: Combustion parameters. 
 Reaction Type 
Parameter Methane Polystyrene Wood 
Stoichiometric coefficient – O2 2.0 10 3.7 
Stoichiometric coefficient – CO2 1.0 4 3.4 
Stoichiometric coefficient – H2O 2.0 8 3.1 
Radiative Fraction 0.15 0.45 Not specified 
Soot Yield 0.01 0.164 0.01 
 
The resulting convective heat release rates are presented below in Figure 6-3. Upon 
inspection of this graph one can clearly see that methane provides an approximate 
average of polystyrene and wood. Although methane lags both wood and polystyrene 
between 80 and 115 seconds it then observes acceleration in its growth until it clearly 
exceeds polystyrene after 170 seconds. Because the convective heat release rate of 
methane is actually greater than both polystyrene and wood in the later stages of the 
fire it is actually conservative to model the combustion reaction using methane. This 
is based on the assumption that a higher heat release rate will cause a more severe fire 
and therefore greater property loss. 
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Figure 6-3: Heat Release Rates for different reaction types. 
6.3.6 Additional parameters 
Other important parameters relating to the model are specified as follows: 
• Domain boundaries in the xz and yz planes have been set as open. 
• The temperature outside and inside the computational domain is assumed to be 
20°C [6]. 
• The flame and smoke were visualised as iso-surfaces with mixture fractions of 
0.136 and 0.001 respectively. 
• Plot 3-D files have been specified every 60 seconds. 
• The “THCP” function has been used to measure temperatures and velocities in 
the central flue at 0.5 m intervals from the floor to the ceiling. Note that the 
temperatures recorded were those of thermocouples as opposed to the actual 
gas temperatures. 
• The simulation time was set as 180 s. 
 
Any other parameters have been set as default. 
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6.4 Results and Discussion – Initial investigation 
To prevent an unnecessary investment of resources it was decided to conduct a 
preliminary investigation into the usefulness of FDS. The model in this case was 
based on the most commonly employed testing arrangement which is a 2-tier high 
arrangement with a 150 mm flue space and all values are set to the defaults described 
above. Regrettably it was not possible to obtain the original data for the experiments 
against which the model is being assessed. Ideally we could compare the actual time 
histories of both the model and experiments to rate the model’s performance. 
Although comparisons of this nature are not an option there are other options. 
Amongst others, Ingason and Kung have provided correlations that describe the fire 
behaviour and associated phenomena (Chapter 3). These correlations have been 
developed based on experimental results and as such it is possible to use them for 
comparison. Those characteristics that were chosen as important for comparing the 
experiments and model are listed as follows: 
• Heat Release Rate, 
• Plume Temperature and 
• Plume Velocity.  
 
These parameters were obtained from the simulations and then plotted versus the 
predicted behaviour according to the appropriate equation. The results are presented 
below with discussion outlining important features. However one should be aware 
that it is unreasonable to expect perfect agreement between the correlations and the 
model results. The correlations represent idealised representations of fire phenomena 
based on curve fits to experimental data. As such they are smooth, continuous 
functions and do not account for the sometimes erratic behaviour of fire. 
Comparatively FDS aims to model reality and the outputs are more representative of 
the true nature of fire. Therefore, when examining results the important issues are the 
general trends of the results as opposed to quantitative comparisons. 
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Figure 6-4: Comparison of convective Heat Release Rate. 
 
According to Figure 6-4 FDS under predicts the convective rate of heat release for 
both the Group 1 and Group 2 curves of Ingason. This is worrying as the modelled 
commodity would be conservatively described by the Group 1 curve. There is 
potential to argue that the commodity is actually Group 2 however the gains are not 
great as FDS still under predicts the heat release for this category. Although FDS 
displays an exponential growth, it is too slow and decays to a linear growth where 
Ingason predicts the growth to continue as exponential. On closer inspection it can be 
seen that FDS severely lags the curves of Ingason for the first 60 seconds of growth. 
However at 60 seconds there is a sudden change in the growth and an acceleration of 
the heat release rate is observed. This suggests that the FDS model has an incipient 
growth phase. The curves of Ingason do not allow for an incipient growth and as such 
it is necessary to perform an adjustment to draw fair comparisons. It was decided to 
adjust the data for the ignition source specified in the model as this was a user defined 
element of the fire behaviour. The ignition source was defined with a 100 kW peak 
heat release rate (70 kW convective) therefore each curve was adjusted to set t = 100 
kW as zero seconds (Figure 6-5). Note the convective heat release has been used for 
comparison as this is what Equation 3-4 has been derived from. 
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Figure 6-5: Comparison of FDS to the Ingason correlation for HRR (Equation 3-4), 
adjusted for ignition scenario. 
 
The adjusted results give far better agreement with the correlations of Ingason 
however there is an element of concern with the behaviour after approximately 65s. 
Up until this point the predicted behaviour is in reasonable agreement with the Group 
1 curve, although the results of FDS between 30 and 65s do not quite show 
exponential behaviour the approximate values for heat release rate are roughly similar 
with a time lag of approximately 10 seconds. Beyond 65s there is a sudden 
deceleration of growth and linear behaviour is observed. This deviates from the 
exponential predictions of Ingason and analysis based on these results may be non-
conservative. Nevertheless the positive elements of the performance of FDS in this 
case indicate that there is potential for accurate modelling. It may be that altering the 
input file or geometry will result in improved performance however this is in the 
realm of future research. 
 
Although the heat release rate is the most important aspect of fire behaviour an 
accurate description of the plume properties is critical for determining conditions 
within the compartment. The most common way to represent the plume is by 
describing temperatures and velocities within the plume. As a result it is important to 
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compare the predictions of FDS to those of the correlations described previously in 
Chapter 3. The comparisons for temperature are presented below as Figure 6-6 to 
Figure 6-8 while those for velocity can be found as Figure 6-11 to Figure 6-13. The 
velocities and temperatures were measured at intervals of 0.5m above the fire 
however no added insight is gained by presenting each graph separately and as such 
they have been omitted: as an alternative the chosen figures been presented as typical 
examples of the in-rack plume flow. It is important to note that the HRR of FDS has 
been used as the input HRR for the correlations. This was done to normalise the 
results and ensure accurate comparisons. 
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Figure 6-6: Comparison of in-rack temperatures at z = 1 m 
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Figure 6-7: Comparison of in-rack temperatures at z = 2 m 
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Figure 6-8: Comparison of centreline temperatures at z = 5 m. 
 
The behaviour displayed by Figure 6-6 and Figure 6-7 indicate major discrepancies 
between FDS and the predictions of Ingason. Not only does FDS indicate a lower rate 
of temperature rise it also predicts temperatures higher than the 840˚C limit set by 
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Ingason (Chapter 3). Although the general form of each curve is similar, and therefore 
encouraging, the resultant errors of up to 40% are concerning. Attention must also be 
drawn to the drop in temperature in Figure 6-6 where Ingason predicts steady 
temperatures. This is quite unusual and when attempting to explain this behaviour the 
author is at a loss; the implication is that the flame temperature is cooling in this 
location however this is extremely unlikely. Once more we are left in a situation 
where further investigation is required to determine whether FDS is capable of 
improvement for different scenarios. 
 
On the other hand FDS gives entirely different results when predicting the 
temperature at the ceiling. The general shape of each curve is very similar however 
according to Figure 6-8, FDS over predicts the rate of temperature rise. Another 
similarity is the predicted maximum temperature of approximately 900˚C is within 
7% of the 840˚C limit of Ingason. A possible explanation for the faster temperature 
rise in the FDS model is related to the in-rack flow. From Figure 6-7 it is evident that 
the in-rack temperatures are over-predicted within FDS. This would make the gas 
more buoyant and therefore travel at faster speeds than witnessed in the experiments 
thus resulting in hotter temperatures at the ceiling in a smaller amount of time. This 
phenomenon becomes important when considering detector response but is not 
thought to provide too much cause for concern and the overall agreement is taken to 
be very satisfactory. 
 
Although graphs such as those shown above provide an understanding of the fire 
behaviour over time they are generally only useful for qualitative comparisons. As a 
result it was decided to create a plot of the residual error, where the residual is the 
amount that a variable deviates from what is considered to be true [11]. In this 
instance the correlations of Ingason and Kung et al are considered to be true and the 
residual is the percentage that FDS under or over predicts the value for a given time 
step. This type of graph allows quantification of the goodness of fit while still 
providing useful insight into the behaviour over time. A plot of the residuals for the 
centreline temperatures obtained for Run 1 is presented below in Figure 6-9. 
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Figure 6-9: FDS Residuals for Centreline Temperature 
 
Figure 6-9 displays some very useful information. From the graph it is evident that the 
first 90 seconds of the model give wildly erratic results. If we consider a maximum of 
30% error as acceptable and error less than 20% as good agreement then we do not 
start achieving satisfactory results until after 120 seconds. At this point the residuals 
for elevations greater than or equal to 1.5 m begin to stabilise and fall within the 
acceptable limits. In general the agreement improves as the elevation increases with 
the temperatures at the ceiling agreeing to within 5%. This behaviour also seems to 
concur with the explanations provided previously. Although the agreement higher in 
the rack at later stages in the fire is encouraging the discrepancies at elevations of 
0.5m and 1.0m need explanation as does the universally erratic behaviour for the first 
60 seconds. It may be that these elevations are more sensitive to the early fire 
behaviour or that approximations in the geometry do not match those from 
experiment.  
 
The irregular performance in the first 60 seconds is thought to be due to the incipient 
phase described earlier. During this period the fire specified as the ignition source is 
driving the plume. As a result we see unusual behaviour; the correlations are for a 
growing rack storage fire and during this period the fire can not be considered as such. 
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Therefore we must adjust the results in the same way as described above where we set 
t = 100 kW as t = 0 seconds. This removes the incipient phase and provides a more 
correct comparison as shown below. 
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Figure 6-10: FDS Residuals for Centreline Temperature adjusted for the 100kW 
ignition scenario 
 
When comparing Figure 6-10 to Figure 6-9 it is clear to see that the adjustment for the 
incipient phase makes a marked improvement to the residuals. The inconsistent 
performance is largely removed and instead we are provided with a graph that 
displays vital information. While the behaviour is still irregular for the first 45 
seconds we can see that after this time the FDS residuals for elevations greater than or 
equal to 1.5 m give satisfactory agreement to the predictions of the Ingason 
correlation. In fact the positive values of the residuals show that FDS is predicting 
higher temperatures than Ingason and therefore may result in conservative estimates 
of plume temperatures. Upon consultation with Ingason it was discovered that the 
840°C limit imposed on the correlations was only an average and that temperatures 
exceeding this value often occurred [12]. As such the predictions of FDS for times 
greater than 45 seconds and elevations greater or equal to 1.5 m are taken as valid.  
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The conformity described above is heartening however the disagreement for the first 
45 seconds and lower elevations needs to be dealt with before we can take true 
confidence in the ability of FDS. The erratic behaviour for the first 45 seconds could 
be due to a number of reasons however as a first option it is best to investigate the 
HRR at this time to see if anything unusual is occurring. Upon inspection of  
Figure 6-5 we can see that the fire is still in the initial stages of growth and as such the 
plume flows may not be fully established. This would lead to inconsistent 
performance as the flows would be quite turbulent and the flaming region would still 
be in the process of development. It could also be that the correlations do not allow 
for this behaviour as they are a smooth function with no allowance for sudden 
changes in temperature during the early stages. In addition to this the initial behaviour 
is probably not as important as that once the fire becomes fully established. The 
relatively low heat release rates and temperatures mean that any effects are probably 
negligible after the fire has developed because the response of detectors and sprinklers 
will be governed by conditions later in the fire. As such it is considered that the 
irregular performance in the early stages of the fire can be ignored and is simply due 
to phenomena associated with establishing the fire plume. 
 
Adjusting the residuals for the incipient phase still failed to provide agreement 
between FDS and Ingason at elevations lower than 1.5 m. In fact Figure 6-10 
indicates that FDS drastically under-predicts the centreline temperature at these 
elevations. This deviates from predictions higher in the rack as these temperatures are 
generally over-estimated; this is taken as indication that there must be something 
distinctly different about the plume and fire behaviour in this region. Although erratic 
behaviour can be expected for the first 45 seconds, according to the explanations 
above, we see that this behaviour continues well past this period. Part of the 
explanation may be that the thermocouples at these elevations are within the flaming 
region after the 45 seconds has passed. This would mean that the plume correlations 
can not be applied as the thermocouples are not actually within the plume itself. 
However while this may lead to unusual behaviour it still does not account for 
temperatures far less than the 840°C advocated by Ingason. In addition those 
thermocouples at higher elevations are also located within the flaming region later in 
the fire however they still display good agreement with Ingason. Why such 
discrepancies occur is unknown at this stage and a possible area for future research. 
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The unusual behaviour at lower elevations is unfortunate however the implications are 
not considered crucial for two reasons; firstly Ingason does not advocate use of the 
correlations for racks less than one tier high and secondly the need to model 
behaviour in this region is not great. The limits of Ingason dictate that the plume 
correlations are not applicable for racks of less than two tiers and while the model is 
considering a two tier arrangement the tier height is only 1.5 m. It is reasonable to 
assume that behaviour in the first tier may be the same irrespective of the presence of 
tiers above. Therefore the plume correlations can not be applied in this region and we 
would expect disagreement when comparing the correlation to the FDS model. These 
arguments help to explain the disagreement however as stated above it is not often 
that one would care to model the plume behaviour at such low elevations. The 
placement of detectors or sprinklers at such elevations is not common practice and as 
such a fire engineer need not concern themselves with applying the correlation in this 
region as long as the correlation or FDS model provides useful results at higher 
elevations. The fact that reasonable agreement was obtained at higher elevations and 
that the best agreement was obtained at the ceiling where a conventional detector and 
sprinkler system would be located means that FDS can be used for such applications. 
Admittedly faster and similar results are obtained by using hand calculations but 
should the need to use FDS arise the user can be confident in the predictions of plume 
temperature.  
 
As previously mentioned, in addition to plume temperatures plume velocities are also 
imperative for describing the plume flow. The measured velocities are plotted below 
against the predictions of Ingason. Once again a limited number of graphs are 
presented as it is believed they display typical behaviour.  
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Figure 6-11: Comparison of in-rack velocities at z = 1 m 
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Figure 6-12: Comparison of in-rack velocities at z = 2 m 
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Figure 6-13: Comparison of in-rack temperatures at z = 5 m 
 
Upon inspection of Figure 6-11 it is apparent that FDS does not match the correlation 
of Ingason. Although good agreement is obtained for the first 30 seconds the curves 
then deviate with FDS predicting lower velocities. It is to be expected that the FDS 
velocities are less than those of Ingason as lower temperatures (Figure 6-6) would 
result in reduced buoyancy but FDS actually exceeds the temperatures predicted by 
Ingason for a period at this elevation. If the velocities were solely driven on buoyancy 
one would expect to see a marked increase in velocity exceeding that predicted by 
Ingason during the same time period, but this is not the case.  
 
On the other hand the behaviour depicted in Figure 6-12 makes reasonable sense. The 
higher temperatures at this elevation (Figure 6-7) will lead to higher velocities and 
this is what is shown. In fact the general shape of each curve is very similar which is 
taken as a positive result because if the flows are better predicted at higher elevations 
in the rack then perhaps the errors lower down can be ignored as it is not often 
necessary to model anything in this region. In addition by slightly altering the input 
parameters it may be possible to get excellent agreement with the predictions of 
Ingason. In this case further investigation is undoubtedly justified. 
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Figure 6-13 provides very conflicting results. While the two curves are similar in 
shape we can see the velocities given by FDS are far less than those of Kung et al. 
This is not what is expected as Figure 6-8 indicates that FDS predicts higher 
temperatures than those of Ingason. If buoyancy is the primary driver of the plume 
velocity then we would expect to see higher velocities from FDS. The only 
explanation for the slower velocities is that some other factor is affecting the velocity. 
The correlation from Kung et al is said to calculate the velocity where the plume 
centreline impinges on the ceiling [13] however this makes no sense as theoretically 
this is a stagnation point: this was confirmed when attempting to measure the vertical 
velocity at this point within FDS. Hence Kung et al must have actually measured the 
velocity at a certain distance below the ceiling which is why the velocity was 
modelled at an elevation of 4.9 m (Figure 6-13). This elevation was chosen as it was 
as close to the ceiling as one could model the velocity while still achieving reasonable 
results. Yet we have no way of knowing if this corresponds to the elevation chosen by 
Kung et al as the original paper could not be obtained. Due to the poor agreement it 
was then decided to model the velocity at 0.1 m intervals below the ceiling, to a 
maximum of 0.5 m (Figure 6-14), to see if better agreement could be obtained. It is 
clear that the best agreement is obtained at an elevation of 4.8 m which is equivalent 
to 0.2 m below the ceiling. It is also clear that the velocity reduces as elevation 
increases. This may be due to the presence of the ceiling causing a deceleration of the 
plume flow as the plume gases approach the stagnation point.  
 
 188
-
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
- 15 30 45 60 75 90 105 120 135 150 165 180
Time (seconds)
Ve
lo
ci
ty
 (m
/s
)
FDS 4.5 FDS 4.6 FDS 4.7 FDS 4.8 FDS 4.9 Ingason
 
Figure 6-14: Comparison of Centreline Velocities at near ceiling elevations 
 
The discussion above provides much of the necessary information regarding the 
modelling of velocities however for completeness a plot of the residuals adjusted for 
the ignition scenario is displayed below as Figure 6-15. This figure clearly displays 
poor agreement at an elevation of 0.5m while much better agreement is obtained 
higher in the stack and the best agreement being seen at 1.5m. Most notable is the 
steady-state of the residuals with a relatively constant velocity being seen for all 
elevations after 60 seconds. This indicates that the in-rack flows have become well 
established and that a steady state has occurred which can be taken that the residuals 
for temperature (Figure 6-10) will reach a similar state as the fire progresses. 
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Figure 6-15: Run 1 residuals for velocity. 
 
6.4.1 Conclusions 
Despite some gross errors between the predictions of FDS and the chosen correlations 
the general results are encouraging. Although errors exceeding 50% have been 
obtained the behaviour shown is of a very similar form and the trends are 
encouraging. As a result additional modelling is warranted and, more importantly, 
necessary to determine the utility of FDS for this type of scenario. By altering the 
geometry and varying the input parameters it is thought that the model may be 
improved to provide excellent agreement with the correlations. The nature of the 
modelling and the results are discussed below. 
 
6.5 Number of tiers 
Although a 2-tier stack may be the most commonly tested arrangement in experiment 
real life warehouses will tend to use much higher arrangements with stacks of more 
than 6 tiers being commonplace. This is generally due to the desire of the property 
owner to store as much as possible in the smallest area possible. Consequently it is 
important to investigate the ability of FDS in predicting fire behaviour for warehouses 
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employing such storage heights as such occupancies may not be covered under the 
regulatory guidelines and therefore require specific engineering design. FDS happens 
to be a commonly employed tool for such design and as a result it is essential that its 
effectiveness is determined. 
 
The resultant modelling included stacks up to 5 tiers high and the results are presented 
below in Figure 6-16. Note that the results have been adjusted according to the  
100 kW ignition scenario as for Figure 6-5. The 5 tier limit was chosen as the 
correlations of Ingason are only applicable to this limit.  
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Figure 6-16:Heat Release Rates for different stack heights  
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Figure 6-17: FDS residuals for HRR of different stack heights 
 
Figure 6-16 and Figure 6-17 give clear indication that FDS improves its performance 
as the number of tiers is increased. Although not exact the agreement between FDS 
and the curves of Ingason for 3, 4 and 5 tier arrangements is much improved when 
compared to that of a 2 tier arrangement. Despite this there is concern about the 
behaviour between 15 and 45 seconds. There is a considerable lag in growth with heat 
releases being under predicted by as much as 60% when considering the five tier case. 
The differences in this case could be due to a number of different factors; reduced 
pre-heating, insufficient radiative feedback or ventilation conditions. Incorrect 
representation of one, some or all of these phenomena could lead to a reduction in fire 
growth thus accounting for belated acceleration. In fact the discussion above states 
that the in- rack temperatures and velocities are under predicted for this stage of the 
fire, this would in turn cause a reduction in preheating and radiative feedback thus 
limiting the fire growth. While this may be partly responsible it is not believed that 
the under-prediction is of sufficient magnitude to be the sole explanation; especially 
when the rapid growth that occurs after 45 seconds coincides with a period where 
velocities and temperatures are still under estimated. It is also hard to explain why the 
lag during this time becomes more pronounced as the number of tiers increases. From 
Figure 6-16 we can see that the convective heat release rate is identical for the first 40 
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seconds for each stack height whereas the correlations of Ingason suggest there should 
be a deviation. This could be due to lingering effects of the ignition scenario and that 
flow patterns relating to the increased stack height have not yet been established. 
However once the flow pattern in the rack has been established we would then expect 
to see the acceleration in the heat release rate as Figure 6-16. This suggests that the 
results of FDS may be taken as valid for later stages in the fire particularly for racks 
of four tiers or more. To validate this claim let us examine how the velocities and 
temperatures of FDS compare to the predictions of Ingason and Kung et al in taller 
stacks. 
 
In keeping with earlier analysis we will first examine the performance of FDS for 
predicting the plume temperature. The residuals for Runs 2, 3 and 4 which correspond 
to stack heights of 3, 4 and 5 tiers are displayed below in Figure 6-18, Figure 6-19 and 
Figure 6-20 respectively. The over-riding trend for the residuals is that agreement at a 
particular elevation does not improve as stack height increases. For example at an 
elevation of 3.0m the residual at steady-state is approximately 20% regardless of the 
number of tiers and this is fairly typical. The exception being at elevations of 0.5 and 
1.0m, here the agreement does improve with an increase in the number of tiers. 
Inspection of Figure 6-9 shows that at elevations of 0.5m and 1.0m a steady-state is 
not obtained and the behaviour is very erratic yet when compared to the predictions of 
FDS for 3-5 tiers we see a distinct change, particularly at 1.0m where steady-state 
agreement is within 20%, and as little as 5% for 5 tiers (Figure 6-20). This 
improvement is taken as further proof that the performance of FDS improves as the 
stack height increases and is once again considered to be related to an established 
flow around the fuel arrangement dominating the transport of products. Admittedly 
the conformity at 0.5m is still grossly different with errors of approximately 50% 
however it is believed this is not critical to the overall results and is attributed to 
reasons relating to the limits of applicability of Ingason’s correlations.  
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Figure 6-18: Temperature residuals for 3 tiers. 
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Figure 6-19: Temperature residuals for 4 tiers. 
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Figure 6-20: Temperature residuals for 5 tiers. 
 
Another notable feature of the results is that the magnitude of the residuals decreases 
as the elevation increases as shown by the values in Table 6-3. In fact we see a two-
fold reduction in the average residual of 38% for z equal to 0.5m and 19% for z equal 
to 2.5m. Again we see the improvement in FDS’s capabilities as the number of tiers 
increases and on the whole it is clear that the performance of FDS in predicting plume 
temperatures improves as the stack height increases 
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Table 6-3: Average temperature residuals over time for different stack heights. 
  Number of Tiers   
Elevation 
(m) 2 3 4 5 Average
0.5 61% 33% 28% 28% 38% 
1 16% 9% 8% 7% 10% 
1.5 25% 24% 26% 27% 25% 
2 22% 22% 23% 23% 22% 
2.5 18% 19% 20% 20% 19% 
3  18% 20% 23% 20% 
3.5   15% 18% 18% 17% 
4   12% 15% 14% 14% 
4.5    15% 14% 14% 
5 37%   13% 12% 12% 
5.5     10% 9% 10% 
6      9% 9% 
6.5   38%   9% 9% 
7       8% 8% 
7.5           
8     25%    
8.5           
9           
9.5       19%   
Average 30% 21% 18% 15% 16% 
* Note that the shaded area represents measurements within the rack. 
 
The encouraging results for centreline temperatures should indicate that the agreement 
between FDS and Ingason will be of a similar order for centreline velocities as plume 
velocity is strongly influenced by buoyancy and therefore temperature. The residuals 
relating to centreline velocity for 3, 4 and 5 tiers are shown below as Figure 6-21, 
Figure 6-22 and Figure 6-23 while the average residuals for stacks of 2-5 tiers are 
shown in Table 6-4. As it happens the most telling statistics come from the table as it 
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is here that we see the true ability of FDS to model velocities. As opposed to 
centreline temperatures where we see improvement with three tiers, it is only with 4 
and 5 tiers that FDS begins to better its performance. Average errors of 31% and 34% 
for two and three tiers respectively indicate mediocre performance while the errors of 
26% and 25% for four and five tiers show that FDS does well for stacks of this height. 
Further to this we see a steady improvement as the elevation increases until we see a 
relatively constant error of 14-19% for elevations greater than 3m. This clearly shows 
that FDS is much better at predicting plume velocities as stack height increases and 
the results are seen as validation for the use of FDS to model rack storage fire. 
 
-100%
-80%
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
- 20.00 40.00 60.00 80.00 100.00 120.00
Time (seconds)
0.5m 1.0m 1.5m 2.0m 2.5m 3.0m 3.5m 4.0m
 
Figure 6-21: Centreline velocity residuals for 3 tiers. 
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Figure 6-22: Centreline velocity residuals for 4 tiers. 
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Figure 6-23: Centreline velocity residuals for 5 tiers. 
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Table 6-4: Average residuals for centreline velocities and different number of tiers. 
  Number of tiers   
Elevation 
(m) 2 3 4 5 Average
0.5 58% 67% 70% 73% 67% 
1 31% 47% 51% 54% 46% 
1.5 14% 23% 28% 34% 25% 
2 24% 19% 20% 27% 23% 
2.5 29% 22% 16% 21% 22% 
3   27% 14% 15% 19% 
3.5   33% 16% 16% 22% 
4   36% 16% 16% 23% 
4.5     16% 14% 15% 
5     19% 15% 17% 
5.5     19% 15% 17% 
6       16% 16% 
6.5       17% 17% 
7       17% 17% 
Average 31% 34% 26% 25% 25% 
 
6.5.1  Conclusions 
The results and discussion above are provide evidence to support the use of FDS in 
modelling rack storage fire. While the performance is not optimum for stacks of two 
and three tiers the average errors for plume velocities and temperatures are on the 
order of 30% and for most elevations this error relates to an over-prediction of these 
quantities leading to conservative analysis. Most importantly the total average error 
for both temperature and velocity is 25% respectively (Table 6-3 and Table 6-4) 
which shows that overall the performance is acceptable. 
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6.6 Sprinkler modelling 
The geometry and grid used to investigate the sprinklered model consists of that 
described above with the addition of four sprinklers. These sprinklers were placed 
0.15m below the ceiling at 3m centres (in accordance with NZS 4541:2003) with a 
radial distance of 2.12 m from the centre of the flue. The discharge density was 
15mm/min based on Table 9.3, NZS 4541:2003. The positioning of the sprinklers can 
be seen in Figure 6-24. 
 
 
Figure 6-24: Image from Smokeview showing sprinkler location. 
 
In the absence of anything better the sprinkler properties were specified based on 
sprinkler files within the FDS database. This was done based on a need to ensure that 
the sprinkler is accurately represented and the fact that the files were created by the 
programme developers therefore meaning they will have been detailed correctly. The 
characteristics of the sprinklers used for this investigation were specified using the 
values presented in Table 6-5. 
 
It should be noted that this geometry is not based on a published experimental set up. 
Unfortunately the literature does not provide good information on sprinklered fire 
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tests and instead the set-up is based on what would be required when designing 
sprinklers according to New Zealand standards. 
 
Table 6-5: Sprinkler input parameters. 
Parameter Value 
K-FACTOR 79 
RTI 200 
C-FACTOR 0 
ACTIVATION TEMPERATURE 92 
OPERATING PRESSURE 2.92 
OFFSET DISTANCE 0.1 
SIZE DISTRIBUTION 1 
800.0  2.43  0.6 
VELOCITY 1 
55.0  75.0  8.0 
 
Most of these variables are familiar for those who have knowledge of sprinklers, but 
the variables entitled Offset Distance, Velocity and Size Distribution warrant an 
explanation. The Offset Distance is the radius of a sphere centred on the sprinkler in 
which the water droplets are initially placed. Once the droplets have moved further 
than this distance they are assumed to be independent and transported irrespective of 
each other [2]. The Size Distribution describes the size of the water droplets through 
the use of a Rossin-Rammler/log-normal distribution. In this case a median 
volumetric diameter of 800μm has been specified. The additional numbers given 
describe the tightness of the distribution around the median. The Velocity parameters 
describe the initial droplet velocity distribution. In this case the values of 55, 75 and 8 
represent the minimum spray angle, maximum spray angle and speed respectively. 
Thus defining the region in which the droplets are initially placed and the speed at 
which they travel. For further information on any of these parameters it is 
recommended the reader consult the User’s Guide [1]. 
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6.6.1 Results and Discussion 
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Figure 6-25: Comparison of sprinklered Heat Release Rates for FDS and Yu et al with 
incipient heat release removed. 
 
Inspection of Figure 6-25 shows interesting behaviour. As we would expect the initial 
growth phase for both models is no different to that for uncontrolled fire, however the 
time to sprinkler activation, the peak heat release and the decay phase are markedly 
different between the models. We shall now examine these differences to determine 
whether the FDS model provides reasonable performance. However before going 
further it is worth noting that we are not comparing the FDS results to experimental 
results. Unfortunately no results exist for this exact geometry, and it is actually very 
hard to find any time histories for sprinklered rack storage tests. Therefore we are 
comparing it against the model of Yu et al as this has been based on numerous rack 
storage tests and has already been accepted as a suitable representation of sprinklered 
rack storage fire within this research. In addition it is the same model on which the 
FDS sprinkler algorithm is based therefore similar results would be expected. 
 
The difference in sprinkler activation time (FDS = 90s and Yu et al= 75s) and peak 
heat release rates (FDS = 8,700kW and Yu et al= 10,600kW) can be explained by the 
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different growths in heat release and different plume temperatures. From the results 
and discussion above we are already aware that FDS predicts lower heat release rates 
and plume temperatures than the correlations of Ingason which are used to describe 
the fire prior to sprinkler activation. Therefore it is expected that the sprinkler will 
activate at a later time within FDS as the rate of heat transfer to the sprinkler will be 
reduced. As a result the difference in sprinkler activation time of 15s seems 
reasonable and is not viewed as a concern. Instead this result is taken as encouraging 
and suggests that FDS is indeed capable of calculating the time to sprinkler activation 
accurately. 
 
Similarly the difference in peak heat release rates is also encouraging with FDS 
having a peak of 8,700kW and Yu et al a peak of 10,600kW resulting in an 18% 
difference between the two models. While an 18% difference provides good accord in 
itself, when we consider the extremely rapid growth of the Yu et al fire this agreement 
becomes even more positive. For example a 5s delay in sprinkler activation would see 
the Yu et al peak heat release as high as 13,500kW and a resulting 35% difference 
between the two models. Therefore we can take good encouragement from the FDS 
results and conclude that FDS provides realistic results for the time to sprinkler 
activation and the peak heat release rate of the fire. 
 
Unfortunately the good agreement that was obtained for the period of the fire up to 
and including sprinkler activation does not extend to the decay phase. The FDS model 
indicates that the fire has been extinguished by 150s while the Yu et al decay has only 
been reduced by approximately 15% of the peak heat release at the same time. This 
translates to the sprinkler extinguishing the fire in less than a minute which may be 
overly fast, and this is without considering that sprinklers generally act in control 
mode. This suggests that the conversion of Yu et al’s model from a global to a local 
perspective within FDS may be erroneous. It could be that Yu et al have applied a 
conservative decay in their model or that their different experimental set-up reduced 
the water’s effectiveness as an extinguishing agent. In the experiments of Yu et al 
they did not use sprinklers to apply the water but instead used a “water applicator” 
which consisted of eight parallel pipes with eight spray nozzles along each pipe, thus 
forming an 8 x 8 matrix of spray nozzles at 305mm spacings. This water applicator 
was situated 30.5mm above the array to deliver the water directly to the top surface of 
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the array. It is thought that this type of water application may produce a very different 
distribution to that of 4 ceiling mounted sprinklers. As opposed to the uniform 
delivery used by Yu et al the cone from each sprinkler’s spray will overlap therefore 
potentially delivering up to four times as much water in the centre flue. Such delivery 
would cause a significant reduction in the heat release rate and may explain the 
discrepancy. Although plausible, further investigation is required to establish the 
cause of this divergence, however the solution will not be found in this research. 
 
Speaking qualitatively one can say that the general shape of the curves is similar and 
that FDS might provide a reasonable representation of sprinklered rack storage fire. 
Regardless of this, the aim of this research is to determine whether FDS can be used 
to make loss estimates and the above result is not encouraging. If FDS is over-
predicting the suppression rate of these fires then this presents a problem as loss due 
to flame damage may be under estimated. According to the Fire Service response 
model discussed earlier it is not unreasonable to expect 10-20 minutes between 
detection and Fire Service intervention. From Figure 6-25 we can see that FDS 
predicts the fire to be extinguished within a minute of detection therefore potentially 
removing a considerable period of quite vigorous burning, according to the 
predictions of the Yu et al model. This period of burning could translate to quite 
significant amounts of flame, smoke and heat damage possibly meaning that FDS 
drastically under-predicts the total loss. Consequently it is thought that the FDS model 
for sprinklered fire needs to be further investigated and validated against experimental 
data to improve its accuracy for making loss estimates. 
 
6.6.2 Conclusions 
The performance of the FDS model for sprinklered rack storage fire is mixed. While 
the time to sprinkler activation and peak heat release rate obtain good agreement with 
the alternative model, both within 20%, the suppression rate is substantially different. 
FDS suggests that the fire will be extinguished within 1 minute after sprinkler 
activation while the model of Yu et al predicts control type decay. This disparity has 
been highlighted as concerning for a number of reasons and further research in this 
field is advocated. Nonetheless the aim of this modelling was to determine if the 
sprinklered fire model within FDS could be applied for making loss estimates of full 
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scale warehouse fire. To this end it is thought that the model is worthy of further 
investigation. Although there may be concerns over the suppression rate McGrattan’s 
research suggests that the model may have improved performance for real-life rack 
storage geometries. Therefore it was decided to look into the use of sprinklers within 
FDS when making loss estimates, but to keep in mind the problems outlined above, 
and analyse all results with due consideration of these factors. 
 
6.7 Full scale modelling 
6.7.1 Introduction 
Given the success of the feasibility modelling it was decided worthwhile to 
investigate the capabilities of FDS for full scale modelling of warehouses. The 
primary aim of this modelling is not whether FDS can accurately predict fire 
behaviour; instead the aim is to establish whether FDS is capable of predicting loss 
estimates. It is believed that the detailed results of FDS will lead to excellent loss 
estimates as the user is effectively able to count the individual boxes that are damaged 
and assess possible structural loss by modelling the heat transfer to structural 
members. The ability to make such precise measurements when calculating the 
possible loss is seen as very beneficial to property owners and other interested parties. 
 
To allow comparison of different possible protection scenarios the same four 
scenarios used previously were chosen for modelling; Scenario A (no protection), 
Scenario B (sprinklers), Scenario C (smoke and heat vents) and Scenario D 
(sprinklers and smoke and heat vents). In addition the same four scenarios were 
modelled to provide accurate comparisons between the other loss estimate methods 
proposed in this work. 
 
6.8 Modelling 
The fundamental input parameters for fuel properties and the combustion reaction 
were the same as those described previously for the feasibility modelling. Therefore 
they will not be repeated. Instead the following section covers model parameters such 
as geometry, the computational mesh, and specification of the protection measures. 
 205
Any parameters/inputs not described were either set as default or have been described 
in earlier sections. 
 
The modelling was performed on HP Proliant ML350 with dual Xenon 3.06GHz 
processors, 2.5GB Ram, 40GB Internal HD and a 200GB External HD. Each 
simulation was run for 1200s and simulations typically took between 6-10 days. 
 
6.8.1 Geometry 
As for previous models the warehouse modelled has the following dimensions; 60m 
long by 30m wide by 6m high and 17 rows of back to back racking however the FDS 
model of the warehouse differs in regard to flue and aisle width. Due to the large 
volume, 10,800m3 it was decided it was infeasible to model a 150mm flue space as 
this would necessitate a maximum dimension of 150mm and therefore a minimum of 
3,200,000 cells within the computational mesh. Cell numbers of this magnitude result 
in impractical run times and instead a flue width of 300mm was chosen. To maintain 
consistency between the number of racks, and therefore the total value of property at 
risk the aisle width was reduced to 0.9m accordingly. It is believed that the narrower 
aisle widths allows easier heat transfer across aisles therefore increasing the chance of 
fire spread and mitigating the effect of having wider flues which may lead to slower 
fire spread within racks. Similarly the probability of boxes burring in areas remote to 
the fire origin is quite low and therefore the primary cause for including these boxes is 
to reduce the available volume for smoke spread. The low volume will result in worst-
case estimates while still providing reasonably accurate depictions of the smoke 
location making the actual flue and aisle width inconsequential.  
 
In summary the dimensions of the warehouse modelled within FDS are as follows; 
• 60.3m long by 30.3m wide by 6m high 
• 300mm flue space 
• 0.9m aisle width 
• 3m high racks 
• 34 racks in total 
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A rendering of the geometry made by the programme Smokeview is available in 
Figure 6-26. 
 
 
Figure 6-26: An image of the modelled warehouse taken from Smokeview. 
 
6.8.2 The mesh 
Although it has already been alluded to in the previous section the large volume of 
this warehouse presents a considerable computational challenge for FDS. By 
specifying a fine mesh the computational times become impractical however if the 
mesh is not sufficiently fine the fire behaviour is not accurately modelled. As a 
solution to this problem the concept of symmetry was employed. Figure 6-26 clearly 
shows that two plans of symmetry exist within the warehouse; one bisecting the 
warehouse laterally and one longitudinally. In situations like this FDS allows the user 
to specify these planes as planes of symmetry using the SURF_ID=’MIRROR’ 
function. The user can then model a quarter of the original computational domain as 
FDS assumes symmetrical fire behaviour across the planes of symmetry and reverses 
the flow accordingly [1]. Therefore two planes of symmetry were defined and the 
resulting computational domain is presented in Figure 6-27. 
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Figure 6-27: An image of the reduced warehouse according to allowances for 
symmetry. 
 
Although the use of symmetry reduced the computational domain to a quarter of its 
original size therefore providing much shorter computational times the actual mesh 
size is still an important variable for providing an accurate representation of the fire. 
To this end multiple meshes were employed. FDS allows the user to specify a number 
of different meshes within the domain therefore allowing the use of fine grids for 
accurate modelling of important phenomena and coarse grids in areas where there is 
less concern over accurate representations of the flow. By doing this the user is able to 
develop an accurate model while providing economical run times. The meshes for this 
model were defined as follows; 
 
• Mesh 1: 50mm by 50mm by 100mm. 
• Mesh 2: 150mm by 150mm by 150mm. 
• Mesh 3: 150mm by 150mm by 150mm. 
• Mesh 4: 150mm by 150mm by 150mm. 
• Mesh 5: 300m by 300mm by 300mm. 
 
The specification of the mesh in this way allowed accurate modelling of the fire in the 
immediate area of origin. In addition flows within the rack of origin, across the aisle 
from the tier of origin and in the ceiling jet could be reasonably well modelled. The 
total number of cells in the domain is of the order of 347,000 however if we multiply 
this by 4 to allow for the use of symmetry the entire warehouse has actually been 
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modelled using close to 1,388,000 cells. A rendering of the meshes from Smokeview 
can be seen below. 
 
Figure 6-28: An image of the mesh used for modelling taken from Smokeview. 
 
6.8.3 The fire 
The initial fire used for ignition was the same as that used for the feasibility modelling 
however the peak HRR was increased to 400kW. This was due to the wider flue space 
making it harder to sustain combustion. It is thought that the higher peak heat release 
for the initial fire is of little consequence when considering the peak HRR of a 
burning rack. 
 
6.8.4 Protection measures 
The sprinklers used were the same as those described previously and spaced at 3m 
centres as per NZS4541:2003. 
 
Vents were specified using the HOLE namelist and activated based on the response of 
a heat detector with the same response characteristics as the sprinkler. Each vent was 
3m2 and they were spaced evenly over the warehouse roof with the total area 
amounting to 15% of the roof area in accordance with C/AS1. 
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6.9 Results and Discussion 
The intention was to report the results for each scenario in the same way as for 
Chapter 5 with a break down of the different types of loss and the resulting dollar 
values. However rather than applying safety factors the loss was going to be 
calculated explicitly based on the results from FDS. Yet when this analysis was 
attempted it was found that the specific nature of FDS was both a hindrance and a 
help. Complications arose in a number of different areas and it was finally decided too 
difficult to produce valid loss estimates using FDS. The reasons for this are explained 
in the following sections where instead of the loss being calculated for each 
component the reasons as to why an accurate loss measurement could or could not be 
obtained are explained. 
 
6.9.1 Flame damage 
Flame damage can be easily predicted in FDS; the ability to both visualise and 
measure the extent of fire spread is one of the important features of FDS and 
fundamental for the model’s credibility. The extent of flame damage can be measured 
in a number of ways however the following are the most practical: 
• Using the “Show Char” function when visualising boundary files of surface 
temperature in Smokeview. The extent of char shows all the surfaces where 
temperatures have exceeded the ignition temperature.  
• Thermocouple measurements on the box face of either temperature or mass 
flow. By measuring the temperature of the box face it can be said that the box 
is burning once it reaches the limiting temperature. Alternatively pyrolysis can 
be modelled by using the mass flow function. 
• Visualisation of the mixture fraction within smokeview. By specifying a 
mixture fraction equivalent to that required for the combustion reaction 
smokeview can be used to visualise the possible flame location. The user can 
then visualise the fire and see which boxes are contained within the 
combustion zone and therefore considered to burn. 
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The “Show Char” function is the perfect tool for estimating flame damage. By 
showing the surfaces that have reached their ignition temperature one can make a very 
accurate estimate of the flame damage. Both specifying and visualising boundary files 
can be done with ease and therefore provide efficient ways of estimating flame 
damage. One downside is that boundary files require a lot of memory and one must be 
careful when specifying the time interval at which they are produced. Nevertheless 
careful specification by the user can mitigate this problem and we are left with a very 
accurate tool for specifying flame damage. An example of this visualisation is shown 
in Figure 6-29 
 
 
Figure 6-29: Example of visualising flame damage using the “Show Char” function. 
 
The other two methods are also easy to employ however they do have their 
drawbacks. The specification of every box face as an individual thermocouple would 
be time consuming. For example if you had as few as 100 pallets in your domain you 
would have to specify 600 individual thermocouples to ensure coverage of each face. 
Considering that the number of pallets contained within a warehouse can stretch into 
the thousands specification of these thermocouples would become extremely time 
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consuming. In addition the large amounts of data produced would be awkward to 
manage. In this case the practicality of making these measurements is brought into 
question. Comparatively visualisation of the mixture fraction would be less time 
consuming however the results become subjective as they are based on the user’s 
interpretation of the Smokeview output. Because the mixture fraction only gives an 
indication of where combustion may be occurring, it is possible that the user may fail 
to identify a region of combustion and therefore skew the final loss estimate. 
Therefore we can conclude that the “Show Char” function is the most effective means 
of estimating flame damage. 
 
6.9.2 Heat damage 
Heat damage of the building contents is directly related to compartment temperatures 
and radiative feedback from surrounding surfaces. The ability to predict such 
phenomena accurately is a strength of FDS. This implies that FDS should be able to 
predict heat damage in a precise manner. To make such predictions the user has the 
following options; 
• Visualisation of boundary files measuring “WALL_TEMPERATURE”. This 
function allows one to see the temperature of all surfaces within the domain 
using Smokeview. 
• Thermocouple measurements of the box face temperature. By measuring the 
temperature of the box face it can be said that the box is damaged once it 
reaches the limiting temperature.  
• Visualisation of temperature isosurfaces within Smokeview. This approach is 
similar to applying a layer height in that any boxes contained within the 
isosurface are taken as damaged. 
• Visualisation of plot3d and slice files. Both of these options provide means of 
visualising the temperatures taken as sections through the compartment. The 
user can then identify regions where boxes are exposed to areas greater than 
the limiting temperature and are therefore lost. 
 
The use of boundary files to visualise surface temperatures within the domain is a 
simple way of estimating the extent of heat damage. If one sets the maximum 
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temperature plotted to the limiting temperature of the goods then one can easily count 
those boxes which can be considered damaged. One problem, as stated previously, is 
that one must carefully consider how often boundary files are specified to prevent 
using too much memory. In addition for large warehouses it may become infeasible to 
inspect all 6 faces of a pallet to determine if it is damaged. However the biggest 
obstacle is that the surface temperatures are not constant throughout the simulation 
and if a surface reaches the limiting temperature and then cools to a lower temperature 
it may not be included in the final estimate. An example of this can be seen below in 
Figure 6-30 and Figure 6-31. To prevent such omissions the user must both specify a 
great number of boundary files and be very patient when assessing heat damage thus 
bringing into question the efficiency of making such an analysis. 
 
 
Figure 6-30: Surface temperatures at 300s for an uncontrolled fire. 
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Figure 6-31: Surface temperatures at 960s for an uncontrolled fire. 
 
Again, none of the other methods listed are difficult to use however the practicality 
and accuracy of each are drawn into question. The arguments against using 
thermocouple measurements are outlined above however they are still the most 
accurate form of estimating loss due to heat damage. Use of the other methods gives 
an indication of areas of high temperature yet it is entirely possible that the boxes 
exposed to such temperatures are not actually in thermal equilibrium with their 
surrounds. Conversely boxes exposed to radiation may reach high temperatures while 
the surrounding gases are comparatively low. In addition to their subjectivity these 
methods create large output files and if one wishes to create enough of these files to 
gain a reasonable indication of temperatures throughout the compartment then the 
user has resource concerns for data storage. Therefore those methods described above 
that employ Smokeview visualisations are once again subjective and possibly very 
erroneous as well as raising questions of practicality with regard to data storage. 
Consequently while it is entirely possible to estimate heat damage using FDS it is not 
practical for a warehouse fire scenario. 
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6.9.3 Smoke damage 
Often described as the largest and therefore most critical component of loss it is 
imperative to model smoke damage correctly. Unfortunately FDS does not lend itself 
well to measuring smoke damage; while it is taken that smoke transport is adequately 
modelled it is not possible to convert such phenomena into a loss value. When 
measuring smoke spread in FDS the user can employ one or all of the following; 
• Point measurements of soot density throughout the warehouse. 
• Visualisation of the smoke mixture fraction. 
• Visualisation of the soot density. 
 
However these methods are all subjective and were seen to produce very different 
results. The measurement of soot density is easy to perform using the thermocouple 
measurement however no correlations were found to relate soot density to smoke 
damage and although such measurement will give an indication of where smoke is 
present this could only be converted to a loss value through an educated guess by the 
user. Similarly visualisation of the smoke mixture fraction may lead to skewed results 
as specification of the mixture fraction value is a user input and, like that for the 
combustion mixture fraction, only gives an indication of where smoke may exist. 
Viewing the soot density is believed to be the most effective means for determining 
where smoke is present in the compartment however a clear distinction between the 
smoky upper layer and the relatively smoke free lower layer could not be made. This 
is because the transition between the upper and lower layer is continuous leading to a 
gradient of increasing soot density. As such it is difficult to decide exactly where 
critical concentrations of smoke occur from visual inspection. In addition the 
temperature of the smoke is important as hot smoke will penetrate goods more easily 
and therefore result in greater levels of loss. But how does one measure the smoke 
temperature and decide at what temperature it can be classed as damaging? Because 
the research to answer these questions has not been performed it is not possible to 
provide the answers: at this point in time to do so would simply be guessing.  
 
This problem is highlighted further when comparing results between visualising the 
mixture fraction and soot density; Figure 6-32 and Figure 6-33 show the Smokeview 
output using both methods at 1440s (approximate time for Fire Service arrival) when 
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vents are employed. They clearly display the problems outlined above. If making a 
loss estimate based on the mixture fraction it could be said that the bottom tier is not 
exposed to smoke however if this is compared to the visualisation of the soot density 
we see the entire warehouse as smoke logged. In large warehouses this could amount 
to discrepancies of tens of thousands of dollars for the final loss estimate. While it 
could be said that using the soot density output is conservative in this case it may be 
overly conservative and the purpose of using FDS is to gain accurate estimates not 
generalisations. Hence we can see the problems with using FDS for predicting smoke 
damage. At best the user can gain rough estimates however if this is the case they may 
be better to employ a zone model for a better return on investment of time and 
resources. 
 
 
Figure 6-32: Image of smoke location using visualisation of the mixture fraction at 
1440s. 
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Figure 6-33: Image of smoke location using visualisation of soot density at 1440s. 
 
6.9.4 Structural Damage 
Structural damage is one loss component that can be modelled confidently with FDS 
because it is based almost entirely on thermal conditions. We have already accepted 
that FDS can model radiative and convective heat transfer and as such it is not 
difficult to extend this to estimating the structural response under fire conditions. It is 
by no means proposed that FDS can calculate failure stresses or member buckling, for 
these types of analysis it is best to use specific programmes such as SAFIR, rather it is 
believed that a good indication of possible structural failure can be obtained. 
 
To calculate structural damage the user can create structural members as obstructions 
within the domain. By assigning appropriate properties to the member through the 
SURF_ID function it is possible to model the thermal response. In most occasions the 
warehouse will be constructed as a steel portal frame and in this case the most 
important variable will be the temperature of the steel however it would be possible to 
monitor temperatures and pyrolysis rates of large timber members should the need 
arise. The user is then free to analyse the results and gauge an indication of the 
possible damage. 
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6.9.5 Water damage 
It is proposed that water damage would be calculated in the same way as described in 
Chapter 5. Significant modifications could be made as better knowledge of the area of 
sprinkler operation will be possible. In addition the final fire area could be better 
estimated and therefore correlated to the area of Fire Service water application. For 
example this could reduce the are from a 260m2 design area (NZS 4541:2003) to a 
more typical area of operation such as 36m2 (the area covered by 4 sprinklers). 
Nonetheless the basic principles of calculation would be the same and although FDS 
may provide better information to make the loss estimate the calculation would 
essentially be the same as previously described. As such no further elaboration shall 
be made here. 
 
6.9.6 Time 
A lot of the arguments described above are based around the practicality of using FDS 
as a tool for loss estimation. To some this may appear to be a reluctance to analyse 
results because it is too hard and that if one was patient and persevered then in most 
cases a reasonable loss estimate could be formulated. However for the practicing 
engineer time is an extremely important consideration. The client does not generally 
have an unlimited budget therefore requiring useful results in a realistic time frame. In 
this regard FDS is a poor performer. Even with modern computing resources it seems 
that FDS takes too long to set-up, run and analyse to be of use in the world of 
consulting. 
 
If we consider the numbers it becomes very apparent that FDS is too time consuming 
to be of use. For most geometries the model will take anywhere from half a day to a 
day and a half to set-up and in the case of particularly large warehouses with unusual 
racking arrangements this time may extend further. On top of this the model will take 
at least a week to run; in the case of the simple warehouse modelled in this research it 
took at least 6 days to obtain results for a run time of 1400 seconds (Fire Service 
arrival). In the case of warehouses up to and in excess of 10m in height the run-time 
will increase drastically. If this is then coupled with a comparatively long time to Fire 
Service arrival run times of several weeks are not improbable. It is recognised that 
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while the model is running there is little required of the user however whether the 
client can withstand such long run times is not certain. Then to actually analyse the 
results it is likely that several days to a week will be required; even then the results 
produced are likely to be quite subjective. Consequently it is not unreasonable to 
expect an investment of at least a month to obtain a result which will be based in part 
on the model output and in part on the user’s interpretation of the results. For this 
outlay of resources the client would have a right to feel that the estimates provided are 
suitably accurate and given the difficulty with assuring such accuracy the use of FDS 
can hardly be justified. 
 
6.10 Conclusion 
At present the use of FDS for making loss estimates for warehouse fires is not 
practical. Not only are models time consuming to develop and run but the results are 
too open to interpretation. In addition there are a number of different ways to 
represent and measure important phenomena associated with the fire; each with their 
own benefits and drawbacks as outlined above. The fact that no guidance exists on 
what methods are the best to use further complicates things and increases the 
likelihood of user error. This overwhelming uncertainty about how best to interpret 
the results and the required time to develop and assess the output renders FDS 
impractical for making loss estimates for warehouse fire. 
 
It should be noted that these comments are particular to warehouse fire scenarios and 
other large, single compartment industrial buildings. In the case of smaller 
compartments it may be that FDS can provide useful results in a timely manner. For 
example assessment of conditions within spaces where valuable equipment or 
artefacts are stored, such as IT hubs or museum spaces, might be feasible. The smaller 
compartments and requirement to assess damage to a smaller number of items 
increases the practicality, and likelihood, of making accurate loss estimates. Also 
inherent with smaller compartments is the ability to use smaller grid sizes further 
improving the accuracy. Unfortunately for the components of damage where 
subjectivity is an issue there is currently no solution. One can only advise that people 
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attempting to use FDS as a loss estimation tool need to be very careful with how they 
interpret the results. 
 
Based on the findings of this research there a number of improvements that could be 
made to improve the loss estimation capabilities of FDS. The common problem for 
assessing most components of damage was related to time and that the user must be 
very observant when watching simulations so that the damage is correctly estimated. 
However for loss estimation one is not concerned with the progression over time but 
the final state and the extent of damage. In a similar vain to the “Show Char” option, 
functions could be developed that allow the user to visualise variables such as the 
maximum extent of smoke spread and the maximum temperature of surfaces. Such 
summary statistics would greatly improve the feasibility of using FDS for loss 
estimation as the required time for analysis of the results is diminished. Furthermore 
subjectivity within the results would be removed thus improving the overall accuracy. 
These are obvious advantages and it may be that over time such improvements be 
incorporated into FDS but until such a time the use of FDS for loss estimation for a 
rack storage warehouse is not advised. 
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Chapter 7 Discussion 
7.1  Introduction 
In accordance with the objectives of this research 3 different ways of loss estimation 
for warehouse fire were investigated. These consisted of a probabilistic event tree-
based model, a deterministic BRANZFIRE based model and a CFD model that 
employed the computer programme FDS. It was found that all three were capable of 
estimating loss in some way however the statistical and deterministic models were far 
more practical than that using FDS. Further to the aims of the research all the models 
could assess the impact of different protection measures. Therefore all that remains to 
satisfy the third objective of this research is to identify which is the best model and 
the most appropriate for further development.  
 
Unfortunately, as has been explained in Chapter 6, the use of FDS for modelling loss 
in a rack storage warehouse fire is impractical. Although it may be possible to 
formulate a loss estimate, the required investment of time and resources is too great 
for use in the world of consulting. Compounding this feature is that the final loss 
estimate is too dependent on interpretation by the user. If the results are to be 
considered accurate the ability of FDS to make quantitative loss estimates has to be 
improved. By doing this the results would become less user dependent and require 
less time for analysis hence improving the practicality of employing FDS as a loss 
estimation tool. Nevertheless for the purposes of this research FDS is not considered 
useful and as such the remaining discussion shall centre on the other two models. 
Before going further it should be noted that even though FDS was deemed unfit for 
warehouse fire this does not extend to calculating loss for smaller occupancies or 
when using FDS to assess life safety. It is also believed that the capabilities of FDS 
could be greatly improved by including the ability to view summary statistics such as 
maximum extent of some spread and maximum temperature of surfaces. 
 
Prior to the discussion of which model has the most merit for further development a 
reminder of the strengths and weaknesses of each follows. 
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7.2  Statistical model 
The statistical model described in Chapter 4 provides a very useful model for 
calculating the possible loss for warehouse fire. The final model provides a simple, 
easy to use model that produces results in a timely fashion. The user is able to specify 
any combination of protection systems they require and then calculate the distribution 
of TAPL. Once obtained, the distributions of different protection strategies can be 
compared to find the optimal combination of systems. Alternatively they can specify 
an acceptable level of risk and decide which protection measures will provide the 
required protection. The distribution of loss becomes particularly useful in this regard 
as it allows one to specify the percentile loss that is acceptable as opposed inferring 
results from a single point estimate. All of these features contribute to the value of the 
model and allow more informed decision making when specifying fire safety systems 
for property protection. 
 
An additional benefit of the model is the ability to investigate the sensitivity to input 
parameters. By identifying which factors are critical for loss reduction the engineer or 
building owner can take appropriate action to ensure that the critical protection 
measures are given special attention. This is the equivalent of identifying risk-
reduction factors however it is done in a quantitative form that ensures efficient 
reduction of the risk. 
 
Although the results produced are considered extremely useful for any decisions 
regarding fire protection of warehouses it is very important to remember that the 
results are theoretical. Unfortunately some of the input data is questionable in nature 
and not based on large statistical studies. This is of a particular concern when 
specifying the effectiveness of Fire Service intervention and the likely loss that may 
result. In the event that better data becomes available the model should be adjusted 
accordingly and once sufficient confidence is obtained the TAPL can be changed to 
an Annual Property Loss. Until this point the dollar values for the TAPL should only 
be used as a guide and the relative changes by specifying different systems are of 
more use to the parties concerned. 
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7.3  Deterministic model 
Comparatively the deterministic model developed as part of Chapter 5 provides a very 
different way of estimating loss. Rather than dealing in terms of likelihood and 
consequence the results produced are a point estimate for the worst-case fire scenario 
and the damage that may occur. In this way it is more of a traditional fire engineering 
analysis; the fire behaviour is modelled to give an indication of the compartment 
conditions and the engineer can then make decisions based on this analysis. All that is 
required is a shift in focus from life safety to property protection. Then by calculating 
the loss for each of the different protection strategies informed decisions can be made 
to determine which is the most beneficial. Such information is valuable to building 
owners and insurers as they gain insight into the worst case scenario should a fire 
occur. 
 
Despite the fact that the model is thought to be useful it is still recommended that care 
is taken in its application. It may be that analysis of some warehouses does not 
produce realistic results due to the use of equations outside their recommended limits. 
In response to this potential problem it is strongly suggested that the model be only 
used by someone with adequate knowledge regarding warehouse fire behaviour and 
fire loss. In addition further automation of the model is required. At present the 
method is laborious and significant improvement could be made through the use of 
Microsoft Excel and VBA to develop fully automated loss calculations. Other 
drawbacks include the use of BRANZFIRE and the subjective inputs such as the 
susceptibility of goods to smoke, water and heat damage. Unfortunately the ability of 
zone models to model large compartments and sprinklered fire is highly questionable. 
Despite this zone models are the only tool that could be used to give the required 
information and therefore BRANZFIRE’s use was accepted. Similarly sufficient 
information regarding smoke, water and heat damage does not exist requiring the 
approximations included in the model. In spite of these limitations the model is still 
considered useful and the current deficiencies are nothing that could not be addressed 
through further research. 
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7.4  Comparison 
Although both of these models have their strengths and weaknesses it is believed that 
the statistical model is the superior. Given its ability to calculate the loss as a 
distribution, perform sensitivity analyses and that it can be used by non-engineers it is 
far more versatile and provides better information. In addition its weaknesses are 
considered less important than those of the deterministic model and less work is 
required to improve on the model’s limitations.  
 
When comparing the type of loss estimate each model is capable of making we can 
see that they are quite different. The deterministic model is only capable of a single 
estimate for any fire scenario and the damage predicted is the worst possible case. 
Comparatively the statistical method calculates a loss distribution therefore providing 
a truer representation of the possible loss as the distribution encompasses damage 
ranging from the best to worst case scenario. Put simply, the loss distribution can be 
used to calculate a property owner’s or insurer’s risk exposure. This type of 
information is far more valuable than a single worst case estimate and allows 
informed decision making as the range of possible loss can be identified. 
 
The underlying flaw of the deterministic model is its lack of versatility and its 
inability to provide a realistic representation of the interactions between the fire and 
the different protection measures. When considering the benefits obtained from 
making decisions based on a risk distribution, and the ability to model a number of 
different scenarios including extensive sensitivity analyses in a short time frame, the 
deterministic model does simply not compare. Although it is possible to run the 
deterministic model a number of times using different types of protection there is no 
way to quantitatively determine how sensitive the results are to a particular input. 
Similarly the deterministic model assumes perfect behaviour of protection systems 
and therefore can not incorporate the possibility of component failure. In other words 
the deterministic model is too idealised and lacks adaptability. Given that the users of 
the model will require a realistic loss estimate we can see that the statistical model is 
far superior for this purpose. 
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From the above discussion it is clear that the statistical approach provides a more 
useful form of loss estimation however it is also superior in that less work is required 
to improve its capabilities. In its current structure the deterministic model is based on 
equations that are limited in application and it also pushes the capabilities of 
BRANZFIRE modelling. Moreover, subjective inputs are required to estimate the loss 
due to smoke, heat and water damage as nothing is available within the literature that 
provides an appropriate correlation to estimate these loss components. To rectify these 
shortcomings thorough testing and analysis is required. Such testing is expensive to 
perform, is quite probably beyond the capacity of any existing calorimeter and will 
take years to conduct, especially considering the current focus on life safety will 
probably ensure a low priority. By comparison the statistical model only requires an 
improvement in the data it is based on. In some cases adequate statistics may exist so 
that appropriate input distributions can be formulated, in other cases it is likely that a 
data collection programme will need to be commissioned. Regardless of what is 
necessary to improve the data it is believed that it will be a much simpler task and 
may benefit fire engineering as a whole. As previously mentioned the current status of 
fire statistics is poor in relation to loss. If the data collection process is improved then 
important information may come to light that improves fire engineering knowledge 
and persuades property owners to abandon the common “bare minimum” approach. 
 
Furthermore, an important feature of any computer programme is “user-friendliness”; 
if the application is cumbersome and time consuming then it is not likely to be 
popular. In this regard the statistical model is the clear winner. To use the model one 
need only specify the required inputs to define the warehouse and have an ability to 
interpret statistical distributions and sensitivity analyses. As a result it can be used by 
both engineers and non-engineers alike. In contrast the deterministic model should 
only be used by a fire engineer who has a good grasp of warehouse fire behaviour and 
is competent in BRANZFIRE modelling. Even then there is still considerable margin 
for error due to applying the model outside its capabilities or making mistakes when 
running the BRANZFIRE component. While some of these drawbacks can be 
improved through automation of the model using VBA applications, the necessary 
resources to perform such work are substantial if the model is to run smoothly. As 
such it is evident that the statistical model lends itself more readily to widespread use. 
 
 226
7.5 Summary 
Although three forms of loss estimation were investigated within this research the 
approach using statistical methods can be identified as the most appropriate for further 
development. In accordance with the project aims all three models are capable of 
producing a loss estimate and assessing the benefits of different protection measures. 
Unfortunately the model using FDS analysis was disregarded on the grounds of 
impracticality however if sufficient time were available then a loss estimate could be 
formulated. As a result it had to be decided which out of the deterministic and 
statistical models best lent itself to additional investigation. The statistical approach 
detailed in Chapter 4 was deemed to be the far better method for a number of reasons 
including; 
 
• An ability to calculate the loss as a distribution thus providing more useful 
results. 
• A higher level of versatility. 
• The ability to conduct sensitivity analyses and thus identify the critical inputs. 
• A higher level of “user-friendliness” and an ability to be used by both 
engineers and non-engineers. 
• The required work to improve the model is arguably easier to perform. 
 
All of these benefits make the statistical model the best loss estimation tool 
investigated within this research and it is believed that with reliable input statistics the 
model could become an extremely powerful loss estimation tool. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions & Recommendations 
The aim of this research was to investigate appropriate methods for realistic loss 
estimation for warehouse fire. Secondary to this aim was that the methods were 
capable of assessing the impact of different protection measures and that one model 
would be identified as appropriate for further development. Three possible methods 
were identified for investigation; a statistical approach, a deterministic approach and 
computational fluid dynamics modelling. These categories were chosen as they 
represent the three main fields of modern fire engineering. 
 
An extensive literature review was conducted into current methods of loss estimation. 
The overall conclusion was that no acceptable method exists for predicting fire loss 
for warehouses. The reason being that existing methods are based on old or limited 
data and do not work when applied to warehouses. It is believed that a contributing 
factor to this gap in the literature is fire engineering’s strong focus on life safety. In 
general regulatory requirements do not necessitate protection of one’s own property. 
As such building owners employ a bare minimum approach to fire safety and property 
protection is ignored except in very rare circumstances. Nevertheless the work that 
was uncovered could be segregated into those employing statistical, deterministic and 
computational fluid dynamics techniques. As such encouragement was taken to 
continue pursuit of these fields for loss estimation. 
 
An additional literature review was performed to identify methods for modelling 
warehouse fire behaviour. Although a great number of techniques do not exist those 
identified were generally based on extensive testing and deemed appropriate for use. 
Of particular note is work by Hakuur Ingason of the Swedish National Testing 
Institute. His work is the most extensive and provides valuable insight into the in-rack 
behaviour of rack storage fire. Complimentary to this work were publications from 
Factory Mutual Research Corporation which have analysed fire behaviour out of the 
rack, as well as providing methods for modelling sprinklered heat release rates. By 
combining the correlations presented by these organisations a cohesive model of 
warehouse fire was developed. 
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Of the three forms of loss estimation explored within this research the statistical 
model described in Chapter 4 was established as the most fitting to the project aims. 
The model itself allows efficient loss estimation and provides for effective 
comparison of different protection measures. Comparatively the deterministic model 
was limited in application, and analysis of some warehouses will not produce realistic 
results due to the use of equations outside their recommended limits. In addition the 
use of BRANZFIRE and subjective inputs such as the susceptibility of goods to 
smoke, water and heat damage give cause for concern as the ability of zone models to 
model large compartments and sprinklered fire is highly questionable. On the other 
hand the use of FDS for making loss estimates for warehouse fires was deemed 
impractical. There was no question over whether the fire was modelled correctly but it 
was decided that the models are too time consuming to develop and run, and the 
results produced are too subjective to user interpretation. Therefore the statistical, risk 
based approach is clearly the better model with further benefits including; 
• An ability to calculate the loss as a distribution thus providing more useful 
results. 
• A higher level of versatility. 
• The ability to conduct sensitivity analyses and thus identify the critical inputs. 
• A higher level of “user-friendliness” and an ability to be used by both 
engineers and non-engineers. 
• The required work to improve the model is arguably easier to perform. 
 
Together these features make the statistical model the best loss estimation tool 
investigated within this research. With further development and improved input 
statistics the model could become an extremely powerful loss estimation tool. 
Consequently it is recommended that further efforts are made to improve the integrity 
of the statistical data required as inputs for the model. By performing this analysis the 
approach will become robust and produce increasingly more reliable estimates thus 
satisfying the primary aim of this research. 
 
An additional recommendation is that further research be conducted into full scale 
rack storage fire behaviour. Quite clearly there are limitations with equipment and the 
safety of such testing; however the current knowledge with respect to heat release 
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rates after the 10MW limit is unacceptable. If practising engineers are going to 
conduct adequate assessments of property damage, or more importantly, life safety 
then they need to have an understanding of what might occur beyond this limit. 
Admittedly warehouses are generally low occupancy buildings however the move to 
“mega-mart” type department stores that use rack storage of goods means 
increasingly large occupant loads in these buildings are occurring. In a worst case 
scenario with ignition in the flue and rapid propagation of fire the consequences may 
be disastrous. Therefore this gap in the research must be addressed. 
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Chapter 9 Appendix A – Fire Service response time 
 
The Fire Service response time was calculated based on the method contained in 
Appendix C of AS1668.3:2001. To obtain the best possible response time travel and set-
up times were set to the minimum allowed. Therefore the time to Fire Service 
intervention is calculated as follows; 
 
avelfighter trsetupresponsedetectionincipientoninterventi tttttt ++++=  
 
From Table C2 of the standard we find that the incipient period for a fire is taken as 180s. 
Therefore  
 
stincipient 180=  
 
The fastest possible detection time is obtained with smoke detectors with a direct 
connection to the Fire Service. Table C3 then gives the time for detection as -120s. 
Therefore 
 
st 130detection −=  
 
Fire Service response time is taken as a summation of dispatch time, turnout time and 
travel time. Therefore based on a warehouse located in an outer suburb 1 km from the 
nearest fire station the response time is calculated as follows; 
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Setup time is a combination of the time to connect to a water source and the time to lay 
hose both externally and internally. Therefore based on connecting to a below ground 
hydrant and laying one 30m length of hose both internally and externally Tables C3-5 
give the setup time as 
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The standard also requires that foot travel if firefighters is included. Assuming that no 
additional travel is required other than that to lay hose Table C7 gives firefighter travel 
time as 
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Therefore the total time to Fire Service intervention is  
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Chapter 10 Appendix B – BRANZFIRE Input 
 
 
Sunday,April 02,2006,05:54 PM 
Input Filename : C:\Documents and Settings\TimPorter\My 
Documents\Thesis\Thesis\BRANZ\Case 1 fast.mod 
 
BRANZFIRE Multi-Compartment Fire Model (Ver 2004.33) 
 
Copyright Notice - This software is provided for evaluation only and may not be 
used for commercial purposes. 
 
 
 
==================================================================== 
Description of Rooms 
==================================================================== 
Room  1  : warehouse 
         Room Length (m) =                                 50.00 
         Room Width (m) =                                  25.00 
         Maximum Room Height (m) =                         7.30 
         Minimum Room Height (m) =                         7.30 
         Floor Elevation (m) =                             0.000 
         Room  1  has a flat ceiling. 
 
         Wall Surface is concrete 
         Wall Density (kg/m3) =                            2300.0 
         Wall Conductivity (W/m.K) =                       1.200 
         Wall Emissivity =                                 0.50 
         Wall Thickness (mm) =                             100.0 
 
         Ceiling Surface is steel (mild) 
         Ceiling Density (kg/m3) =                         7850.0 
         Ceiling Conductivity (W/m.K) =                    45.800 
         Ceiling Emissivity =                              0.90 
         Ceiling Thickness (mm) =                          2.0 
 
         Floor Surface is concrete 
         Floor Density (kg/m3) =                           2300.0 
         Floor Conductivity (W/m.K) =                      1.200 
         Floor Emissivity =                                0.50 
         Floor Thickness = (mm)                            100.0 
 
==================================================================== 
Description of Wall Vents 
==================================================================== 
 233
From room  1  to outside, Vent No 1 
                   Vent Width (m) =                        0.900 
                   Vent Height (m) =                       2.100 
                   Vent Sill Height (m) =                  0.000 
                   Vent Soffit Height (m) =                2.100 
                   Opening Time (sec) =                    0 
                   Closing Time (sec) =                    3000000 
 
From room  1  to outside, Vent No 2 
                   Vent Width (m) =                        0.900 
                   Vent Height (m) =                       2.100 
                   Vent Sill Height (m) =                  0.000 
                   Vent Soffit Height (m) =                2.100 
                   Opening Time (sec) =                    0 
                   Closing Time (sec) =                    300000 
 
From room  1  to outside, Vent No 3 
                   Vent Width (m) =                        0.009 
                   Vent Height (m) =                       6.000 
                   Vent Sill Height (m) =                  0.000 
                   Vent Soffit Height (m) =                6.000 
                   Opening Time (sec) =                    0 
                   Closing Time (sec) =                    0 
 
From room  1  to outside, Vent No 4 
                   Vent Width (m) =                        0.900 
                   Vent Height (m) =                       2.100 
                   Vent Sill Height (m) =                  0.000 
                   Vent Soffit Height (m) =                2.100 
                   Opening Time (sec) =                    0 
                   Closing Time (sec) =                    3000 
 
From room  1  to outside, Vent No 5 
                   Vent Width (m) =                        0.900 
                   Vent Height (m) =                       2.100 
                   Vent Sill Height (m) =                  0.000 
                   Vent Soffit Height (m) =                2.100 
                   Opening Time (sec) =                    0 
                   Closing Time (sec) =                    3000 
 
==================================================================== 
Description of Ceiling/Floor Vents 
==================================================================== 
==================================================================== 
Ambient Conditions 
==================================================================== 
Interior Temp (C) =                                        20.0 
Exterior Temp (C) =                                        20.0 
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Relative Humidity (%) =                                    65 
 
==================================================================== 
Tenability Parameters 
==================================================================== 
Monitoring Height for Visibility and FED (m) =             2.00 
Occupant Activity Level =                                  Light 
Visibility calculations assume:                            reflective signs 
FED Start Time (sec)                                       0 
FED End Time (sec)                                         600 
 
==================================================================== 
Sprinkler / Detector Parameters 
==================================================================== 
Sprinkler installed in Room                                1 
         Sprinkler is off. 
         Response Time Index (m.s)^1/2 =                   110.0 
         Sprinkler C-Factor (m.s)^1/2 =                    1.0 
         Radial Distance (m) =                             2.1 
         Actuation Temperature (C) =                       68.0 
         Water Spray Density (mm/min) =                    0.0 
         Distance below ceiling (mm) =                     15 
         Ceiling Jet model used is NIST JET. 
 
==================================================================== 
Mechanical Ventilation (to/from outside) 
==================================================================== 
Mechanical Ventilation not installed in Room 1 
 
==================================================================== 
Description of the Fire 
==================================================================== 
Radiant Loss Fraction =                                    0.35 
Soot Alpha Coefficient =                                   2.50 
Smoke Epsilon Coefficient =                                1.20 
Smoke Emission Coefficient (1/m) =                         1.20 
Characteristic Mass Loss per Unit Area (kg/s.m2) =         0.011 
Air Entrainment in Plume uses McCaffrey (default) 
 
Burning Object No 1 
 
              Located in Room                              1 
              Energy Yield (kJ/g) =                        12.4 
              CO2 Yield (kg/kg fuel) =                     1.270 
              Soot Yield (kg/kg fuel) =                    0.015 
              HCN Yield (kg/kg fuel) =                     0.000 
              Fire Height (m) =                            0.000 
              Fire Location (m) =                          Centre 
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              Time (sec)               Heat Release (kW) 
               0                       0 
               179                     0 
               180                     2 
               185                     60 
               190                     139 
               195                     248 
               200                     395 
               205                     589 
               210                     845 
               215                     1179 
               220                     1612 
               225                     2170 
               230                     2884 
               235                     3797 
               240                     4957 
               245                     6427 
               250                     8284 
               255                     10000 
               1440                    10000 
 
==================================================================== 
Postflashover Inputs 
==================================================================== 
Postflashover model is OFF. 
 
==================================================================== 
Flame Spread Inputs 
==================================================================== 
 
 
 
 
